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Commission Report on the Operation of  the Own Resources System t.  Executive summary 
The object of  the present report is to review the performance of the EU own resources 
system,  including  the  search  for  new  own  resources  as  well  as  the  possibility  of 
applying  a  fixed  rate  of call  for  the  VAT  resource;  and  to examine  the  correction 
mechanism in  favour of the United Kingdom and  the issue of contributions to the EU 
budget raised by several Member States. 
The  EU  own  resources  system  has  evolved  considerably  over  time  and,  following 
modifications introduced by the  1988  and  1994 Own Resources Decisions, the equity 
among  Member  States  of  gross  contributions  to  the  EU  budget  has  improved 
substantially as they have become more aligned with their respective shares in EU GNP. 
This improvement has been primarily a result of the increasing importance of the GNP 
resource  in  total  budget  contributions.  The  current  system  has  also  provided  the 
resources necessary to finance EU expenditure.  However, the present system has shown 
shortcomings  in  at  least  two  respects.  By  relying  increasingly  on  transfers  from 
Member States treasuries,  the system has not  secured genuine financial  autonomy for 
the EU;  and various interventions in the contributions system, including the correction 
mechanism  in  favour  of the  United  Kingdom,  have  inhibited  transparency  in  the 
financial relationships of  the Member States and the EU budget. 
Reform of  the present EU financing system could take either oftwo forms.  It  could  be 
directed towards enlarging the fiscal  base and  developing new own resources for  the 
Union or it  could aim  towards a simplification of present contributions arrangements. 
In the former case, the report notes that several candidates for new own resources exist 
but only one would be realistically available in  the medium term.  This  is  a modified 
VAT  resource  which,  however,  would  not  be  entirely  consistent  with  the  equity 
criterion.  Under the  latter possibility,  the  present  syst~m of contributions  could  be 
replaced by a system where the VAT  resource or even the so called Traditional Own 
Resources  (TOR,  i.e.  essentially  customs  and  agricultural  duties)  are  replaced  by 
contributions based on GNP.  In this respect, Spain, supported by Greece and  Portugal, 
has proposed the introduction of an element of  progressivity into the system taking into 
greater account,  albeit  modified,  each  Member  State's GNP.  Although  prima  facie 
appealing, progressivity in contributions would not be consistent with the current acquis 
communautaire of practising solidarity through the expenditure side of the budget and 
promoting real convergence through investment. 
Despite conceptual and technical difficulties linked to the relevance and  measurement 
of  budgetary (or net) balances, the issue of budgetary imbalances has re-emerged in the 
budget debate.  Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden, have argued that their 
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budgetary  balances  ought  to  be  considered  as  excesstve  under  the  terms  of the 
F  ontai neb I  eau agreement. 
The report, as mandated by the 1994 Own Resources Decision, reviews the functioning 
of the  existing correction  mechanism in favour of the United Kingdom  and  of the 
budgetary imbalance of this Member State.  The report notes that circumstances at the 
background of the UK rebate have undergone significant  changes since the early and 
mid-1980s.  The UK imbalance is no longer unique since several other Member States 
record  similar  imbalances.  The  relative  prosperity  of the  United  Kingdom  after 
enlargement  will  be well  above the  average of the  Union.  While  the Fontainebleau 
mechanism was essentially  intended to  provide a correction  for  the  low  share of the 
United Kingdom in agricultural expenditure, it  currently confers it  an advantage for all 
expenditure.  Furthermore, if the  mechanism were to remain unchanged,  the United 
Kingdom would pay only one third of what it  would otherwise pay for the forthcoming 
enlargement.  Nevertheless, even after the rebate, the United Kingdom remains a larger 
net contributor than some Member States with higher capacity to pay. 
The budgetary imbalances of  Germany,  the Netherlands,  Austria am/ Sweden  have 
become large in recent years reflecting, predictably, the impact of several factors.  For 
the years to come, these imbalances, when measured in terms of GNP, are expected to 
change  somewhat,  under  the  influence  of the  forthcoming  enlargement  and  the 
prospective reforms of expenditure policies and this would be  more pronounced in the 
case of the Netherlands.  Regarding enlargement, there will  be an average deterioration 
in the budgetary balance ofthe present Member States of  around 0.15 per cent of GNP, 
which should not give rise to demands for compensation.  With regard to the reforms, it 
is  not  possible  to  estimate  precisely  their  impact  prior  to  the  completion  of the 
negotiations.  However,  it  is  likely that the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy 
will not affect significantly the budgetary balance of  the Member States in question with 
the exception of the Netherlands where there is likely to be an accounting rather than a 
substantive  effect.  The  impact  of the  reform  of Structural  policies  on  budgetary 
balances is  even more difficult to estimate but,  in  any case, the reduction in  Structural 
expenditure within the present 15 Member States will mean a reduction in contributions 
and  a  consequent  relative  improvement  in  the  budgetary  balances  of these  Member 
States even if Structural spending is concentrated in less prosperous regions. 
If  a political consensus on the need to address the issue of  these imbalances were to 
develop,  three courses of  action would be possible.  An option on the financing side of 
the budget would be to move towards an own resources system characterised by greater 
transparency, that is  absence of ad  hoc features,  and  equity, that is  the removal of the 
remaining elements of regressivity.  This would encompass the reduction or even the 
phasing out of  the present correction mechanism, whose rationale would be weakened if 
an  option on the expenditure side were to be adopted,  and/or the partial  or complete 
substitution of  the GNP resource for the other resources were to be implemented. 
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Another approach, consistent with the Fontainebleau conclusions, would be to introduce 
corrections  on  the expenditure side  of the budget.  The  report  discusses  an  option 
involving the partial (75  per cent) reimbursement of CAP expenditure on direct aids to 
"  farmers.  Without affecting  either the Community  nature of the  CAP  or the  overall 
assistance  to  farmers  - since  the  conditions  attached  to  direct  aids  payments  will 
continue to be  an  integral  part of the Common Agricultural  Policy and  would result 
from  EU  decisions  - the possibility exists to  share between the  EU  and  the  national 
treasuries  the  amount  of assistance  in  direct  aids.  This  option  would  benefit  those 
Member States where the share in financing is greater than the share in direct aids, but it 
would affect adversely those Member States where the opposite holds.  Such an option 
would  permit  a  reduction  of the  Agricultural  Guideline  and  possibly  of the  own 
resources ceiling. 
Finally, there is the option of a generalised co"ection mechanism.  A straightforward 
generalisation of the  present  mechanism  to all  Member States  recording  a  negative 
budgetary  balance  would  involve  a  huge  increase  in  the  redistribution  of resources 
between Member States.  However, it would be possible to modify some parameters of 
the present mechanism, for instance the threshold for compensation or the value of the 
compensation coefficient.  This would generate many outcomes,  some involving less, 
and others involving more, resources than the current UK rebate. 
The report concludes by confirming the view put forward in Agenda 2000, that neither 
the  need  for  an  increase  in  the  financial  resources  of the  Union,  nor  the  limited 
shortcomings of the financing  system provide grounds to modify the Own  Resources 
Decision at an early stage.  The options presented in the report are interchangeable, can 
be completed and can be spread over time.  However, none of  these options provides an 
ideal solution.  Technical and conceptual weaknesses can be found in all ofthem.  The 
shifts  in  the  burden  of financing  that  results  from  some  of these  options  present 
regressive elements that might need a redress in the context of  an overall solution. 
If  a consensus were to emerge on the need to address the issue of budgetary imbalances, 
it  would be necessary to choose between the options presented in the report or to agree 
on a combination of them which would respect their logic.  The timing of any change 
would  depend  on  whether a  modification of the Own  Resources Decision  would  be 
required,  and  enlargement  would  appear  to  present  a  change  of circumstances  so 
significant as to justify such a major structural reform. 
7-10-98 EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
Financing the European Union 
Commission Report on the Operation of the Own Resources System 
Introduction 
1.  The Performance of the Own  Resources System 
1.1.  The resource composition o'f the present system 
1.2.  An assessment of the present own resources system 
1.2.1.  Adequacy and equity 
1.2.2.  Financial autonomy, cost effectiveness, transparency and simplicity 
1.3.  Options for a new system of contributions 
1.3 .1.  Simplification of  the present system of  contributions 
1.3.2.  Criteria for new own resources 
1.3.3.  Possible future own resources 
1.3.4.  Progressivity in contributions 
2.  The Issue of Budgetary Imbalances 
2.1.  The UK budgetary imbalance 
2.2.  The budgetary imbalance of Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden 
2.3.  The impact of Agenda 2000 on the most important budgetary imbalances 
2.4.  Options for reform 
2.4.1.  Return to a more straightforward system 
2.4.2.  Correction on the expenditure side 
2.4.3.  A generalised correction mechanism 
3.  Final Comments 
Annexes 
1.  The evolution of  the EU financing system 
2.  Criteria and proposals for new own resources for the European Union 
3.  The concept and measurement of  the budgetary balance 
4.  The budgetary compensation for the United Kingdom 
5.  A partial reimbursement of  CAP direct aids 
6.  A generalised budgetary compensation mechanism 
7.  Progressivity in budget contributions 
8.  Statistical Annex 
2 
5 
5 
8 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
17 
20 
23 
26 
29 
30 
31 
33 
36 
7·10-98 
(. INTRODUCTION 
The current Own Resources Decision foresees  that the Commission will submit by 
the end of 1999 a  report on the operation of the own resources system as well as on 
the  correction  of the  budgetary  imbalance  granted  to  the United  Kingdom.  The 
Decision also requires that the Commission report on the feasibility of  creating a new 
own resource as well as on the arrangements for the possible introduction of a fixed 
uniform rate levied on the VAT base1• 
The  report  has  been  prepared  at  a  time  when  the  EU  is  expected  to  widen  its 
membership with the  forthcoming enlargement and is  in the process of considering 
significant  policy  reforms.  Although  difficult  to  quantify,  the  likely  effects  of 
enlargement and of  the proposed reforms are also an important part of  the report. 
The· first  part of the  report reviews  and assesses  the  performance of the  financing 
sy~tem of  the European Union.  A key argument developed in this part of  the report is 
that the current system has performed adequately both in terms of sufficiency and in 
terms  of equity  in  gross  contributions.  However,  judged  against  the  criteria  of 
financial  autonomy, ·cost effectiveness  and  transparency,  the  present system shows 
some shortcomings.  The introduction of a new own resource is often seen as a way 
of improving the performance of the system.  This part of the paper examines the 
case for and the difficulties in introducing a new own resource and of permanently 
fixing the rate of call of VAT.  In addition, it reviews the recent proposal of Spain, 
Greece and Portugal to introduce a significant element of progressivity into the own 
resources system. 
The  combination  of the  present  financing  arrangements  and  of the  expenditure 
decisions has resulted in budgetary imbalances which some Member States consider 
as too large.  The second part of the report examines issues related to the budgetary 
positions  of the  Member  States.  In  the  current  system,  the  sole  Member  State 
benefiting from a correction of its budgetary imbalance is the United Kingdom (also, 
Germany's  share  in  the  financing  of the  UK  rebate  is  reduced  by  one  third). 
Recently,  other  Member  States  have  argued  that  they  also  meet  the  conditions 
mentioned  in  the  Fontainebleau  agreement  as  justifying the  granting of budgetary 
relief.  This section ofthe report comments on the budgetary imbalances of  this group 
of  Member States and presents some options for addressing the perceived difficulties. 
1.  THE PERFORMANCE OF THE OWN RESOURCES SYSTEM 
The present  part  of the  report  extends  over  three  sections.  The  first  provides  a 
description of  the resource composition of the current system of  own resources while 
its  historical  development  is  briefly  summarised in  Annex  1.  The second section 
Article  10  of  the  Council  Decision  of  31  October  1994  on  the  system  of  the  European 
Communities'  own  resources  (94/728/EC,  Euratom),  Official  Journal  of  the  European 
Communities No. L 293/9, November 12,  1994. 
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provides an assessment of the present system according to  the criteria of adequacy, 
equity, financial autonomy, transparency/simplicity and cost effectiveness.  The third 
section  addresses  the  issue  of possible  new  own  resources  for  the  EU.  Several 
potential new resources are considered while a detailed review of  new own resources 
options is presented in Annex 2.  Given the unequal tax base each potential resource 
represents  in each of the  Member States,  this  section  also  alludes  to  the  possible 
conflict  between increasing  the  financial  autonomy  of the  EU  and  improving the 
equity of  the system 
1.1.  The resource composition of the present system 
The  most  recent  modification of the  system  of own  resources  was  agreed  in  the 
Edinburgh  meeting  of the  European  Council  in  December  1992.  This  political 
agreement was then transformed into a formal  decision in  October 19942  while the 
ratification by all  national parliaments was  finally  obtained in  the  spring of 1996. 
The present system of own resources  came into  force,  retroactively,  on January  1, 
1995. 
Table 1 
The composition of EU own resources 
(as percent of total, accrual basis; data for 1998 and 1999 are projections) 
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Traditional 
29.1  28.7  29.4  26.4  23.6  20.3  20.6  21.3  19.1  18.8  16.7  16.1  own resources 
VAT 11l  60.0  60.7  69.9  59.5  61.q  54.0  51.9  57.8  51.3  45.5  39.7  35.4 
GNP  10.9  10.6  0.7  14.1  14.5  25.7  27.5  20.9  29.6  35.7  43.6  48.4 
(1) Including the UK correction. 
The  changes  introduced on this  last occasion went  in  the  same  direction of those 
introduced in 1988 and have had significant implications for the composition of own 
resources.  Table 1 presents the share of each category of resources in the budget, 
and  graph  1 shows the absolute value of contributions by  resource, over the period 
1988-1999. 
A notable feature of  these data is, first, the trend decline in the relative contribution of 
the  so  called  ,.traditional  own  resources,.  (TOR,  customs  and  agricultural  duties) 
whose share has fallen from 29.1  per cent ofthe total in 1988 to  19.1 per cent in 1996 
and about 16 per cent in 1998-99.  The impact of trade liberalisation on tariff levels 
has meant that the total yield of this resource has failed to  increase in line with the 
expansion  of world  trade.  In  absolute  terms,  traditional  own  resources  have 
remained in the range of Ecu 12  to  14 billion thus giving the observed reduction in 
the share oftotal resources. 
Council Decision 94/728/EC, Euratom of October 31, 1994, footnote 1. 
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A second important development is represented by the decline in the share of VAT 
contributions from almost 70 per cent of total resources in  1990 to  51.3 per cent in 
1996 and about 35 per cent in 1999.  Correspondingly, the share of  the GNP resource 
has risen to 35.7 p~r cent in 1997 and is projected to be close to 50 per cent in 1999. 
The declining share of VAT revenues primarily reflects policy reforms introduced by 
the  1988  and  1994 Own Resources Decisions.  In  1988  it  had been agreed that the 
VAT base of the Member States should bf- limited to  55  per cent of their GNP.  In 
1994  it  was  decided to  lower this  limit to  50 per cent  from  1995  onwards  for  the 
Member States whose GNP per head was below 90 per cenf of the EU average (i. e. 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) and to  reduce progressively the capping of the 
VAT  bases of the other Member States from  54 per cent in  1995  to  50 per cent in 
1999.  Table 2 records the capping threshold and the Member States whose VAT 
base  has  been  capped  over  the  period  1988-1999  as  well  as  time  series  on  the 
maximum and the uniform call rate for VAT. 
In addition, in  1994 it was decided to  lower, from  1995  onwards, the maximum call 
rate for VAT from 1.4 per cent to  I per cent in 1999.  However, the rate determining 
actual  VAT  contributions  is  the  so  called  uniform  rate  which  is  lower  than  the 
maximum rate because of  the need to leave aside an amount for the notional financing 
of the UK correctionJ.  This rate has fluctuated between 1.20 and 1.28 per cent until 
1994, but has since declined in line with the maximum nite and is projected to drop to 
0.84 per cent in 1999 (see table 2). 
3  See Annex 4 for a discussion of these issues. 
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The role of the  GNP  resource,  introduced by the  1988  Decision, is  one of a buffer 
serving a residual function to equate revenue and aggregate budget expenditure.  As a 
consequence,  the  uniform  call  rate  for  GNP  varies  according to  annual  budgetary 
requirements;  in 1995, for example, it was 0.339 per cent ; ill 1997, it was 0.403 per 
cent;  in the 1999 budget, it is estimated to be 0.534 per cent4• 
The budgetary balance from the previous year can affect resource availability in the 
current  year  and,  correspondingly,  the  need  to  draw  on  the  GNP  resource.  For 
example, the budget surplus of 1989 reduced GNP financing in  1990 to a minimum; 
in  contrast,  the slow growth in  VAT revenues during the recession years of 1992-
1994  made it  necessary to  increase residual  GNP  financing.  In general,  however, 
with the progressive decline in the share of revenues from traditional own resources 
as  well as  from  VAT, the GNP resource is  taking on an increasingly significant role 
in the financing ofthe EU budget. 
Table 2 
Capping threshold, Member States whose VAT base is capped, 
the maximum VAT call rate and the uniform VAT call rate 
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  !  19981"  j  1999111 
:  Capping threshpld  55%  55%  55%  55%  55%  55%  55%  j 
Greece, Ireland,  50%  50%  50%  :::,;:::.  50%  50% 
Portugal, Spain 
Other Member  54%  53%  52%  51%  50% 
States 
--~~:~~~~~~~~~~~---- ----~~--l::~.-~--r;~~~--r;~-~~-~~-r-~~-~--~-r---~-----r-~:~·:t;~:-~:t~-~~-~~l~~-~~~~t~~~~J:i~~ 
is capped  IRL, L ! p UK.  ! P. UK  !  P  !  ·  !  !  '  !  P  !  P  !  P  ! P, UK  ! P UK, 
-M~;~~~r~;:·Ar-~~ii-- ---;-~~---r-~~~-~--~--~---~~--t--;-.~~--~---;~~~---t···;:~;---~---;~~-~--~--~-~;;··t--~---~~--~---;-_~-~--~---;~~~---t---;:~~-
----------------------------- -----------t----------+----------~-----------i-----------t-----------t----------+----------+----------i-----------i-----------~---------
Unifo~~t~~T call  1.27  ~  1.28  j  1.21  j  1.20  j  1.26  j  1.25  j  1.28  j  1.25  j  1.12  j  1.05  j  0.99  J  0.84 
(1)  Projections;  (2)  the difference  between  the  "maximum VAT call  rate"  and  the "uniform rate" depends on  the 
size of the UK correction. 
In  addition  to  the  resources  mentioned  in the  previous  paragraphs,  the  EU  budget 
receives  other  revenues,  which  are  not  considered  own  resources,  resulting  from 
specific Community provisions.  These revenues consist of fines,  revenues accruing 
from  the  administrative  operations  of the  Community  institutions,  contributions 
related to  activities in the European Economic Area, interest on late payments, taxes 
on the salaries of  employees of  the European Institutions, income from borrowing .and 
lending  operations  and  other  miscellaneous  revenues.  In  1997,  such  revenues 
amounted to  Ecu 612 million or 0. 74 per cent of  all resources available to the budget. 
The  1995  and  1997  data  refer  to  the  Supplementary  Amending  Budget  1/95  and  1/97, 
respectively:  the  1999  estimate  is  from  the  Preliminary  Draft  Budget 1999:  the  figures  are 
rounded  to  three  decimals  while  the  actual  budgetary  calculations  are  performed  using  15 
decimals. 
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1.2. An assessment of the present own resources system 
The key criteria according to which the performance of the system can be evaluated 
are: 
•  Resource adequacy, i.e. the resource must have a significant yield relative to the 
size of  the EU budget; 
•  equity  in  gross  contributions,  i.e.  the  burden  should  be  fairly  shared  among 
Member States; 
•  financial autonomy i.e. the resource should increase the independence of the EU 
budget from national treasuries; 
•  transparency and simplicit_v,  i.e.  the  determination of the  tax  should be  easily 
understood by  citizen; and 
+  cost  effectiveness,  i.e.  the  collection  and  administration  costs  of the  resource 
should be low relative to its yield. 
To anticipate the conclusions of this  section, the present own resources system has 
performed  satisfactorily  when  judged  against  the  first  two  criteria,  but  some 
shortcomings are encountered with regard to the last three. 
1.2.1.  Adequacy and equity 
The present own resources system has performed well against the criteria of  adequacy 
of  resources and equity in gross contributions. 
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Adequacy 
The present own resources arrangements have generated sufficient revenue to finance 
expenditure plans.  The decline of the traditional and VAT resources has been made 
up by the GNP resource.  The previous own resources ceiling of 1.20 per cent of  GNP 
proved  barely  adequate  and  difficulties  were  experienced,  part~cularly during  the 
recession of 1993.  The recovery of 1994 and the accession of three new Member 
States  in  1995  eased  somewhat  the  constraints.  More  recently,  however,  the 
progressive increase in the own resources ceiling agreed in Edinburgh has gone hand 
in  hand  with  greater restraint  in  spending  decisions.  As  a  result,  a  margin  has 
appeared under both the Financial Perspective and the own resources ceiling which is 
expected to increase further in 1999 (see graph 2). 
Equity 
The equity of  gross contributions of  the Member States has improved, largely because 
of the progressive replacement of the VAT resource with the GNP resource.  In this 
context, equity is interpreted to mean proportionality of gross contributions to income 
across the Member States5. 
·Graph 3 
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As  a result of the  1988  Own Resources Decision, which opted  for  introducing the 
GNP resource rather than meeting financial needs through increasing the VAT call 
rate, and of  the confirmation of this choice in 1994, Member States' contributions are 
now  becoming  more  closely  correlated  with  national  GNPs6.  As  the  ability  to 
contribute  to  the  EU  budget can best be measured  by  a nation's national  income 
6 
The issue of progressivity in the EU financing system is discussed in section 1.3.2 and in 1.3.4. 
It  is  generally considered  that the  contributions on  the  VAT  resource  are  regressive  since they 
represent a higher proportion of GNP in poor rather than in rich Member States. 
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converted  at  current  exchange  rates  into  a  common  currency,  the  increasing 
importance  of the  GNP  resource  translates  into  improved  equity  in  gross  budget 
contributions. 
Graph 3 presents data for shares in VAT and GNP financing, which is the part of the 
contributions that can be seen as coming directly from the Member States' treasuries, 
and shares in EU-15 GNP in 1997 for all Member States ranked in descending order, 
starting  with  Germany.  The  data  confirm  that  contributions  mirror  closely  GNP 
shares with the particular exception of Italy, and of the UK where the rebate has led 
to contributions that are considerably lower than the GNP share.  Each year, however, 
the relationship between VAT and GNP contributions and GNP shares is  influenced 
by several factors. 
B 
3.1 
3.9 
Table 3a 
Member States' shares in EU financing and in EU-15 GNP 
(in percent of total, data for 1997, including the UK correction) 
Share in EU GNP 
Share in the financing of the EU budget 
of which : Traditional Own Resources 
UK 
16.1 
11.9 
-~J~ELiir~_5]~3~~]~!  .. ~] 7~~1~tiiii£J_!-~i~]~:~~]-~1.-~ 
of which: VAT and GNP contributions 
3.1  96 
First, because all Member States pay an identical percentage of  their VAT base and/or 
GNP,  differences  in  the  rates  of growth of the  VAT  harmonised base  (influenced 
largely by the growth of private consumption) and in that of GNP imply changes in 
relative shares  and  corresponding changes in  relative  contributions.  Secondly,  the 
corrections of the VAT and GNP contributions made once the outturn is  known (i.e. 
in the year following that in which the contributions are paid) usually tend to  amplify 
movements  in  contributions  resulting  from  growth  in  the  economy  (when  good 
economic growth is  sustained for a number of years, the initial forecasts  tend to  be 
underestimated  and  therefore  result  in  large  supplementary  payments  when  the 
correction is made and vice versa in  the case of a downturn).  As a result, trends in 
national contributions tend to  show a cyclical pattern that  is  more pronounced than 
the economic cycle which influences its bases. 
The  inclusion of traditional  own  resources  modifies  somewhat the  pattern of total 
contributions (see table 3a for the percentage shares and table 3b for absolute values). 
The  share  of Belgium,  Ireland,  the  Netherlands  and  the  UK in  TOR  is  markedly 
higher than their shares in GNP, a reflection of substantial port facilities that serve as 
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gateways of entry of foreign goods into the EU;  studies suggest that this effect may 
be  substantial.  Its  existence underscores  one of the  many difficulties involved in 
interpreting a simple difference between budget contributions and budget expenditure 
as a measure of  the benefits a Member State enjoys from membership in the EU. 
B 
Table 3b 
Difference between actual VAT contributions, TOR collection and 
theoretical GNP contributions 
(Ecu million, data for 1997, excluding the UK correction) 
Difference between VAT contributions and theoretical GNP ones 
(a minus sign means that the VAT contributions are lower than those to be paid urder a system based only on GNP) 
299 
UK 
1 521 
Additional advances towards improving equity in contributions will take place over 
the next years as the share of TOR and VAT in own resources will decline further. 
However, perfect equity cannot be expected since the VAT resource will continue tc 
yield revenues which will not be correlated with national income and will continue to 
introduce an element,  albei~ small, ofregressivity into the system.  In addition, equity 
in gross contributions is hindered by the presence ofthe UK rebate mechanism, which 
reduces their  correlation with the ability to pay. 
1.2.2.  Financial autonomy, cost effectiveness, transparency and simplicity 
In  certain  respects,  the  present  system  shows  shortcomings  in  terms  of financial 
autonomy, cost effectiveness and transparency.  To  a large extent, this is  due to  the 
fact  that there are  inevitable trade-offs between financial  autonomy, equity and cost 
effectiveness.  The dominant part of EU resources derives from national contributions 
from the treasuries of the Member States;  this reduces the financial autonomy ·of the 
EU,  but offers a good degree of equity and of cost effectiveness.  Traditional own 
resources  contribute to  financial  autonomy,  but their  equity  is  contested  and  their 
collection and control are very cumbersome. 
Financial autonomy 
Traditional own resources represent current.Jy the only true own resource of the EU. 
However,  the  importance  of TORs  in  financing  EU  expenditure  is  diminishing 
markedly.  Moreover,  although customs duties and related revenues resulting from 
the EU's commercial policy formally  belong to  the EU, Member States that collect 
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these duties tend to  regard them  as  national contributions.  This is  not appropriate 
and it reduces further the significance of  budgetary balances7• 
The lack of financial autonomy resulting from the low share of real own resources in 
the financing of the budget is considered responsible for various shortcomings of the 
present system. 
•  First, it has made the EU increasingly dependent on intergovernmental transfers; 
such  dependence  has  already  contributed  to  conflicts  and  has  encouraged 
Member States to  seek to  maximise ill-defined concepts of the national benefit 
from the EU budget; 
•  second, the system whereby all financing needs not covered by TOR or the VAT 
resource are covered by the GNP resource is  very cost effective, but it results in 
changes in EU expenditure at the margin being reflected in changes in national 
spending.  This  entangles  EU  financing  issues  with  domestic  financial  and 
budgetary  policies  at  the  expense  of revealing  to  the  citizens  the  EU-wide 
priorities at stake; and 
•  third,  democratic  accountability  is  obscured  because  of  lack  of  a  direct 
relationship between citizens and taxes paid to the EU budget. 
Cost effectiveness 
The collection of traditional own  resources is  very cumbersome and the  attitude of 
Member States towards these resources is  ambiguous.  Customs legislation is  very 
elaborate with over eleven thousand tariff positions and a Community customs code 
of about 400 articles8•  However, international trade is a much more complex reality 
with new products and new trade flows appearing every day.  Under these conditions, 
there is scope  for fraud, irregularities and litigation. 
In  the  present  institutional  system,  Member  States  are  responsible  for  collecting 
traditional own resources and putting them at the disposal of the Commission.  The 
latter has the responsibility to control the way Member States perform this task.  To 
this  end  a  complicated  machinery  has  been  set  up  which  amounts  to  a  form  of 
multilateral surveillance of the  way in  which Member States carry out their duties. 
Any  loss  in  the  collection  of TOR  in  a  Member  State  must  be  made  up  by  a 
corresponding increase in the GNP resource called.  As a result, ihe negligence of a 
Member State has  financial  consequences  for  all  the  others.  For this  reason,  the 
results of the control activities of the Commission are made available to all Member 
States9 and all important decisions on the non recovery or remission of  customs duties 
as  well  as  on the write-off of amounts  impossible to  collect are taken with some 
involvement of  all Member States. 
7 
8 
9 
For a discussion of the concept and measurement of budgetary balances see Annex 3. 
There  are,  in  addition,  over  900  articles  of  the  Regulation  laying  down  the  provisions  for  its 
implementation. 
This provision also applies to the controls on the VAT and GNP resources. 
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These provisions result in a substantial amount of administrative work which, as the 
reports  of the  Court  of Auditors  show  year  after year,  always  falls  short of what 
would be  desirable  for  a better protection of the  financial  interests of the EU.  In 
addition, the complexity of the procedures for  the recovery of amounts put at risk by 
fraud  or  irregularities  appears  to  discourage  most  national  administrations,  which 
often appear unable or unwilling to recover what is due. 
Under these  conditions,  Member States  appear  to  prefer to  finance  the EU budget 
through GNP instead of through a more effective collection of TOR even if this must 
have  implications for  the  distribution of the  financial  burden.  In  effect,  they  are 
neither inclined,  for  understandable reasons, to  tighten the regulatory framework of 
the customs system nor do  they appear willing to  commit the necessary resources to 
the collection of customs duties. 
Transparency and simplicity 
With four Member States having their VAT base capped in  1998 (as, probably, will 
be the case for  all the future new Member States), the VAT resource is becoming in 
effect a GNP resource.  In its  1998 report on the functioning of the VAT and GNP 
resources,  the  Court of Auditors  points  out  that  the  VAT  resource,  despite  being 
formally  a  tax  on consumption,  ha:s  taken the  character of a financial  contribution 
from  Member States to the EU budget with its determination depending to a certain 
extent on statistical calculations (especially for the estimation of the weighted average 
rate). 
The presence of the UK rebate contributes to obscuring the exact nature of the system 
and its consequences.  Not only, as  already indicated previously, does it reduce the 
correlation  between  gross  contributions  and  ability  to  pay,  but its  calculation and 
financing  arrangements  are  so  complex  as  to  impair  the  transparency  of this 
mechanism. 
1.3.  Options for a new system of contributions 
Modifications  of the  present  system of contributions  could  either make  it  simpler 
through a  reduction in  the  number of sources of financing  or could introduce new 
own resources in  addition to  the existing ones or as  a replacement of some of them. 
The arguments in favour of a simplification of  the present system of contributions are 
essentially based on the shortcomings of  the present own resources system in terms of 
financial  autonomy,  cost  effectiveness  and  transparency  discussed  earlier.  The 
introduction  of new  own  resources  is  sought  as  a  way  of improving  financial 
autonomy. 
New fiscal  own resources would clearly reduce the share of the EU budget financed 
through national contributions and would ease the  tensions arising from  attempts to 
measure  net  contributions.  Should  the  budget  be  fully  financed  through  own 
resources, the link between changes in EU expenditure and corresponding changes in 
national  expenditure  would  also  be  broken.  As  well,  if the  EU  budget  were  to 
become entirely financed through "real" own resources whose rates of call were to be 
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decided  every  year,  the  budgetary  authority  would  have  full  control  of  the 
expenditure and of the revenue side of the budget.  Finally, proponents of new own 
resources expect them to enhance political  acco~ntability, transparency and visibility 
to  citizens.  However, because the distribution of the tax bases  for  fiscal  resources 
are not equal across the Member States, introducing a new own resource and, thus, 
enhancing  financial  autonomy,  could  be  in  conflict  with  enhancing  equity  in 
contributions. 
1.3.1.  Simplification of  the present system of  contributions 
The yield from TOR is low and will decline further while their administration is very 
cumbersome.  The frustration felt with TOR is such that proposals have been made to 
return them to the Member States.  While admitting that TOR should theoretically be 
attributed to  the central level, it  is  sometimes considered that their relative share in 
the  total  financing of the  EU is  so  low that returning them  to  the  Member States 
would yield practical advantages compensating for the implicit sub-optimality of  such 
attribution.  The distributional  problems  that  are  likely  to  appear could  be  partly 
reduced through measures  aimed  at  en·couraging the  use of the  transit  facility  that 
allows the  payment of customs duties where the goods are  finally consumed.  It is 
clear that even if customs duties ceased to be own resources of the EU budget, they 
would continue to  represent an important instrument of the Union's trade policy and 
their effective collection would require some form of control by the Commission on 
behalf  of  the Member States. 
The  present  VAT-based  own  resource  has  drawbacks  with  respect  to  equity  in 
contributions, financial  autonomy and transparency.  As  the  Court of Auditors has 
recently underlined again,  it is  hardly an own resource given the way in  which  its 
base is calculated and the existence of  rules which, for some Member States, make it 
effectively a GNP based resource.  In addition, its uniform rate of call varies every 
year according to  the size of the UK rebate.  This is due to  a provision that calls for 
the UK rebate to  be notionally financed through VAT and therefore reduces further, 
by a variable amount, the maximum rate of  call. 
If on the occasion of a future modification of the Own Resources Decision the VAT-
based resource were maintained, it would at least appear necessary to call it at a fixed 
rate.  This could be achieved through putting an end to the presumption of financing 
the  UK rebate  on  the  VAT resources  accompanied by a corresponding permanent 
lowering of  the maximum rate of  call10• 
Own resources almost always entail significant collection and control costs and  are 
therefore less cost effective than straightforward national contributions.  In addition, 
no own resource can be more equitable - in the sense of being linked to the ability to 
pay - than a contribution based on GNP which constitutes the best available proxy of 
such ability to pay.  Indeed, some proposals for new own resources include parallel 
10  On  average,  over  recent  years  this  provision  has  lowered  the  rate  of call  of  VAT  by  0.12 
percentage points- see Annex 4. 
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corrections  in  the  form  of an  equalisation  mechanism  intended  to  align  gross 
contributions to GNP shares. 
A  further  consideration  in  this  context  IS  that  taxes  influence  the  allocation  of 
resources and there is  some merit in having a system of national contributions and 
leaving it to the Member States to decide on the best way to raise the corresponding 
financial  resources.  These  considerations  have  prompted  proposals  for  the 
replacement of the present system of own resources with a system based solely on 
GNP contributions, which would provide no financial autonomy whatsoever, but that 
would be equitable, transparent and cost effective. 
Whatever the future of such a proposal, it must be underlined that the present GNP-
based contributions suffer from  the  unwillingness of Member States to  use the best 
available data for the reference aggregate.  Estimating the total value of the national 
income of  a country is a difficult task.  In particular, the methods used must evolve in 
line with the transformations of the  ~conomies to take into account the changes in the 
goods  and  services  produced  and  delivered.  To  this  end,  the  national  statistical 
offices of the European Union have recently developed a new common methodology 
to estimate GNPII and new decisions are taken periodically to update and refine it (a 
recent important one was taken at the end of 1997 and concerned the imputation of 
financial  services  indirectly ·measured).  However,  Member States have  sought  to 
delay  the  use  of these  new  measures  in  the  EU budget12  thus  leading  to  the  co-
existence of two statistical series for GNP:  one, of better quality, for general use and 
another, less reliqble, used for the assessment of the GNP contributions.  If GNP will 
continue  to  play  a  role  in  the  system  of own  resources,  this  situation  must  be 
corrected with any  GNP  contributions based on the  most recent  and  most reliable 
definitions. 
1.3.i  Criteria for new own resources 
A set of criteria, some of which derive from economic rules regarding the assignment 
of policy instruments to  different levels of jurisdiction (Member State or EU) while 
others  are  more specific  to  the  EU,  can be used to  select  candidates  for  new  own 
resources  13•  Economic  theory  predicts  that  tax  instruments  belong optimally  to  a 
II 
12 
13 
European System of Accounts (ESA) 1995, Council Regulation 2223/96 of June 25,  1996, Official 
Journal of the European Communities L31 0, November 30,  1996. 
The  use of the figures  resulting from the new system of national accounts will have to  wait until 
the  adoption  of a new  Own  Resources  Decision  while  those  taking  into  account the  indirectly 
measured financial services will need an ad hoc decision by the Council. 
For  a  review  of these  issues  see  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  (1993):  "Stable 
Money  - Sound  Finances  Community  Public  Finance  in  the  Perspe;ctive  of  EMU",  European 
Economy no. 53,  especially ch.  7;  see also Annex 2. These criteria obviously do  not apply in the 
case of a tax introduced throughout the EU  as  instrument for the implementation of a Community 
policy.  In  this  case,  the  rationale for the  introduction of the  tax would  derive from  the  specific 
policy in question and the  attribution of its yield to  the EU  budget would only have to respect the 
criterion of cost effectiveness. 
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higher level of authority when there are cross-border externalities and/or when it  is 
difficult to attribute specific revenues to specific Member States. 
In the case of the EU,  additional specific criteria are appropriate.  A very important 
one is  that contributions ought to  respect horizontal equity so that among Member 
States of equal  ability  to  contribute  all  do  indeed  contribute  an  identical  amount. 
However, given that the level of  real income is not equal among the Member States, it 
is  sometimes  felt  desirable  that  vertical  equity  be  satisfied  as  well,  so  that 
contributions  to  the  EU  budget  are  a  function  of the  Member States'  differential 
ability to pay.  Recently Spain, supported by Greece and Portugal, has proposed the 
introduction of a significant element ofprogressivity into the contributions to the EU 
budget. 
It is also necessary that new own resources be consistent with other EU policies so as 
not to offset their effects.  Their visibility for the EU citizens is also desirable while, 
on a more technical level, their base must present a sufficient degree of  harmonisation 
and their collection should be possible without too high administrative costs.  Finally, 
their yield must be high enough to finance a substantial amount of  EU spending. 
1.3.3.  Possible future own resources 
The search for new own resources has so far proved elusive:  This has been partly due 
to  the  generally  good  performance  of the  present  system,  which  has  blunted 
incentives  for  finding  new  resources,  but principally to  the  difficulties involved in 
establishing new own resources and also to differing political priorities.  Since 1992, 
however, interest in establishing new own resources has  incr~<tsed, in part reflecting 
institutional  initiatives  and  in  part  related  to  emerging  new  possibilities14•  The 
publication of  a report by the European Parliament on new own resources, advocating 
a modulated VAT  -based system  15, is important in this context. 
A  modified  VAT resource  offers  the  potential  of becoming  an  important  own 
resource in the future.  Such a tax would be highly visible to taxpayers and would be 
consistent  with  the  establishment of EU-wide  minimum  tax  rules  and  would  also 
generate sufficient revenues  for  the budget.  However, ·VAT  is  levied· on a national 
tax base and it is difficult to see its revenues as belonging to the EU, and also it may 
entail considerable administration costs. 
A European Parliament (1994) report 16  advocated  a new own resource based on a 
common VAT call rate across the Member States, differentiated across commodities 
according to  two rates, a lower one and  a higher one, of say  1.5  per cent and 3 per 
cent.  The tax would be levied on a harmonised base through declarations explicitly 
recording that it  is  an  EU  tax.  Total VAT revenues would be divided between the 
14 
15 
16 
Annex 2 reviews in detail eight specific proposals for new own resources. 
See  European  Parliament  (1994):  "Draft Report on  a New System  of Own Resources  for the 
European Union", Rapporteur Horst Langes, Committee of Budgets, A3-0000/94. 
See European Parliament (1994):  op. cit., footnote 15. 
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national budget and the EU, and national parliaments would detennine the part for 
domestic budgetary purposes while the EU budgetary authority would detennine the 
part to be attributed to the Community budget. 
The proposal could be implemented.  It would clearly involve a number of technical 
problems, but these could be overcome if there was the political will to  proceed in 
this direction.  It is questionable, however, if such a system should be accompanied, 
as in the European Parliament proposal, by an equalisation mechanism ensuring that 
national  contributions would be proportional to  each  Member State's share in the 
GNP of the Union17.  If the idea is to tax the consumption of individuals, then the 
concept of  national contributions should not enter into the equation. 
Other possible own resources - a form of withholding tax, a C02/ energy tax, excise 
taxes, seigniorage, corporate and personal inco~e taxes, new communication taxes -
are discussed in the Annex "Review of  possible new own resources for the European 
Union" (Annex 2).  At this stage, it is important to note that, despite proposals made 
for new own resources, there is little consensus about which one(s) would be the most 
appropriate.  This  is  a  reflection  of differences  of views  regarding  the  future 
orientation of  European integration. 
1.3.4.  Progressivity in contributions 
A proposal to introduce progressivity in the system of own resources has been made 
by Spain.  The proposal, which is supported by Greece and Portugal, is founded on 
the P •  .:>tocol  on Economic and Social Cohesion, in particular, on the declaration of 
intent of the  high contracting parties to  take  "greater account of the  contribu~ive 
capacity  of individual  Member  States  in  the  system  of own  resources,  and  of 
examining means of correcting, for the less prosperous Member States,  regressive 
elements existing in  the present own resources system".  It should be stressed at this 
stage that, during the 1992 discussions of  the 1993-1999 Financial Perspective, equity 
was  understood  to  mean  proportionality  with  GNP  and,  as  noted  in  section  1.2, 
measures  have  already been taken  to  address  the  regressive  elements of the  own 
resources  system.  The  proposal  recognises  that  improvements,  related  to  the 
increasing importance of the  GNP  resource, have been made but it  also  underlines 
that  progressivity  in  contributions  continues to  be  absent  from  the  own resources 
system. 
Greater progressivity in contributions could be achieved, according to  the proposal, 
by adjusting the base of the GNP resource through the use of coefficients reflecting 
each Member State's relative prosperity.  The adjustment can be complete (applying 
to the GNP resource) or partial (applying to only part of the GNP resource), and in 
the  latter case progressivity would  also  be partial.  Member States  could  also  be 
grouped into classes of relative prosperity (for example, Member States with income 
per capita less than 90 per cent of  the EU average, those between 90 per cent and 100 
17  See Annex 2 for a more detailed discussion of this proposal. 
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per  cent,  etc)  with  specific  adjustment  coefficients  assigned  to  each  class. 
Contributions  to  the  EU  budget  would  then  be  determined  according  to  the  new 
bases.  The new resource could ultimately, it is argued, replace the VAT resource. 
Table 4 
Modifications of total national contributions relative to the present system 
Progressivity proposal applied to the GNP resource 
(adaptation of the GNP base using the ECU index of GNP per head; 
the percentages indicate changes relative to present total contributions) 
1996  1997 
Ecu million  %  Ecu million  % 
B  75.9  2.7  70.0  2.3 
OK  134.9  9.6  178.6  11.6 
0  1105.6  5.2  1043.4  4.8 
GR  -155.4  -13.8  -204.1  -17.1 
E  -551.1  -11.9  -803.9  -14.8 
F  311.0  2.5  259.1  1.9 
IRL  -45.4  -6.5  -45.4  -6.4 
I  -404.0  -4.4  -466.4  -5.3 
L  38.2  23.5  47.9  27.7 
NL  55.3  1.2  44.5  0.9 
A  102.3  5.4  102.0  4.8 
p  -152.2  -17.6  -199.3  -18.2 
FIN<1>  -6.7  -0.7  1.3  0.1 
s  67.9  3.4  71.1  3.0 
UK<1>  -576.2  -6.8  -98.9  -1.1 
Total  0.0  0.0 
1)  The technicalities of the proposal result in these countries marginally benefiting from the operation of the 
progressivity mechanism even if their index of GNP per head is slightly above 100 (see Annex 7) 
It should be noted at the outset that the proposal does not entail the introduction of a 
new own resource as such but it provides for a significant modification of an existing 
resource  (GNP).  A  simulation  of the  impact  of the  proposal  on  the  budget 
contributions in 1996 and 1997 is presented in table 4. 
The proposal is prima facie appealing since progressivity is  found in virtually all the 
Member  States'  national  tax  systems.  However,  the  proposal  has  an  important 
drawback in that it does not acknowledge the nature of solidarity and its practice in 
the  Community.  There  are  two  main  reasons  for  the  current  EU  choice  of 
implementing solidarity ttrrough the expenditure side of the budget18• 
18  The arguments are developed in greater detail in Annex 7. 
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•!•  First,  solidarity in  the EU  is  mainly expressed  in  the form  of improving real 
convergence by directing funds mainly to eligible regions in any Member State 
rather than to a Member State as a whole. 
•!•  Second, achieving real convergence has a higher probability under expenditure-
based progressivity than under progressivity in contributions.  The reason for 
this is that progressivity in contributions, by lowering the financing shares of 
the less prosperous Member States, would leave it up to them to use the funds 
as they see appropriate.  It is  plausible to  expect that, in  this case, investment 
activity  would  not  be  strengthened  as  much  as,  under  expenditure-based 
progressivity. 
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2.  THE ISSUE OF BUDGETARY IMBALANCES 
Budgetary balances  (also  called  net  balances),  measured  by the  simple difference 
between contributions to  and receipts from  the  E.U  budget,  represent only a narrow 
view of, and fail to  fully  account for,  the benefits accruing to  Member States from 
participating in the EUI9. 
Recorded budgetary flows  fail  to  account for  positive externalities arising from  EU 
policies.  For example, CAP,  structural operations and  external expenditure benefit 
not only the immediate recipients but also give rise to spill-over effects transcending 
national borderszo.  It is clear that their consideration would modify the assessment of 
the  accounting imbalances even  if it  is  not possible to  quantify the  importance of 
these spill-overs  . 
. Graph 4a 
6 
5 
4 
0 
Total allocated expenditure, VAT and GNP contributions (before 
UK correction) and total· payments to the EU budget 
(percent of GNP; average 1995-1997; the data for "allocated expenditure" 
·  include administrative expenditure) 
l VAT and GNP contributions 
l  IRL  GR  P  E  B  OK  FIN  F  NL  A  UK  S  D 
There  are  also  difficulties  associated  with  the  identification  of  the  ultimate 
beneficiaries of EU expenditure policies;  for instance, CAP export restitutions do not 
necessarily benefit the residents of the country where they are paid.  In addition, EU 
budget expenditure is heterogeneous and comparisons of total amounts received have 
often limited meaning in appreciating the "benefit" resulting from such payments:  a 
given  amount  spent  in  purchasing  goods  and  services  does  not  bring  the  same 
advantages of the  transfer of a  grant of an  equivalent amount.  Similar problems 
19 
20 
See Annex 3 for a discussion. 
These spill-over effects include the spending of income generated in the receiving Member State 
on  goods  produced  in  another  Member State,  the  purchase  of  financial  asset  denominated  in 
various Member States currencies etc. 
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appear on  the revenue side:  the  country where  customs duties  are  collected is  not 
necessarily  the  one  of residence  of the  economic  agents  ultimately  bearing  their 
burden. 
The definition of budgetary balances is also fraught with significant conceptual and 
accounting  problems.  To  compute  budgetary  balances  it  is  necessary  to  make 
numerous choices on the items to be included in the receipts and expenditure flows as 
well as on the reference periods (e.g. cash vs. accrual figures, surpluses from previous 
years,  etc.).  Depending  on the  choices made,  it  is  possible  to  obtam numerous, 
equally  valid,  definitions  of  budgetary  balances  which  sometimes  produce 
significantly different results2I. 
Graph 4b 
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EU  expenditure (excluding administration), VAT and GNP contribution 
(before UK correction) and total payments to the EU budget 
(percent of GNP; average 1995-1997) 
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Nevertheless,  the  size  of some  of these  imbalances  has  been  at  the  centte  of 
discussions for many years22.  In response, a compromise was struck in 1984 at the 
21 
22 
See Annex 3 and Commission of the  European Communities (1997):  "Budget Contributions, EU 
Expenditure, Budgetary Balances and Relative Prosperity of the Member States", paper presented 
by President Santer to the Ecofin Council, October 13.  The two definitions used in this report are 
the  UK rebate definition  (concept used  in  the  calculation  of the  UK  rebate) and  the  operational 
definition  (difference  between  all  moneys  paid  to  and  all  moneys  received  from  the  budget 
excluding administrative expenditure and expenditure related to other Ell institutions). 
The largest imbalances, although substantial in absolute terms,  measured as a percentage of the 
GNP,  are  much smaller than the  regional budgetary positions existing within  Member States.  A 
recent  study conducted  under contract for DG  XIX  indicates that,  using  a definition of regional 
budgetary  positions  comparable  to  that commonly  used  in  the  relationships  between  Member 
States and the EU  budget, the average negative budgetary position of a region of northern Italy is 
equal  to  almost 4 per cent of its GOP,  while  the  average  positive  balance of a southern  Italian 
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Fontainebleau meeting of the European Council.  According to  the  conclusions of 
that meeting, 
"Expenditure policy is  ultimately the  essential means of resolving  the  question  of 
budgetary imbalances. 
However,  it  has  been  decided  that  any  Member  State  sustaining  a  budgetary 
burden which  is  excessive in  relation  to  its relative prosperity may benefit from a 
correction at the appropriate time." 23 
The reference to expenditure policy as the means of correcting budgetary imbalances 
reflects the prominent role that expenditure decisions have in their determination (see 
graphs 4a and  4b ).  Correcting budgetary imbalances through ad  hoc mechanisms 
essentially amounts to a refusal to act directly on the sources of  the imbalances. 
Graph 5 
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In the  present part  of the  report,  the  first  section reviews  the  performance of the 
correction  mechanism  in  favour  of the  United  Kingdom .  set  up  following  these 
decisions.  In March 1998,  four Member States, namely Germany, the Netherlands, 
Austria and Sweden have stated their belief that their negative balances are to be seen 
as  excessive  in  relation  to  their  prosperity  under  the  terms  of the  Fontainebleau 
agreement.  The  second  section  of the  report  examines  the  development  of the 
balances of  these Member States. 
23 
region is equal to  around 7 per cent;  see G. Pola (1998): '"The Regional Incidence of a Central 
Budget- The Italian Case". 
See  Fontainebleau  European  Council,  Conclusions of the Presidency,  Bulletin of the European 
Communities 6-1984. 
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The third  section provides  some  indications  of the  possible effects of the  Agenda 
2000  reforms  on  the  budgetary  imbalances  of the  five  countries  examined  in  the 
previous two sections.  Finally, the fourth section reviews some of the main options 
available  in  relation  to  the  issue  of budgetary  imbalances:  phasing  out  of the 
correction mechanism for the United Kingdom, corrections on the expenditure side of 
the  budget  and  application  of  a  correction  mechanism  to  all  Member  States 
experiencing large imbalances. 
2.1. The UK budgetary imbalance74 
The budgetary imbalance of the United Kingdom was at the centre of the political 
debate  for  about a decade (1974-1984)  provoking  frequently  stalemates  in  the  EU 
decision-making  process.  The  question  was  finally  settled  at  the  Fontainebleau 
European Council of 1984 and the resulting rebate mechanism constitutes an integral 
part of  the Own Resources Decisions taken subsequently.  The rebate was reviewed in 
1988 and 1992 and on both occasions the European Council decided that it should be 
continued. 
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The size of  the budgetary imbalance of  the United Kingdom - and therefore that of its 
compensation - has fluctuated substantially since 1985 around half a point of  GNP for 
the  imbalance  and  0.3  per  cent  of GNP  for  the  rebate25.  Graph  6  shows 
developments in the shares of the United Kingdom in payments to the EU budget and 
in EU expenditure over the period 1987-1998. 
24 
25 
For more details on the functioning of the UK rebate, see Annex 4. 
See Annex 4 for a more detailed analysis of the evolution of the UK rebate and an  explanation of 
its variability. 
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Graph 7 shows that the mechanism has been effective in  reducing substantially the 
negative balance of the United Kingdom.  However, even after the rebate the United 
Kingdom remains a larger net contributor to the EU budget than Member States with 
a higher capacity to pay. 
Graph 7 
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Some of the conditions that prevailed at  the time the mechanism was decided do not 
apply any more: 
t)  Changes in  the composition of EL:  spcndmg ha\·c modified the rationale of the 
compensation.  Whereas in  I 984. it  had essentially the nature of a correction for 
the  specific  agricultural  problem  (CAP  represented  about  70  per cent of total 
allocated expenditure), it  has now lost to a great extent this characteristic since it 
corrects  equally  the  agricultural  problem  as  well  as  the  Umtcd  Kingdom's 
contribution  to  the  solidarity effort  of the  ELJ  and  to  its  other policies.  If a 
correction on the expenditure side of the type presented in  section 2.4.2 (partial 
reimbursement  of CAP direct  aids)  were  to  be  introduced.  tlus  consideration 
would become even more relevant. 
11 l  The bud~ctary imbalance of the United Kingdom is no longer umquc.  In  llJR4. 
the tmbalance of the United Kingdom. before correction. was the  largest of the 
Community.  In  recent years. four more countries have budgetary imbalances as 
large as  the United Kingdom's (sec graph 8). 
iit)  The gap in  relative prosperity between the United Kingdom and some other large 
contributors to the EU budget has narrowed.  The U'litcd Kingdom hds a relative 
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prosperity (and a corresponding relative capacity to pay) around the EU average 
and will certainly be above this mark after the forthcoming enlargement of the 
EU26. 
The  mechanism  also  has  some  technical  drawbacks  and  a  more  fundamental, 
systemic,  characteristic  which,  although  not  new  or  unexpected,  ought  _~to  be 
underlined.  1 
With respect to the t.echnical drawbacks, 
•  the existence of tbe rebate leads to budget contribution by the United Kingdom 
representing  a  lower  proportion  of its  income  than  those  paid  by  the  other 
Member States and therefore creates a distortion in the system of  contributions; 
•  the  definition  of the  EU  expenditure  to  be  used  in  the  calculation  of the 
compensation ("allocated expenditure") includes also administrative expenditure 
whose nature is substantially difrerent from  the rest of EU spending and whose 
inclusion  in  any  calculation  of the  budgetary  imbalances  has  often  been 
questioned27;  and 
•  allocated expenditure is defined in a way which may provoke a small, but quite 
unjustified, increase in the rebate at the time of  enlargement.  With enlargement, 
some expenditure flows directed to the new Member States (e.g. PH ARE), which 
are currently considered "external expenditure" and therefore do not enter into 
the calculation of  the rebate, will be replaced by payments under internal policies 
which enter into the calculation. 
The  systemic  characteristic  of the  rebate  mechanism,  on  the  other  hand,  is  its 
function as a shock absorber for all changes in the imbalance of the United Kingdom; 
this would  place this country in a unique position in respect to common budgetary 
decisions.  This not only risks insulating the United Kingdom from the implications 
of budgetary decision-making but would have significant adverse effects at the time 
of enlargement.  The accession of a large number of new Member States with very 
low  standards  of living  is  expected  to  have  a  negative  effect  on  the  budgetary 
positions  of the  current  Member  States.  But  the  United  Kingdom  will  see  its 
budgetary position deteriorate by only one third of what. would have happened in the 
26 
27 
International  comparisons  of income  are  made  by  comparing  the  levels  of GNP  per  head  of 
differenl countries.  These comparisons need a common  numeraire which is usually arrived  at 
through  the  use of currant exchange rates  or especially  computed  conversions  rates  - the  so 
called "purchasing power parities" (PPP) - which  take  into  account the differences in the price 
levels.  Data based on current exchange mtes provide  a measure  of actual  income  and  are 
therefore the best proxy for the ability to pay.  Data based on PPP estimates measure the real 
income  of  the  average  citizen  of  a  country  when  he/she  spends  it  in  his  country.  The 
Fontainebleau  agreement  does  not  specify  the  measure  to  be  used.  The  EU  uses  both 
measures.  PPP  data are used  in  identifying &objective  1" regions  and the  beneficiaries of the 
Cohesion Fund;  current exchange rates are used in the calculations of budgetary contributions 
and in  the Identification of the countries benefiting from  the lower level of capping of their VAT 
bases. 
For this and other difficulties in defining budgetary imbalances see Annex 3. 
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abseuce of the correction  mechanism, which would put into question an  equitable 
sharing out of  the burden resulting from enlargement. 
The provisions for the calculation and for the financing of the rebate are extremely 
complicated and inhibit budgetary transparency and accountability.  In any case, it 
would be necessary to at  least simplify the financing provisions and ensure that the 
VAT rate of call will not depend any more on the size of the rebate (see paragraph 
1.3.1 ). 
2.2. The  budgetary  imbalances  of  Germany,  the  Netherlands,  Austria  and 
Sweden 
Germany,  the  Netherlands,  Austria,  and  Sweden  have  recently  indicated  that  they 
consider their negative budgetary positions as excessive "relative to  their prosperity" 
and, therefore, as candidates for a correction under the Fontainebleau agreement.  In 
addition,  these  countries  underlined  their dissatisfaction  with  the  present  situation 
where other Member States of similar capacity to contribute to  the EU budget show 
much smaller negative balances or even positive ones.  Graph 8 confim1s that these 
four countries do indeed record significant budgetary imbalances. 
0 
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The Fontainebleau agreement established that to benefit from a correction mechanism 
a  Member  State's  budgetary  burden  must  be  excessive  in  relation  to  its  relative 
prosperity28 .  Relative prosperity is used to determine how well off are the citizens of 
a country or of a region compared to the  EU average and is expressed in  Purchasing 
Power Standards (PPS) data.  Subsequently, the  Protocol  on  Economic and  Social 
28  See footnote 26 and Annex 4. 
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Cohesion established  that  the proper way  to  take  greater acr....ount  of the  Member 
States' relative prosperity in  the system of own  resources  is  by considering their 
contributive  capacity.  A  Member  State's  contributive  capacity  can  be  used  to 
determine its (citizens') capacity to contribute to a given  international expenditure 
and  is  measured by converting nomin&l  incomes  into a common numeraire  using 
current  exchange rates,  since the  latter constitute the  terms  in  which  a  c~'s 
income  purchases  international  goods  and  services,  including  EU  1  budget 
cont.ributions29• 
Over the last decade, substantial changes in the relative position of  the fou.r  Member 
States, measured by either concept, have taken place and these have been particularly 
pronounced in the cases of Germany and Sweden (see table 5, and tables 8 and 9 of 
the Statistical Annex 8). 
TableS 
Capacity to pay and relative prosperity 
Gross national product at current market prices per held of populltion in Ecu and in PPS 
(until1990: D  and EUR-15 exdude East Germany;  from  19a1:  D  and EUR-15 indude the new Lander) 
ECU  PPS'1 
1984  1990  1991  1995  1997  1984  1990  1991  1995  1997 
B  101.0  104.0  106.0  121.5  112.8  106:6  105.3  109.2  115.7  115.3 
OK  131.1  127.8  124.3  140.2  137.4  106.7  100.6  ~02.4  110.8  112.5 
D  129.9  127.3  114.6  130.9  118.6  119.0  117.8  107.3  110.4  109.4 
GR  53.5  44.0  46.6  49.2  53.3  62.8  59.3  62.3  66.5  69.0 
E  52.3  66.7  71.4  63.4  62.6  69.0  74.2  79.4  76.8  n.1 
F  115.7  111.4  110.3  116.4  109.9  111.7  109.7  113.0  106.7  104.3 
IRL  61.9  61.3  62.4  69.1  79.9  59.6  64.3  68.7  80.5  82.4 
I  92.7  101.1  105.3  83.2  92.2  101.9  101.9  105.5  103.7  102.6 
L  171.4  184.0  192.3  201.8  186.4  173.5  185.2  196.6  1C1.6  1762 
·-
NL  112.0  100.7  101.2  113.7  108.1  102.7  101.3  102.3  1()11.8  1060 
A  109.3  109.2  111.8  127.6  118.8  106.1  105.8  108.8  111.1  112.6 
p  26.2  35.8  41.5  46.8  46.7  49.4  58.9  64.5  70.0  6S.6 
FIN  130.1  139.5  123.3  105.9  104.9  99.1  99.9  91.1  93.6  96.4 
s  144.5  137.8  142.4  111.7  114.2  111.8  104.5  102.4  97.3  93.7 
UK  98.6  89.1  91.2  83.8  101.8  99.&  99.5  96.3  964  100.3 
EUR-15  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1) PPS =Purchasing Power Standards 
29  See footnote 26. 
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The  ongms  of the  imbalances  of these  four  countries,  however,  are  different. 
Germany has had a large negative budgetary position for many years.  As a wealthy 
country with a relatively small agricultural sector it attracts low shares of Structural 
Funds and CAP spending.  The German negative balance deteriorated further between 
1990 and 1995 for various reasons.  In 1990 and 1991, the country experienced a rate 
of  economic growth much higher than those of  the other Member States which led to 
an increase in its relative share in GNP and in the financing of  the Community.  After 
unification the country started receiving significant payments in favour of the new 
Lander  under  the  Structural  Funds,  but  this  was  more than  compensated  by the 
progressive increase in Structural Funds spending decided in Edinburgh in 1992 and 
by their concentration in the so called "cohesion" countries.  Since 1995, the negative 
budgetary position of  Germany has remained essentially stable.  These developments 
have been largely consistent with the projections made at  the time the  1988  Own 
Resources Decision was modified.  In fact, had EU expenditure increased by as much 
as  the  current  Financial  Perspective  would  have  allowed  the  negative  budgetary 
balance of  Germany would have been largerJO. 
Table 6 
Budgetary balances of  some Member States in 1999 and 
worst and best performance in the 1995-97 period 
(percentage of GNP;  UK before correction) 
Germany  Netherlands  Austria  Sweden  UK 
Operational  balances 
worst  -0.72  -0.76  -0.49  -0.59  -0.73 
best  -0.58  -0.65  -0.12  -0.35  -0.38 
1999  -0.59  -0.79  -0.49  -0.61  -0.68 
UK correction definition 
worst  -0.66  -0.46  -0.50  -0.62  -0.57 
best  -0.62  -0.23  -0.20  -0.35  -0.27 
1999  -0.54  -0.45  -0.46  -0.54  -0.58 
More data  can  be found in Annex 8. 
The case of the Netherlands is different.  The definitions of budgetary balance used 
in  graph 8 and in table 6 do not take into account the effect known as the "reverse 
gateway effect", i.e. the fact that export restitutions paid where the port facilities are 
located, often do not go in favour of nationals of that country.  The figures for the 
Netherlands are influenced by this  effect.  As long as  export restitutions played a 
30  A  study  of  the  Bundesbank  published  in  November  1993  (Die  Finanzbeziehungen  der 
Bundesrepublik  Deutschland  zu  den  Europaischen  Gemeinschaften  seit  dem  Jahr  1988, 
Monatsbericht, November 1993) had forecast a negative budgetary position for Germany in  1997 
30 per cent higher than the one effectively recorded. 
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significant  role  in  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  (together  with  measures  for 
storing  surpluses  temporarily  withdrawn  from  the  markets)  the  country  was  a 
significant recipient of this type of expenditure to  the point of appearing  for  many 
years as a large net beneficiary.  The reforms of the CAP have gradually altered this 
situation  and  the  Netherlands  has  gradually  become  a  net  contributor  to  the  EU 
budget as  it receives  low  returns from both the Structural Funds and on direct aids 
from agricultural expenditure. 
However, the position of this country also depends to a large extent on the definition 
of budgetary balance used and, in particular, on the treatment of customs duties.  If 
balances  are  calculated  according  to  the  provisions  of the  correction  mechanism 
decided  in  Fontainebleau,  which  would  neutralise  the  impact  of traditional  own 
resources  in  the  measure3 1,  the  negative  balance  of the  Netherlands  is  currently 
somewhat smaller than that of  the other countries. 
Both Sweden and Austria were expected to have negative balances.  The shares in 
Agricultural and Structural Funds spending that these countries can expect up to  1999 
are  low.  In 1997 these two countries were contributing 3.1  and 2.8 per cent of the 
EU financing, respectively.  Their shares in CAP spending were 1.8 and 2.1  pet cent, 
while their shares in the Structural Funds were 0.9 and 1.4 per cent.  A significant 
amount of spending foreseen for these two countries in  1995 was paid only in 1996 
and this explains the apparent improvement of their position in 1996.  In 1997, the 
two countries received Ecu 76 and Ecu 71  millions, respectively, as  the penultimate 
instalment of  the temporary compensations decided in the accession treaties. 
It has often been underlined that in 1997 Germany's budgetary balance amounted to 
more  than  60  per  cent  of all  negative  balances.  This  estimate,  however,  was 
influenced  by  the  strong  fluctuations  of the  UK  rebate.  In  1999,  the  budgetary 
balance of Germany should represent  slightly less  than 50  per cent of all  negative 
balances.  In  coming  years  this  percentage  is  expected  to  come  down  further  as, 
following enlargement, more Member States are  likely to  record negative budgetary 
balances;  it is likely that by 2006 Germany's share in all negative budgetary balances 
will have decreased to around 40 per cent. 
2.3. The impact of Agenda 2000 on the most important budgetary imbalances 
To understand the impact of the Agenda 2000 programme on budgetary imbalances it 
is  necessary  to  consider the  effects of both  enlargement  and  the  proposed  policy 
reforms. 
The countries  which  will join the  Union on the  occasion of the next enlargement 
have  a  level  of prosperity  well  below  that  of all  the  current  members  and  will 
therefore become large net beneficiaries.  This implies that the budgetary positions of 
the  present  15  Member States  will  have to  undergo  a corresponding  deterioration 
31  See Annex 3 for a discussion of these issues. 
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which, on the basis of the approach that the Commission outlined in its Agenda 2000 
communication32, can be estimated at  around 0.15  per cent of their GNP by 2006. 
As the Commission has indicated in Agenda 2000, this development "cannot come as 
a surprise and should not give rise to claims for compensation". 
,-
The  reform  of the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  is  not  expected.  to  affect 
significantly the budgetary balances of  the five countries examined in this section of 
the report.  However, this must be qualified since the proposals presented by the 
Commission  in  March  of 1998  contain  numerous  provisions  which  may  affect 
payments in the individual Member States.  As a result, the eventual precise effects 
on the budgetary positions of the Member States will depend on the outcome of the 
current negotiations. 
In general terms, the proposed reform aims at reducing the level of  guaranteed prices 
while partially compensating the resulting income losses through increases in direct 
aids..  This may have an effect on the budgetary balances of  the Member States which 
is  largely of a  purely accounting nature  and  underscores the  fragile  nature of the 
budgetary balances calculations.  The n;IOSt notable example of this is in the case of 
the Netherlands. At present the Union intervenes in the Netherlands to  support the 
price of produce  fot:  which  a common market organisation ·exists through  exports 
restitutions.  The expenditure carried out in this country will benefit the producers 
which  may well  be  situated  in  other countries;  say,  in  neighbouring  Belgium  or 
Germruiy.  As CAP spending moves from  market support towards direct aids,  the 
producers in these two countries will be receiving in direct aids some of the support 
which they were previously deriving from the market intervention measures carried 
out in the Netherlands.  As a result of  this change, the recorded budgetary balance of 
the  Netherlands  will  deteriorate  correspondingly  while  those  of Belgium  and 
Germany will improve without any fundamental change in the underlying situation. 
This consideration must be kept  in  mind when examining the  impact of the  CAP 
reform on the budgetary imbalances of the Member States since it explains some of 
the expected changes. 
In global terms, the reform is expected to lead to an initial increase in CAP spending 
(until  2003/2004)  followed  by a  stabilisation  as  implementation of the  reform  is 
completed.  The overall amount of  spending plays also an important role considering 
that  for  most countries there  is  a significant difference between their share in the 
marginal financing of EU expenditure (i.e. their share in EU GNP) and their share in 
CAP expenditure which is not expected to change dramatically because of  the reform. 
The main sectors affected by the reform are arable crops, beef and the dairy products. 
Considering the parameters of the reform and the importance of these sectors in the 
agricultural  sector of the  five  countries  examined  in  the  previous  sections,  it  is 
possible to predict that, if the Commission's proposals were to  be confirmed by the 
32  Commission of the  European  Communities  (1997):  Agenda  2000  For a  Stronger and Wider 
Union, COM (97) 2000 and Bulletin of the European Union, Supplement 5/97. 
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negotiations,  the  reform  of the  CAP  should  not  have  a  significant  effect  on their 
budgetary imbalances. 
Once the reform of the CAP will have reached its full  effect (i.e. towards the end of 
the  period  covered  by  the  next  Financial  Perspective),  the  budgetary  balances  of 
Germany,  Sweden and of the United Kingdom,  measured as  a percentage of their 
GNP,  should  hardly  change  compared  to  their  pre-reform  levels.  The  expected 
increases  in  CAP  spending  received  by  these  countries  should  be  offset  by  the 
increases in their contributions to the EU budget provoked by the change in total CAP 
spending.  The  budgetary  imbalance  of the  Netherlands  could  record  a  small 
deterioration although this may be largely an accounting effect of the type mentioned 
at  the  beginning  of the  section.  The  budgetary  imbalance  of Austria  could 
experience  an  improvement  although  this  essentially  would  be  the  result  of the 
proposed  transfer  of  rural  development  measures  from  structural  spending 
("heading 2" ofthe Financial Perspective) to agricultural expenditure ("heading 1"). 
More  uncertain  are  the  effects  of  the  reform  of Structural  spending.  The 
Commission has  proposed to  maintain  the  overall  EU  effort  in the  structural  area 
constant as  a percent of GNP at the level of 0.46 per  cent of the GNP of the Union. 
This effort, however, will have to  cover also the structural part of the pre-accession 
strategy and the aid to the new Member States.  For the current 15 Member States the 
proposed reform implies some decline of total spending measured as a percentage of 
GNP between 1999 and 2006. 
The precise effects  of the  reform  on the  individual  budgetary  imbalances  are  still 
uncertain and will depend on the eligibility decisions to be made on the basis of the 
latest available data and on the outcome of the current negotiations.  The general aim 
of the proposals presented by the Commission is to  focus resources on the areas and 
sectors  in  greatest need.  This  is  to  be  achieved  through  a  stricter geographical 
concentration  and  through  a  rationalisation  of the  modes  of intervention.  In 
particular, it is proposed to reduce the number of regions receiving the highest levels 
of aid through a strict respect of the conditions for eligibility as "objective 1" regions 
(i.  e.  GDP per head in purchasing power parities lower than  75  per cent of the EU 
average).  A  greater  geographical  concentration  is  also  sought  for  the  so  called 
"objective 2" regions. 
Additional elements which may  affect the distribution of Structural Funds spending 
amongst Member States are the criteria which should be used to  determine the level 
of per head aid in the eligible regions.  These criteria include the gap between GDP 
in  the  region  and  the  EU  average,  the  relative  prosperity of the  country  and  the 
relative level of  unemployment. 
However  uncertain  these  elements  may  be,  it  is  possible  to  venture  some  broad 
considerations  which  can  contribute  to  a  better  assessment  of the  trend  of the 
budgetary  imbalances  being  discussed  here.  Austria,  Germany,  the  Netherlands, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom all contribute to  the EU budget with shares which 
are  substantially  higher  than  their  shares  in  structural  spending  and  are  therefore 
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likely to see some  improvement in their budgetary balances due to the lower overall 
expenditure resulting from the reform, even if this will be concentrated in the regions 
characterized by the greatest need. This improvement may be greater in the case of 
Germany.  A  strict  respect  of the  75  per cent  benchmark  for  the- choice  of the 
"objective 1" regions will not affect this country (except East Berlin).  In addition, 
the overall effect of the criteria for the determination of the aid per head may also be 
to the advantage of  the new Uinder. 
As a result of  the whole Agenda 2000 package, of the five Member States examined 
in this section, only the Netherlands is expected to experience between 1999 and 2006 
a deterioration of  its net balance of  the same order of magnitude as that mentioned at 
the  beginning of this  section as  the average impact of enlargement (about 0.15  per 
cent of GNP).  This result, however, is strongly influenced by the mechanical effect 
of the shift away from  CAP market support measures to  direct  aids payments and 
should not correspond to  a parallel deterioration in the benefits derived by the Dutch 
economy.  The reform of the Structural Funds,  on  the other hand, should have a 
small positive effect on the budgetary balance of  this country. 
The budgetary balances of Austria, Germany and Sweden are expected to deteriorate 
somewhat less than the impact of enlargement. In the case of Austria, the transfer of 
rural development measures from  the structural funds  to the CAP should provoke a 
less  favourable  result  of  the  reform  of  the  structural  funds  matched  by  a 
corresp_onding better outcome of  the CAP reform. 
Very  different  is  the  position  of the  United  Kingdom  whose  budgetary  position 
(measured as a percentage of its GNP) could remain broadly stl'lble between 1999 and 
2006.  The  reforms  of the  CAP  and  of the  Structural  Funds  would  not  affect 
negatively  the  budgetary  balance  of  this  country.  Furthermore,  unless  the  UK 
correction is modified, the negative impact of enlargement on the budgetary position 
of the  United  Kingdom  would  be reduced  by the  operation of the  compensation 
mechanism. 
2.4.  Options for reform 
If a broad agreement on the need to address the issue of  budgetary imbalances were to 
emerge,  some  key  options  could  be  contemplated.  These  options,  which  are 
discussed below, obey a certain logic.  First, on the financing side, it is possible to 
consider that an orthodox and transparent system should be put in place.  This would, 
imply  that  the  UK rebate  is  progressively eliminated.  Secondly,  it  is  possible to 
consider, in recognition of the fact that the principal cause of  budgetary imbalances is 
the expenditure side of the EU budget, the possibility of implementing reforms on EU 
spending with the view to reducing these imbalances.  And, third, ad hoc solution5 on 
the  revenue  side  of the  budget,  aimed  at  redressing  the  imbalances,  can  also  be 
contemplated.  The present section considers these possibilities sequentially. 
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2.4.1.  Return to a more straightforward system 
It could be envisaged progressively to phase out or to reduce the correction presently 
granted to the United Kingdom .  This could find a justification in the fact that after 
enlargement, tne relative prosperity of the United Kingdom, which is  already around 
the  EU  average  today,  would  almost  certaialy  be  above  the  EU  average,  thus 
weakening one of the conditions for  the initial granting of the  rebate.  In addition, 
with five  countries experiencing negative budgetary positions of a similar order of 
magnitude, the maintenance of a special treatment for just one of them could appear 
unjustified.  The change in the nature of the mechanism mentioned in section 2.1  -
from correction of a specific structural agricultural problem to a reduction in the cost 
of all expenditure decisions - is also a strong argument. 
Furthermore, it is conceivable that other changes to  the present arrangements might 
make the maintenance of  the rebate superfluous or, at least, less justified.  This could, 
for  instance, be the case of the introduction of a correction on the expenditure side 
along the  lines  indicated  in  the next section.  But ending the UK rebate by itself 
would not remove the current imbalances between the contributor Member States. 
Table 7 
Cost of the UK correction for Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden 
(perc~ntage of GNP, 1995-1997 cash data, 1999 Preliminary Draft Budget) 
Germany  Netherlands  Austria  Sweden 
19v5  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.03 
1996  0.03  0.05  0.05  0.05 
1997  0.03  0.05  0.05  0.05 
1999  0.04  0.07  0.07  O.G7 
It is  also  important  to  mention  that  there  exist  additional  possibilities  that  could 
contribute towards the development of a more straightforward financing system for 
the  EO.  One  possibility  would  be  to  substitute  the  GNP  resource  for  the  VAT 
resource.  Clearly, as noted earlier, the equity of the system would improve since the 
regressive elements associated with VAT would be removed.  Table 3b  (in section 
1.2.2) offers an  indication,  for  the year  1997, of the  effects,  per Member State, of 
substituting the VAT resource with a theoretical GNP resource.  Another possibility 
would be to  substitute all other own resources (including traditional own resources) 
with the GNP resource (the results for each Member State are also shown in table 3b  ). 
It is  clear that there is  a trade-off between financial  autonomy and  simplicity.  To 
replace fiscal  resources with direct contribution from Member States may render the 
system more intelligible and cost effective, but it  certainly reduces  further financial 
autonomy and, in the case of  TOR, would constitute a significant departure from EU 
orthodoxy. 
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2.4.2.  Correction on the expenditure side 
A correction on the  expenditure side,  which would not require modification of the 
Own Resources Decision,  would  be  consistent with the  Fontainebleau conclusions 
and would address the  fundamental  cause of budgetary imbalances.  The current 
imbalances  result  essentially  from  Structural  Funds  and  agricultural  spending.  It 
would  not  appear  logical  to  correct  the  imbalances  resulting  from  structural 
interventions as these have an explicit redistributive aim.  It is however conceivable 
to  modify  agricultural  spending.  Given  the  integrated  nature  of the  Common 
Agricultural Policy, it is not possible to modify spending by Member State, but it is 
possible to reduce the overall amount of spending which is allocated through the EU 
budget. 
Table 8 
Implications of a partial reimbursement (75%)1 of CAP direct aids 
(Year 2006, in Euro million and in percent of GNP, at current prices) 
Change in budgetary balance  Change in budgetary balance 
(before UK correction}  (after UK correction} 
Euro,million  Percent of GNP  Euro million  Percent of GNP 
B  110.7  0.03  121.9  0.04 
OK  -100.6  -0.05  -93.2  -0.04 
D  678.2  0.03  733.5  0.03 
GR  -451.7  -0.30  -446.3  -0.29 
E  -528.2  -0.07  -503.4  -0.07 
F  -648.5  -0.04  -585.2  -0.03 
IRL  -195.8  -0.23  -192.8  -0.22 
I  134.5  0.01  186.6  0.01 
L  11.6  0.05  12.4  0.05 
NL  168.8  0.03  1,85.7  0.04 
b  43.8  0.02  53.2  0.02 
p  -23.9  -0.02  -19.2  -0.01 
SF  22.8  0.01  28.1  0.02 
s  62.3  0.02  72.6  0.02 
UK  429.6  0.03  146.1  0.01 
New6  286.4  0.07  300.0  0.08 
Total  0.0  0.0 
1)  A rate of reimbursement of 75% of CAP direct aids is equivalent to a reduction of agricultural expenditure spent 
out of the EU budget of about Euro 9 ~45  million or 17% of total CAP payments in 2006  .. 
In  particular,  it  is  possible to  imagine  that,  while market support expenditure  will 
continue to be integrally reimbursed to Member States, that part of  expenditure which 
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goes  directly  to  individual  beneficiaries  could  be reimbursed  only partially.  The 
scope for this type of action would increase as the proposed reform of the CAP aims 
at reducing the weight ·of market support measures, while the relative weight of  direct 
aids would increase correspondingly (from 65  per cent in 2000  to  75  per cent in 
2006).  The essential idea is to take advantage of the fact that all the Member States 
that record large budgetary imbalances have a share in the financing of  the EU budget 
much higher than that in EU agricultural spending, and that a reduction in the overall 
amount of  spending would improve their budgetary balances.  Moreover, the original 
rationale  for  100%  financing  of the  CAP  market.  support  expenditure  (i.  e.,  that 
market  support benefits  farmers  throughout  the  Community,  not just those  in the 
Member States where the expenditure occurs) is  no  longer valid for the income aid 
component. 
If implemented,  this  option  would  be  consistent  with  and  would  represent  a 
generalisation  of the  principles  currently  governing  most  EU  expenditure  and 
especially that under the Structural Funds.  At the same time, it should not be seen as 
a dismantling of the  CAP  or  a move  towards  its  re-nationalisation.  Neither the 
·degree  of integration,  nor  the  level  of decision  making  or  the  overall  amount of 
financial  resources available to  pursue its objectives would be modified.  Farmers 
would receive the same support as currently since CAP expenditure by Member State 
is compulsory once determined by the relevant legal provisions.  The level and the 
conditions  attached  to  the  payment  of these  direct  aids  would  continue  to  be an 
integral part of the  CAP  and  would  result  only from  EU decisions.  The overall 
amount of spending available would remain the same, but would be shared between 
the EU budget and the national exchequers. 
The fact that a lower share of financial resources would need to be allocated through 
the  EU  budget suggests  that  the  agricultural  guideline  should be reduced if this 
constraint is to maintain its effectiveness.  A corresponding reduction in the Own 
Resources ceiling might also be appropriate.  This could be done on the occasion of 
the first modification of the Own Resources Decision33 and, in the meantime, should 
be replaced by some form of  strong engagement not to use the whole ceiling. 
Table 8 presents the impact of  a 75 per cent partial reimbursement of  CAP direct aids. 
The overall reduction ofEU spending in 2006 amounts in this example to Euro 9 145 
million.  More details on this simulation are presented in Annex 5.  The table also 
shows the negative effects that the introduction of a measure of  this type would have 
on the budgetary balances of  some Member States. 
33  On the occasion of the first modification of the Own Resources Decision the reference will have to 
change from the GNP based on the  2"d  edition of the European System of Accounts to the new 
ESA 95.  If the level of the GNP of the EU according to  the new system of accounts were to be 
different, this would justify a corresponding adaptation of the ceiling so as maintain the stability of 
the financial resources put at the disposal of the EU budget. 
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2.4.3.  A generalised correction mechanism 
Gennany,  the  Netherlands,  Austria  and  Sweden  have  asked·  to  benefit  from  a 
transfonnation  of, the  present  correction  mechanism  applying  to  the  UK  into  a 
capping modeL  A simple transposition of the  present mechanism is not possible. 
Applying  the  present  mechanism  to  all  countries  that  have  a  negative  budgetary 
balance or simply extending to  the four countries that have made the request would 
result in a three to  fourfold  increase of cost of the mechanism (see table 9 and the 
report by the European Court of Auditors (1998)34).  In addition, depending on the 
assumptions  made,  this  burden  would  have  to  be  borne  by  a  group  of countries 
representing less than a fifth of  the GNP ofthe European Union. 
The four countries that have made the request, aware of  this difficulty, have asked for 
a  modified  version of the  mechanism.  They,  correctly,  point out that the  present 
mechanism contains various implicit parameters that may be modified.  In particular, 
they point out that whereas the current mechanism corrects 66 per cent of  the entirety 
of  the negative balance of  the United Kingdom, it is conceivable that Member States 
be asked to  accept a negative balance up  to  a given percentage of GNP - say 0.3  or 
0.4 per cent of  GNP -:- and be granted a compensation only for the part exceeding this 
threshold.  In  addition, the benchmark of 66  per cent may also be modified.  It is 
also possible to  introduce modifications in the items included in the contributions to 
the EU 'budget (e.g.  traditional own resources could be excluded or re-apportioned 
according  to  different  keys)  and  in  those  included  in  expenditure  (e.g.  to  exclude 
administrative  expenditure or expenditure  in  the  new  Member States  or Structural 
Funds and so on). 
Table 9 
Overall redistribution induced by the UK correction mechanism 
for 19961 under different assumptions 
(Ecu million) 
Mechanism applied to the  Mechanism applied to all the 
Mechanism applied to 5 
United Kingdom 
countries with a negative 
countries 
budgetary balance 
(present situation) 
(UK, 0, NL, A,  S,  F,  I) 
(UK, D, NL, A,  S) 
2 856  12 384  11138 
On the assumption that the beneficiaries are excluded from the financing, the burden would be spread 
1) 
34 
over a number of countries representing the following percentages of EU GNP 
86.5%  17.0%  48.9% 
The simulation has been prepared on the basis of 1996 data to make the results comparable to those 
reported by the European Court of Auditors (1998):  op. cit., footnote 38. 
European Court of Auditors (1998):  Special report no 6198 on the system. of own resources based 
on VAT and GNP. Official Journal of the European Communities C 241, July 31, 1998. 
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Table 10 
Changes in the budgetary balances induced by comp·ensation 
mechanisms based on different parameters 
(Euro million; data b.a.s.e.cl. Ql112ll1ie.'-tiQl1S. fo.c.1SSS1) 
Sum of all net  Germany  Netherlands  Austria  Sweden  UK 
rebates 
Present mechanism 
(Threshold 0.0 per cent of  GNP;  rate of  reimbursement 66 per cent) 
4952  - 1 008  - 311  - 173  - 189  +4 952 
Unconstrained generalised correction mechanism 
(Threshold 0.0 per cent of GIVP;  rate of  reimbursement 66 per cent) 
7 601  + 4 110  + 112  + 68  + 185  + 3126 
Difference relative to the present situation 
2 649  + 5118  +423  + 241  + 374  - 1 826 
Constrained generalised correction mechanism 
(Threshold 0.3 per cent of  GNP;  rate of  reimbursement 66 per cent) 
3 538  + 1 669  - 123  -54  +50  + 1 819 
Difference relative to the present situation 
- 1 414  + 2 677  + 188  + 119  +239  -3133 
1)  The  results are shown for  1999 only because the data for other years are not appropriate.  1996 is not 
representative  for  Sweden  and  Austria;  1997 and  1998 are  unrepresentative for the  United  Kingdom 
because of the  exceptionally high variability of the rebate in these years - see graph 7;  the  data in the 
first  column  under  the  various  extensions  of the  correction  mechanism  correspond  to  the  sum  of all 
improvements (financed, equivalently, by the sum of all deteriorations) in budgetary balances reported in 
column (6) of tables 1 and 3 of Annex 6. 
An additional important modification could concern the financing of the rebates.  In 
the  present  system  the  United  Kingdom  does  not  finance  its  own  rebate.  A 
generalisation could be seen as implying that the Member States benefiting from the 
system  should not  finance  it.  However this solution is  not only very costly in  a 
situation where many Member States benefit from the system, but is also fraught with 
risks.  In  particular,  a  "threshold effect"  could appear whereby  a country with  a 
negative balance just above the threshold would receive a minimal rebate but would 
be  exempted  from  the  burden of financing  whereas  if it had been just below the 
threshold  it  would have  had to  contribute to the  financing  of aU  other rebates  for 
substantial  amounts.  It seems  logical  therefore to  assume  that  a  Member State 
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should  not  finance  its  own  rebate,  but that  it  should  finance  all  the  others35  (as 
assumed in the simulations presented in table 1  0). 
Modifying  these  parameters  provides  the  system  with  a  substantial  degree  of 
.flexibility, albeit at the cost of  significantly reducing transparency and increasing the 
complexity of the calculations.  However, this flexibility yields mechanisms with 
different overall costs and different effects for the individual Member States. 
Annex 6 discusses some simulations and some key results are reproduced in table 10. 
The simulations show that any system based on the same parameters for all Member 
States,  and  under the  assumption  that its  overall  cost is  to  be maintained  within 
reasonable  limits,  would  lead  to  substantial  reduction  in  the  size  of the  rebate 
currently enjoyed by the United Kingdom. 
35  See Annex 6 for a discussion of this model and in particular for the opportunity to ignore second 
round  effects, i.e.  the  case where a country  is just below the threshold  at the beginning  of the 
exercise,  but where  it will exceed  it once  the  cost of financing  the  other rebates  is taken  into 
account. 
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3.  FINAL COMMENTS 
The  proposals  presented  by  the  Commission  in  Agenda  2000  indicate  that  it  is 
possible to face the challenges resulting from enlargement and from the reform of  the 
major EU policies within the own resources ceiling set, for an unlimited time, by the 
current Own Resources Decision.  To achieve this it  is essential that the budgetary 
rigour pursued by the Member States in the framework of  EMU characterises also the 
EU budget. 
The shortcomings of the system discussed  in  the first  part of the report do not by 
themselves provide grounds to justify an urgent modification of the Own Resources 
Decision.  If  and when this Decision were to be modified so as to allow an in depth 
reform of the Own Resources system, these shortcomings could be corrected either 
through a simplification of  the system of  contributions or through the introduction of 
new own resources.  The proposed introduction of  an element of progressivity could 
also be discussed in this context. 
Currently, the most pressing source of dissatisfaction with the present arrangements 
appears  to  be  linked  to  the  issue  of budgetary  imbalances  of Germany,  the 
Netherlands, Austria and Sweden.  It is not possible, at this stage, to determine with 
precision  how  these  imbalances  will  evolve  over  the  next  few  years  as  some 
important policy parameters have yet to be fully articulated.  However, it is possible 
to predict that the' imbalances of  these large net contributors as a percentage of GNP 
should deteriorate somewhat, more for the Netherlands than for the others, but most 
likely less than the average deterioration due to enlargement.  This outcome  would 
be  due to the proposed containment of spending in the present Member States over 
the period covered by the next Financial Perspective and to some specific provisions 
of  the proposed reforms. 
Establishing correction mechanisms to ameliorate budgetary imbalances is a difficult 
task  since,  for  a  given  size of the  EU budget,  an  improvement  in  the  budgetary 
position of some Member States invariably involves a corresponding deterioration in 
the  budgetary  position of others.  If a  consensus were  to emerge  on the  need  to 
address the issue of  budgetary imbalances, a decision would have to be taken on how 
to achieve this result and on the timing of  the changes.  · 
The report indicates three, mutually compatible, options: 
•  on the financing sitle:  a simplification of  the financing structure in favour of a 
system more, or even totally, based on GNP contributions;  such a simplification 
could also include the phasing out of  the exi.sting correction mechanism; 
•  on the expenditure side:  the introduction of a system of partial reimbursement 
of  CAP spending aimed at directly supporting incomes; 
•  on the balances:  the application of a generalized correction mechanism to all 
Member States experiencing large imbalances. 
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None of  the options discussed in the report provides an ideal solution.  Technical and 
conceptual weaknesses can be found  in all of them.  The  shifts in the burden of 
financing  that  results from  some of these  options  present  regressive  elements that 
might need a redress in the context of  an overall solution. 
The timing of  any changes would  depend  on whether it will be necessary to modify 
the Own Resources Decision or not.  A modification would entail long ratification 
delays and  would suggest a process allowing the new financing  system to become 
effective  at  the time  of the  accession  of the first  group  of new  Member  States. 
Enlargement would indeed represent such a significant change of circumstances as to 
warrant a structural modification of  this type. 
The significant methodological and conceptual reserves that the Commission has on 
the issue of  budgetary imbalances have prompted it to limit this report to a review of 
options for their correction.  If  a broad agreement towards a solution of  the problem 
were to appear within the European Council, the Commission would put forward the 
appropriate detailed proposals. 
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ANNEX 1 
The evolution of the EU financing system1 
During  the  period  1958-1970  the  Community  budget  was  financed  exclusively  by 
contributions froin  the Member States.  The Luxembourg European  Council of 21-22 
April  1970  introduced  for  the  first  time  a  system  of own  resources  for  the  general 
budget  of the  Community  taking  effect  in  1971.  One  objective  was  to  gradually 
enhance the Community's financial independence from Member States' transfers.  The 
own resources introduced were customs duties and  agricultural levies  (which were to 
become known as the Traditional Own Resources, TOR) and one based on a harmonised 
VAT base.  While traditional own resources became effectively own resources over the 
period  1971-1975,  difficulties  with  establishing  a  common  VAT  system  across  the 
Member States and with defining the base for VAT assessment delayed the introduction 
ofVAT as an own resource untill979. 
In the period 1975-1987 revenue growth on the own resources account was eroded by a 
diminishing yield from TORs while revenues from VAT were adversely affected by the 
generally weak economic growth prevailing during this period.  At  the same time, the 
strengthening of existing  and  the  launching of new  policies,  the  inability  to  contain 
spending on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and expenditure growth associated 
with  the  two  enlargements2  led  to  pronounced  resource  inadequacy.  Persistent 
complaints on the part of the UK concerning its financial contribution also became a 
feature of  the budgetary disputes that were prominent during this period. 
A  temporary  resolution  of the  budget  difficulties  was  secured  at  the  Fontainebleau 
European  Council.  The  Fontainebleau  Council  of June  25-26,  1984  increased  the 
maximum rate of call for the VAT resource to  1.4 per cent and established a correction 
mechanism for budgetary imbalances which has since applied only to the'UK3. 
The  modifications  to  the  financing  system  introduced  by  the  Fontainebleau  Council 
proved  almost immediately insufficient.  They  failed  to  generate  sufficient  revenues 
owing to  the .  continuing decline in  revenues  from  TORs and  to  the  slow growth .in 
revenues  from  the  VAT  resource.  In addition, some dissatisfaction started to  appear 
with the VAT based resource which, being based on consumption, was felt to contain a 
significant regressive element.  The problem of revenue inadequacy and inequity was 
compounded by rising, and incompletely anticipated, expenditure commitments.  These 
2 
3 
For a detailed review of the  history as well  as an  assessment of the  EU financial arrangements up  to  the  early 
years of the Edinburgh agreement see Commission of the European Communities (1995):  European Union Public 
Finance,  Luxembourg:  see also the  discussion in  Commission of the  European Communities  (1997):  "Budget 
Contributions,  EU  Expenditure,  Budgetary  Balances  and  Relative  Prosperity  of the  Member  States",  paper 
prepared by OG-XIX and forwarded to the Ecofin Ministers by President Santer for their October 13 meeting. 
Greece joined the Community in 1981 followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986. 
See Fontainebleau European Council, Conclusions  of the  Presidency,  Bulletin  of the  European  Communities 6-
1984. 
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were related to  difficulties in controlling spending on the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), especially following the accession of  Portugal and Spain, the dollar depreciation 
after the spring 1985 and the fall in international commodity prices, factors which added 
considerably to the financing of  export restitutions. 
Fundamental  reforms,  which  determined  the  character of the  present  own  resources 
system,  were  adopted  in  June  19884.  Among  the  principal  reforms of the  Brussels 
European Council was  the  introduction of a new own resource based on the Member 
States' GNP (intended to match contributions closer to the ability to pay), and that of  an 
overall ceiling to  the  total  amount of own resources which could be called to  finance 
Community spending.  This payments ceiling was set at  .1.15  per cent in  1988  with 
progressive yearly increases  which were to  bring it  to  1.20 per cent  by 1992.  The 
Council also limited the role of the VAT resource by introducing a capping of its base at 
55 per cent of GNP, a measure intended to reduce the effects ofthe regressive char~cter 
of  the resource. 
The consolidation of the 1988 reforms and ultimately of the Community finances took 
place within a context where the Community's ambitions, expressed in the Treaty on 
European Union,  grew  significantly.  The Edinburgh  agreement of December  1992, 
which adopted the financial perspective for  the years 1993-1999, increased the overall 
ceiling of own resources from  1.20 to  1.27 per cent.  In addition, it introduced steps to 
decrease further the importance of VAT in the financing of  the budget. 
However, the system of own resources decided in Edinburgh could only enter into force 
on January 1,  1995.  In the meantime, significant difficulties were experienced during 
the recession years of the early 1990s when initial budget estimates turned out to be too 
optimistic.  Successive  downward  revisions  in  economic  growth  during  1992-1994 
resulted  in  corresponding  revisions  to  budget  revenues.  Nevertheless,  despite  the 
adverse climate, it was possible to respect the constraints imposed by the own resources 
ceiling without undermining financial discipline. 
In  subsequent  years  budgetary  arrangements  have  proved  generally  successful.  In 
addition, from  1997 cautious annual budgetary decisions have lead to spending levels 
significantly lower to  those  foreseen  in the Financial Perspective.  As  a  result,  the 
European Union approaches the challenges resulting from enlargement to Cyprus and to 
the countries of  central and eastern Europe and from the reform of  its main policies with 
substantial margins under the own resources ceiling. 
4 
•••  •••  •  ••  •  •  • 
See  Council  Decision  88/376/EEC.  Euratom  of  June  24,  1988,  On  the  System  of  the  Communities'  Own 
Resources.  Official Journal of  the European Communities, L 185, July 15, 1988. 
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A review of possible own  resources for the European 
Union 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The issue of the financial  autonomy of the EU is  central to the debate about new own 
resources.  The  Luxembourg  agreement  of 21-22  April  1970  provided  that  the 
replacement of  Member States contributions by own resources was meant to finance the 
complete budget.  However, this financial  autonomy has proved elusive.  A dominant 
part of the EU budget is  currently financed by block grants in  the form  of VAT and 
GNP contributions from the treasuries of the Member States.  To remedy this situation, 
proposals for different categories of new own resources have on occasion been made1• 
The purpose of  this annex is to provide a critical review of some of the most important 
of  these proposals. 
There are three sections in the Annex following the introduction.  Section 2 presents the 
criteria  against  which  the  suitability  of proposed  own  resources  can  be  evaluated; 
section 3 examines eight specific proposals in detail;  and section 4 concludes. 
2.  CRITERIA FOR OWN  RESOURCES 
The theory  of fiscal  federalism  predicts  that  the  assignment  of tax  competencies  at 
different levels of  authority rests on two important economic considerations and also on 
several subsidiary criteria.  The former, which are the primary criteria, are: 
>  the presence of  externalities which transcend national borders;  and 
>- the regional arbitrariness of  the tax base/of the tax revenue2. 
•  If the tax in question has external effects which go beyond the locality where it is 
levied, then it ought to be optimally assigned to the higher level of authority.  Two 
broad  cases  can  be  considered  here.  First,  taxation  that  affects  the  prices  of 
2 
For the  general principle in favor of own  resources, see for example,  European Parliament (1990). 
The  report  "Insists  that  the  Community  budget  must  be  financed  from  the  Community's  own 
resources"; Part A,  para.  10.  Some of these issues have  also been  considered  in  Commission of 
the  European  Communities  (1992).  The quest for  new  own  resources  dates  back to  the  1970s; 
see, for example, the MacDougall (1977) report, vol. II, ch.  16, p. 479-504. 
For a discussion of these criteria as they apply to the case of the European Union see Commission 
of the European Communities (1993a), ch. 7,  Begg et.  al.  (1997) and Keen (1995), section 2,  p.  9-
39.  See also Bureau and  Champsaur (1992), Commission of the  European Communities (1992c), 
section  IV.3,  European  Parliament  (1994),  p.  3,  and  Commission  of the  European  Communities 
(1993a). Table 30, p.  84 for a (somewhat dated) summary of the assignment of tax competencies in 
selected federal states in 1988. 
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internationally traded  goods  or factors  of production  in  imperfectly competitive 
markets;  this can lead to distortion of  competition between national fiscal systems, 
an important factor at the background of the process of indirect tax harmonisation 
undertaken in the EU.  And, second, taxation levied on mobile tax bases.  A parallel 
version of  the criterion states that if  the benefit from a particular service transcends 
national borders, then the financing of the service ought to be assigned to a higher 
level of government.  Clearly, in the presence of externalities subsidiarity, despite 
its importance, becomes a secondary issue since economic efficiency predicts that 
the tax should be assigned not to a national but to a supranationalleveJ3. 
•  Regional arbitrariness refers to the impossibility to reasonably define the base of 
the  tax  or,  alternatively,  to  the  arbitrary  distribution of the  revenue  in  the  case 
where  the  tax  is  levied  locally.  Revenues  from  the  common  external  tariff 
constitute a clear example of the  latter.  Here,  especially as  a consequence of the 
internal  market,  it  is  difficult  to  determine  with  accuracy  the  national  base that 
ultimately bears the tariff.  Should the tariff be levied in, say, the port of  Genoa, the 
revenues  from  the  tariff only  partly  belong  to  the  citizens  of Italy  since  such 
imports,  once  in  the  EU,  are  consumed  widely  by  all  European  consumers. 
Revenues  from  customs and  agricultural  levies  are  currently assigned  to  the EU 
level  (with the Member States simply collecting the  levies) because they comply 
with the criterion of  regional arbitrariness 4. 
Several  secondary  criteria  for  assigning  tax  instruments  to  a  supranational  level  of 
government ought also to be considered.  First, in order to ensure horizontal equity5 in 
3 
4 
5 
Leaving  aside externalities  or revenue arbitrariness,  subsidiarity is a crucial  issue  here;  see,  for 
example, the importance accorded to it in the motion for a resolution in European Parliament (1994). 
It is possible to argue that full respect of the subsidiarity principle would be consistent with Member 
States  contributing  to  the  EU  budget a specified  amount,  however defined,  but themselves  alone 
having the responsibility to decide on the sources of financing and the tax instruments to be used, in 
order to  respect their  EU  financing  obligation.  However,  Bureau  and  Champsaur  (1992),  p.  89, 
caution  that  "budgetary  intervention  at  the  Community  level  ought  to  be  admitted  only  in  the 
presence of cross-border externalities or economies of scale, which cannot be properly alleviated by 
a simple coordination between concerned national governments". 
Despite  the  presumption,  there  is  very  little  concrete  evidence  on  the  quantitative  importance of 
regional  arbitrariness  in  the  case of traditional  own  resources.  Nevertheless, according to  recent 
estimates 27 per cent of the total  amount of customs duties levied in  the Netherlands, and  31  per 
cent  of the  import  duties  levied  in  Antwerp,  are  related  to  final  consumption  of goods  in  other 
Member States.  Taking account of this alters considerably the unadjusted shares of Belgium and of 
the Netherlands in traditional own resources.  For example, instead of amounting to 7.4 per cent and 
12.2 per cent of total traditional own resources contributions in 1997, respectively, adjusting the data 
for the presence of the gateway effect would reduce the share of Belgium to  5.1  per cent and of the 
Netherlands  to  8.9  per cent  For the  details  of the  estimates  see  Verbeke  et.  al.  (1998a)  and 
Verbeke et. al.  (1998b). 
Horizontal  equity  refers  to  the  concept  of  individuals  (or  nations)  in  identical  circumstances  are 
treated identically in  their tax liability;  vertical equity, on  the other hand, refers to  the  notion where 
individuals (or nations) in  different circumstances are  accordingly differentiated in  their tax liability. 
Clearly,  it  is  not  straightforward  to  extend  the  application  of  these  principles  from  individual 
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contributions across Member States, a definition of equal treatment for  tax purposes is 
important (the need for  vertical equity, or solidarity to use a term commonly employed 
in the context of  the EU, is addressed through the EU's expenditure policies).  Here, the 
proportionality of the relationship between gross contributions and GNP is the basis on 
which horizontal equity can evaluated6. 
The  second  criterion,  visibility  to  EU  citizens,  has  an  important  accountability 
dimension.  Given the  complex nature of EU finances, comprehension and monitoring 
of the present system on the part of citizens is virtually absent.  For example, from the 
point of view of EU  citizens, the GNP contributions are clearly invisible, but also the 
relationship  between VAT  taxes  paid  and collected by the  Member States  and  their 
contributions  on  the  VAT  resource  is  not easily comprehensible?.  Moreover,  while 
Member  States  themselves  perform  this  monitoring  function,· the  lack  of a  direct 
relationship  between  citizen  and  budget  is  another manifestation of the  "democratic 
deficit"8.  Changes through the introduction of new own resources ought to  improve 
transparency by conveying information about EU financial relationships9. 
A  third  criterion  concerns  links  to  common  policies  and  requires  that  new  own 
resources ought to  be those which are consistent with the other EU policy objectives. 
Financing  the  EU  budget  through  taxes  that,  at  the  same  time,  advance  common 
objectives on, say, transport policy or environmental standards would be consistent with 
this criterion: 
To  avoid  distortions  and  to  enhance  acceptability  the  tax  ought  to  be  levied  on  a 
harmotrised  base.  Few  existing  taxes  enjoy  at  present  a  sufficient  degree  of 
harmonisation  in  their base.  VAT  and  excise taxes  come closest to  the  necessary 
standard. 
A further set of criteria concerning sufficiency, efficietrcy and cost-effectiveness refer 
to  administrative aspects of new own resources.  The revenue from new own resources 
ought to  be sufficient to  finance  a dominant part, if not  all  the resource needs, of the 
6 
7 
8 
9 
taxpayers within a nation to regions within a federation or to the Member States in their relationship 
with the EU budget. 
This was discussed already in Commission of the European Communities (1997a).  Note, however, 
that suggestions have on occasion been made for a more progressive resource as, for example, in 
Padoa-Schioppa (1987), p.  136;  in recent years, Spain has also insisted on the establishment of a 
progressive resource. 
See European Communities Court of Auditors (1998) for a criticism related to this point.  . 
The  "democratic  deficit"  is  usually  meant to  suggest  lack  of  full  parliamentary  scrutiny  by  and 
accountability to the European Parliament;  presently, the term is used to indicate a manifestation of 
this in the form of the incomplete monitoring and control of the budget by the citizen. 
The European Parliament (1990) report emphasizes that "the development of a genuine system of 
own resources to  replace the contributions from the Member States could take the form of a direct 
link between the Community and the taxpayer";  see European Parliament (1990), Part A, para. 15. 
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budget;  it  should  also  be  stable  and  predictable  and  subject  neither  to  unforeseen 
fluctuations nor to a trend decline: 
The manner in which this revenue is collected ought to be efficient in the sense of  being 
assigned to the level of government where tax losses and fraud are minimised.  The tax 
ought to be consistent with improving economic efficiency as well, in that it ought not 
to discriminate against activities promoted by national or EU policies. 
Cost-effectiveness as a criterion refers to tax administration arrangements that maximise 
the  revenue/cost ratio.  Assigning  an  EU  tax  to  a higher level  of government could 
contribute to reducing duplication of  tax administration services, and it could also make 
possible the  exploitation of economies of scale in tax  collection.  At  the same time, 
however, legal, institutional and  language differences among the Member States do not 
necessarily  favour  assigning  the  EU  tax  to  a  higher  level  of government;  on  the 
contrary, it  may be  less  costly to  permit a lower level of tax authority to  implement 
collection,  an  arrangement  which  could  be  particularly  effective  if combined  with 
incentives to  Member States to  act  efficiently.  A clear example is  the collection of 
revenues from traditional own resources by Member States on behalfofthe EU. 
3.  PROPOSALS FOR NEW OWN RESOURCES 
The  present  section  examines  eight  resources  that  have  been  proposed  on  various 
occasions as new own resources.  These are, a CO/Energy tax;  a modulated VAT tax; 
excise  1.:l.xes  on  tobacco,  alcohol  and  mineral  oil;  corporate  income  tax; 
communications taxes;  personal income tax;  withholding tax on interest income;  and 
ECB  seigniorage.  The  review  takes  the  form  of commentary and,  for  a  convenient 
summary, of  a tabular presentation of the principal issues at the end of the discussion of 
each resource. 
3.1. COz/Energy tax 
This tax  was proposed by the  Commission in  October 1991, reflecting the increasing 
awareness of potential environmental degradation due to high carbon dioxide emissions. 
The Commission set the objective of stabilising C02  emissions by 2000 at their 1990 
level.  The proposal, which foresaw an increase in the tax to USD 10 per barrel of oil by 
the end of  the century, was virtually abandoned following considerable opposition in the 
Council.  In order to  overcome this opposition, a revised proposal was put forward in 
May 1995 which introduced the concept of a transitional stage whereby Member States 
would  agree  the scope  and  structure  of a  common tax but would be free  to  decide 
product by product, whether to  introduce a positive rate of tax and the level of tax they 
wished to  apply.  However, discussions on this revised proposal broke down on the 
question of  what was to happen at the end ofthe transitional period.  Following this, the 
Ecofin Council of March 11,  1996 called on the Commission to prepare new proposals 
for  the taxation of energy products by expanding the Community excise duty rules on 
mineral  oils  into  a  new  taxation  scheme  for  all  energy  products.  The  European 
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Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee have also argued in favour of such 
an approach. 
The Commission has prepared new proposals intended to strengthen the deepening of 
the internal market and at  the same time to  permit the introduction of energy taxation 
according to national preferences including the granting of tax exemptions for energy-
intensive  industries.  Furthermore,  environmental  protection,  the  development  of a 
sustainable transport policy and the support of EU competitiveness are also objectives 
of the proposals10.  The aim of  the proposals is to establish minimum levels of taxation 
for an enlarged group of energy products.  It is clear, however, that the proposals have 
not been prepared with the view to facilitating the establishment of  new own resources. 
•  The  CO/energy  tax  meets  the  externality  criterion  since  pollution  transcends 
national  frontiers.  The tax  as  such could be  seen as  a means to  internalise the 
negative externalities associated with pollution.  However, given the disparate level 
of development and of energy use  across  the Member States, such a  tax would 
undoubtedly not perform well  on grounds of equity11 .  Furthermore,  since  it  is 
possible,  as  envisaged  in  the  initial  Commission  proposal,  to  exempt  certain 
firms/sectors  from  the  tax  on grounds of undertaking  energy-saving innovations 
this would also effect equity adversely.  Failing the equity criterion, however, is 
secondary since the primary objective of such taxation is,  inevitably, to penalise 
polluters. 
•  Base harmonisation is non-existent although under the Commission's proposals for 
minimum  taxation  of  energy  products  considerable  harmonisation  could  be 
achieved in the future. 
•  On the criterion of visibility, while it is possible to design the taxation in question 
in a transparent manner for the benefit of EU citizens, the possibility of  taxing both 
intermediate and final  products will likely attenuate the visibility link between the 
revenues and the financing of  the EU budget. 
•  Regarding  links  to  common policies,  a  CO/Energy tax  scores  high  since  it  is 
consistent with the EU's environmental objectives.  Moreover, it is consistent with 
the Commission's proposals for establishing minimum levels of  taxation for energy 
products  across  the  Single Market.  The  Commission has  also  suggested using 
10 
11 
See  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  (1997b)  and  Commission  of  the  European 
Communities (1997c). 
Estimates by the Commission suggest that with a USO 10 per barrel the tax would amount to as little 
as 0.79 per cent of GOP in France and  as  much as 3.08 per cent of GOP in Luxembourg;  Greece 
would contribute the equivalent of 2.45 per cent of GOP,  Ireland 1.93 per cent of GOP and  the UK 
1.53 per cent of GOP;  see Commission of the European Communities (1993a), Table 33. 
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environmental taxes  as  a  means to  reduce  the  burden of taxation on  labour and 
foster employment growth without endangering budget restraint12• 
•  It is  uncertain whether the  tax  would  yield sufficient  and  predictable  revenues. 
According  to  Commission  estimates,  a  USD  10  per  barrel  would  yield  the 
equivalent of about one percent of EU GNP, clearly sufficient to  finance  a  large 
part of current and projected EU expenditure.  However, revenue from this tax will 
undoubtedly be unpredictable since it  will  be  levied on  cyclically prone sectors 
exhibiting large variability with respect to economic fluctuations.  Moreover, it is 
possible that  energy  substitution will  take  place  on  a  scale  sufficiently  large  to 
undermine revenues from this source and its suitability as  an own resource for the 
EU. 
•  On grounds of efficiency and cost-effectiveness it  is  difficult to evaluate the C02 
tax.  It is  possible to levy the tax at the stage of primary production, at the import 
stage  and  at  the  stage  of final  consumption/use.  The  optimal  stage,  from  the 
perspective of  the criterion, is that of  primary production and imports;  however, in 
this  case  it  would  not  be  possible  to  exclude  preferred  sectors.  Until  explicit 
proposals  have been defined  at  a  practical  level,  it  is  difficult to  determine  the 
administrative costs/advantages, although it is likely that under some circumstances 
the tax would be administered effectively. 
•  Several Member States have  objected to  this  tax  for  reasons of protecting  their 
international  competitiveness.  An  additional  consideration  may have  been  the 
desire  to  keep  their carbon  taxes  low  in  order to  protect some energy-intensive 
domestic producers.  A co-ordinated implementation of  carbon taxes with EU wide 
tax  exemptions would be necessary to  intemalise these  externalities  and  also  to 
reduce environmental damage. 
As  they  are  predominantly allocative  taxes,  energy  taxes  should be expected to  and, 
indeed, fare poorly in terms of equity and tend to be regressive across Member States. 
This  is  a  lesser concern  given  the  primary objective of the  tax.  At the  same time, 
however,  if it  were  possible  to  reach  a  Council  agreement  on  the  complex  and 
fttndamental  issues involved,  which until  now has  proved  impossible, this tax would 
probably be one of  the most serious candidates for a genuine EU resource. 
12  See  Commission of the  European Communities (1994a),  p.  156, for a discussion, and  also  Dreze 
and  Malinvaud  (1994b).  If revenue  for the  EU  is  indeed  raised  through  a CO/energy tax,  GNP 
contributions  would  decrease  correspondingly  and  Member  States  could  pass  this  on  to  their 
economies through lower taxes on labour. 
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Box 1 
COzEnergy tax 
Criteria  Performance 
Equity  would  not  be  served  well  since  the  tax  would  be  paid 
proportionately more  by those  Member States  dependent on  older and 
more  pollution-intensive  technology;  however.  this  is  an  inevitable 
Equity  consequence of such taxation.  Should it be possible to  exempt certain 
firms/sectors for the tax.  adverse distributional consequences would also 
follow.  Negative  pollution-related  externalities  could  be  internalised 
through a tax assigned to the EU. 
Base harmonisation  Currently non-existent. 
The  link  between  the  tax  and  EU  policies  could  be  made  visible. 
Visibility to taxpayers  However.  with  the  tax applying to  both  final  and.intermediate products 
visibility may not be as transparent as desired. 
Link to common policies 
Clearly  linked  to  Community  environmental  and  tax  harmonisation 
policies. 
A tax of USD10 per barrel could raise revenues equivalent to  about 1% 
Revenue sufficiency,  of  EU GNP.  However, it is possible that substitution away from pollution-
intensive  activities  could  ultimately  lead  to  diminishing  revenues.  efficiency and cost-
Moreover,  revenues may be too sensitive to  business cycle movements  effectiveness 
undermining  sufficiency at a  time  of an  economic  downturn.  The  tax 
could be administered efficiently and effectively. 
3.2.  Modulated VAT tax 
The present VAT  -based resource constitutes a significant source of financing in the EU 
budget.  Although  reforms  implemented  following  the  1988  and  the  1994  Own 
Resources Decisions have improved on undesirable characteristics of this tax significant 
difficulties remain to  be addressed.  Nevertheless, support for a tax based on VAT as  a 
new own resource continues to  remain buoyant.  In recent years, the principal advocate 
for establishing a new own resource on VAT has been the European Parliament which 
has developed extensively the case in a 1994 report13. 
The  report  favours  the  replacement  of the  third  and  fourth  resource  by  a  new third 
resource based on VAT,. and taking the form of a specific percentage of VAT imposed 
for  the benefit of the EU  and levied together with the national VAT taxation.  There 
would, therefore, be a combined VAT rate consisting of the national and the EU rate. 
The  report  also  argues  in  favour  of  a  common  rate  across  the  Member  States 
differentiated across commodities.  To contribute to equity across individuals within the 
Member States, the report proposes that there would be two VAT rates, a lower one and 
13  See European Parliament (1994).  It should be stressed, however. that there are reservations in the 
European Parliament itself regarding  VAT as  an  own  resource.  The  European  Parliament (1990) 
report notes "that VAT. which has become the main source of revenue, while having the  advantage 
of being applied to  a tax which is almost harmonized, has the grave disadvantage of inter-personal 
and spatial regressivity, and should therefore not occupy in future the  pre-eminent position it enjoys 
at the moment";  see European Parliament (1990), Part A,  para. 16. 
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a higher one, for example, the former at 1.5  per cent and the latter at 3.0 per cent.  The 
report  argues  that  the  tax  would  be  imposed  on  a  harmonised  VAT  base  through 
declarations stating clearly on each invoice that it  is an EU tax.  Thus, both national 
parliaments and the EU would be granted the power to determine separately which rate 
would be imposed for purposes of the national budget and which for  the EU budget, 
respectively.  The amounts collected would therefore have a direct link to the EU budget 
in the eyes of  citizens/taxpayers. 
Given the possibility of inequities in gross contributions resulting from such a system, 
the  report  favours  an  equalisation  mechanism14  based  on  GNP.  The  proposed 
mechanism would be based on establishment of  all EU budget resources in a given year 
in terms of  a fixed share in EU GNP.  If a Member State's total contributions at the end 
of  the year as percent of its GNP was lower (higher) than the predetermined benchmark 
then the Member State would make additional payments (receive refunds) equal to the 
difference  between  the  two  shares.  In  this  manner,  the  proposed  system  could 
accommodate country-specific characteristics (regional development etc) and fine tune 
the own resources system in order to ensure improved equity in gross contributions. 
• 
• 
• 
14 
Taxation in the form of VAT is  generally regressive with relatively less well off 
Member States contributing proportionately more as a result of the lower share of 
savings  in  national  income  (the  criterion  of vertical  equity  is  not  satisfied). 
Recognition of  this aspect has led to the capping of the VAT base as well as to the 
reduction of the. VAT call rate and, as a result, the share of VAT in total budget 
resources has diminished. 
It is difficult to see VAT payments as deriving from a common EU source.  VAT 
revenues are nation-specific and, therefore, the criterion of regional arbitrariness is 
likely not satisfied. 
The implementation of this tax  as  proposed  in the European Parliament (1994) 
report could conflict with national  tax  setting  and especially national budgetary 
priorities  unless  close  co-ordination  of  tax  decisions  at  the  two  levels  of 
government is put in place.  In particular, there may l;>e difficulties in integrating an 
EU VAT tax within the national VAT taxation, especially in light of  proposals for a 
minimum VAT taxation in the EU.  However, Keen (1995) suggests that although 
it is possible that the combined (national and EU) VAT rate may be set too high, 
this remains an empirical question that cannot be reso.lved a priori. 
An  equalization mechanism had  already been  proposed, also  by  the  European  Parliament, in  the 
early 1980s;  see European Parliament (1984), article 73. 
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•  VAT base harmonisation is  advanced.  Following the Sixth VAT Directive15,  and 
barring the  possibility  of changing  the  basket of goods  and  services  subject  to 
minimum VAT taxation, base harmonisation is now substantial. 
•  In  the  form  of two  separate  tax  rates,  a  national  and  an  EU  one,  the  tax  will 
undoubtedly be highly visible to  taxpayers/citizens and is certain to be understood 
as a contribution to the EU budget, thus improving on the democratic deficit. 
•  It is  likely that the  tax will  yield sufficient revenues for  the purposes of the EU 
budget.  Nevertheless,  private  consumption,  which  would  be  the  principal 
component  of  the  VAT  tax  base,  has  pronounced  cyclical  characteristics.  · 
Fluctuations in private consumption are a leading cause of business cycles.  The 
replacement of the current  3rd  and· 41h resources with a VAT  resource of the type 
proposed  would  undoubtedly  raise  the  variability of EU  budget  revenues.  It is 
worth recalling that the recession of the early 1990s had significant effects on EU 
revenues during that period. 
•  The co-occupancy of the same base by national and EU authorities will contribute 
to  reducing  compliance  and  monitoring  costs  (compared  to  introducing  an 
independent a new tax) and to  also  limiting the extent of tax  fraud,  evasion and 
avoidance.  With  the  national  VAT  rate  exceeding  significantly  the  EU  one 
Member States should have sufficiently strong incentives to monitor compliance on 
the  part  of taxpayers.  Nevertheless,  the  present  experience with  VAT  revenue 
performance· since  the  recession  indicates  that  problems  of compliance  may  be 
important. 
In  order to  ensure  that  fiscal  obstacles  to  the  completion of the  Single  Market  are 
abolished the Sixth VAT Directive provided that a definitive VAT  system ought to  be 
based on taxation in the Member State where the goods or services are suppliedl6.  The 
Commission has  put  forward  ideas  for  minimum VAT taxation  which  are  consistent 
with  the  origin-based system17  and  which  are  likely to  ease  some  of the  drawbacks 
currently characterising VAT as an own resource. 
With  an  origin-based  VAT  system  for  the  EU,  VAT  might  present  itself as  a  good 
candidate  for  a  genuine  own  resource.  It has  considerable  attractions  in  terms  of 
visibility, adequacy and buoyancy although some key reservations cannot be ignored. 
However, a principal difficulty relates to the regressive nature of the tax.  Should it be 
necessary  to  introduce  corrections  in  the  form  of  a  GNP-related  equalisation 
15 
16 
17 
See Council Directive 91/680/EEC. 
See Council Directive 91/680/EEC. 
See  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  (1996),  and  Commission  of  the  European 
Communities (1997d). 
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mechanism, some of the attractions of this resource (for example, the link with the tax 
actually paid by taxpayers and its transparency) would disappear. 
Box2 
'  Modulated VAT tax 
Criteria  Performance 
Despite modifications VAT continu9s to be a regressive tax for the EU. 
Equity  No  cross-border externalities although moving to  an  origin-based VAT 
goes in the directions of  making VAT an EU tax.  Not entirely consistent 
with national tax objectives. 
Base harmonisation  Substantial, following the Sixth VAT Directive. 
Visibility to taxpayers  Highly visible,  especially if  recorded on each transaction along with the 
national VAT,  and familiar to taxpayers. 
Link to common policies  Consistent with the establishment of  EU-wide minimum tax rules. 
Revenue sufficiency,_ 
Likely sufficient resources  will become available,  although  they could 
efficiency and cost- exhibit  high  variability;  it  is  possible  to  administer  the  system 
effectively although  administrative  costs  will  certainly be  higher than 
effectiveness 
under the present system. 
3.3.  Excise duties ori tobacco, alcohol and mineral oil 
Excise duties are taxes levied on the production or consumption of specific goods.  In 
the EU "excise duties apply to  a narrow group of goods, tobacco, alcohol and mineral 
oils.  One  attraction  of excise  taxes  is  the  perceived  ease  of introduction  and  the 
sufficiency of revenues.  Currently all  Member States impose such taxes but there are 
enormous  lifferences between the rates applied.  Although tobacco and alcohol excises 
in  particular  are  regarded  as  important  instruments  of national  social  policy  it  is 
conceivable that part of  their yield could be assigned to the EU level. 
Currently, excises rates are subject to  mini-mum rules in the EU but the levels are very 
low  and,  as  a  result,  they  permit wide  differences  among  Member States  that  have 
chosen to  levy excises at often significantly higher rates.  Excises are often employed 
for reasons of  public health and, as a result, they reflect to a considerable extent national 
socio-political priorities.  The European Parliament (1994).report, by referring to  them 
as  "educational taxes", considered such excises in a similar light too.  The report also 
acknowledged that on equity grounds they would be inappropriate as new resources for 
the budget. 
The share of the bases of the excises  in GNP  differs substantially across the Member 
States.  Consequently,  if it  were  that  Member  States  contribute  on  the  basis  of a 
common rate levied on the actual bases of excise duties, the proportions in contributions 
by Member State would differ widely.  This would not be consistent with equity across 
the  Member  States  while,  at  the  same  time,  such  taxes  are  also  regressive  across 
consumers (smoking is  a clear case).  Nevertheless, such regressivity is  a part of the 
design and policy objectives of excise duties and should not necessarily be considered 
as a drawback in the present context. 
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Beyond revenue considerations, taxing demerit goods is  increasingly seen as promoting 
allocative objectives.  Consumption of  such goods can be a serious hazard to health and 
imposes considerable costs in containment and treatment of  die~eases.  Moreover, excises 
on mineral oils can be regarded as  serving environmental objectives.  The tax base, 
especially for tobacco and alcohol excises, is narrow.  Revenues from demerit goods are 
characterised by low elasticities with respect to  GNP but they display high elasticities 
with respect to changes in the excise tax rates since the goods on which they are levied 
tend  to  be  price-inelastic1 B.  Despite  their  "educational  nature"  it  is  of course 
questionable  whether  it  is  appropriate  to  base  the  financing  of the  EU  budget  on 
dissuasive taxation, especially since in the long-run consumption of these goods could 
perhaps follow a diminishing trend. 
> 
The EU's involvement in the area of excise taxation is  based on the requirement to 
ensure unrestricted mobility of goods subject to these duties within the internal market. 
Presently, several directives govern excise rates and structures in the EU19.  They define 
minimum excise rates for each product type and determine the product types subject to 
excise levies and explain the method of implementing the duties as well as the criteria 
for exemptions or preferential treatment as the case may be.  As a result of these steps, 
considerable if yet still !ncomplete base harmonisation has been achieved.  In the case 
of mineral oils in particular, exemptions continue to be numerous2o.  The Commission 
has proposed, in the context of the Single Market, extending the scope of taxation to 
cover all energy products, especially taking into account the wish of several Member 
States to pursue environmental objectives under the umbrella of EU initiatives21.  The 
Commission considers the removal of indirect tax obstacles to  the completion of the 
Single Market as a policy priority22. 
• 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Excise  taxes,  particularly  those  on  demerit  goods,  are  regressive  both  across 
Member States and across individuals.  Equity concerns would, therefore, arise but 
this is  not a decisive drawback being an inevitable consequence of such taxation. 
Moreover, the differences in shares across the Member States reflect differences in 
the  rates  of national  tax  systems.  Taxation of mineral  oil  also  creates  equity 
problems as mentioned previously under heading 3.3. 
See Begg et. al. (1997), p.40. 
The earliest dates back to original Single Market program and the latest concerns the harmonization 
of excises on  mineral oil,  Commission of the  European  Communities (1997b).  There are  in  total 
seven Directives on excise rates and structures currently in force. 
While EU  legislation governing excises on  mineral oils requires a single rate  per product, Member 
States can  request to  maintain or introduce  reduced  rates  or exemptions  on  grounds of specific 
policy considerations under  Article 8(4), Directive 92/81/EEC. 
See Commission of the European Communities (1995). 
See Commission of the European Communities (1997d), p. 5-7, 16 and 26 for a discussion. 
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•  The assignment of part of  the excise taxation to  the EU level would be favoured in 
the  circumstances  where  it  is  necessary  to  internalise  trans-border  pollution 
externalities. 
•  On the other hand,  however, national preferences for particular policies regarding 
demerit goods may not be adequately accounted for under an EU assignment, thus 
violating the subsidiarity principle.  Respecting local preferences argues clearly in 
favour of  assigning these taxes to national parliaments. 
•  There is only moderate visibility to taxpayers/citizens. 
•  The main area where there are links with common policies is in the field of  mineral 
oils where there is  some degree of interrelation with transport, environmental and 
energy  policies.  In  addition,  there  are  some,  albeit  tenuous,  links  with 
health/consumer protection objectives. 
•  Low price  and income  elasticities  suggest  that  the  revenue  from  these  taxes  is 
stable;  also, consumption of demerit goods is  not cyclical.  Excise rates tend to be 
changed  relatively  frequently  to  adjust  for  inflation  or  to  obtain  increased 
government  revenue  but  the  revenue  consequences  of these  changes  are  not 
predictable with a great degree of  accuracy. 
•  Harmonisation at  the EU level  has  not advanced as  much as  in the case of VAT 
particularly in respect of  rate levels. 
•  Administration and  collection costs will be substantially higher than it is the case 
for  the  current  own resources.  Nevertheless,  relying  on  present  administration 
structures could alleviate these costs.  Co-habitation by national and EU authorities 
on the same tax base could also give rise to conflicts similar to those encountered in 
the case of VAT discussed previously. 
Box3 
Excise duties on tobacco, alcohol and mineral oil 
Criteria  Performance 
The  equity  of the  yield  of these  taxes  may  be  poor,  but  given  the 
Equity  characteristics  of the  goods  bein9.  taxed  this  may  be  a  secondary 
consideration. 
Base harmonisation  Advanced. 
Visibility to taxpayers  Moderate/Low. 
Link to common policies  Tax harmonisation linked to internal market policies. 
Although  the  base  is  narrow.  revenue  could  be  substantial.  Low 
Revenue sufficiency,  income  and  price  elasticities  of tobacco  and  alcohol  imply  stable 
efficiency and cost- revenues.  A Community tax is unlikely to  cause additional compliance 
effectiveness  costs.  Evasion and fraud in the area of excises is  significant. reflecting 
the generally high level of  rates levied. 
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Excises suffer notably from  equity concerns.  Despite finding favour for  discouraging 
consumption of demerit goods,  and  for  promoting environmental objectives, Member 
States may not be willing to share important fiscal instruments. 
3.4. Corporate income tax 
Using corporate income as  a tax base for  a new own resource has  been examined on 
several occasions23.  At the background of  these proposals is the evidence that revenues 
from corporate taxes are an important component of national budget revenues24  and also 
that in  federations corporate tax  revenues are either shared between different levels of 
government or the  different  levels  of government  impose their  own corporate  taxes. 
Moreover,  the  benefit  taxation  principle  predicts  that  those  benefiting  from  current 
policies ought to pay for the policies.  In the present case, corporations are expected to 
benefit substantially both from  the Single Market and from  EMU, the former through 
the expansion of the domestic market and the latter as  a result of price transparency and 
enhanced  competition.  In this  perspective,  corporate  taxation  holds  the  promise not 
only to  provide sufficient resources for the EU budget as  well but a:lso  to be consistent 
with the practice in national tax systems. 
Keen  (1995)  points  to  three  dimensions  of interest  of the  corporate  tax  system  in 
Europe.  First, the schedule of statutory rates at which the tax is  levied;  according to 
Albi et.  a!.  (1997), in 1996 these ranged from 28 per cent in Finland and Sweden and 33 
per cent in the UK to 55.9 per cent in Germany and 53.2 per cent in Italy2s.  Second, the 
definition of the tax base upon which the tax is levied.  Here, the variety of regulation:; 
and  exemptions  governing  corporate  income,  including  provisions  for  international 
taxation, constitute a complex and intractable problem.  And, third, the extent to which 
the corporate tax is  integrated with the personal income tax code so that corporate taxes 
are  measured against personal  tax  liabilities26.  He concludes that there is  substantial 
variation across the Member States in terms of the three aspects although, as pointed out 
by the Ruding Report, there has been a considerable amount of convergence in recent 
years27 .  The severest difficulty for corporate taxation to become an own resource is the 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
See, for example, the report by the European Parliament (1990);  for a recent thorough review of the 
issues involved see Albi et. -al.  (1997). 
According to  Eurostat, in  1995 these amounted to  as little as  1.6 per cent of GOP  in  Germany and 
as  much as  5.1  per cent of GOP  in  Luxembourg;  for the  EU-15,  they were  2.4  per cent of GOP. 
They also ranged from a low of 2.9 per cent of total tax revenues in Austria to a high of 11.6 per cent 
in  Luxembourg, while for EU-15 they amounted to 5. 7 per cent of total tax revenues. 
See Albi et.  al. (1997), chart 1, p. 39. 
See  Keen  (1995),  section  3.8,  p.  64  and also  Commission of the  European  Communities  (1993a), 
ch.  7,  p. 87-88. 
See  Commission of the  European Communities (1992d),  especially ch.  8,  p.  153-185.  Bureau and 
Champsaur  (1992)  attribute  this  convergence  to  the  improved  tax  treatment  accorded  to  capital 
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diversity of  the tax base in the EU.  Unlike similar obstacles encountered in the case of 
other potential candidates, the degree of base diversity in corporate taxation constitutes 
a serious disadvantage28. 
Albi et.  al.  (1997) examined the possibility of responding to  the base diversity in  the 
context of considering corporate taxation as  an  own resource.  In reviewing potential 
indicators  for  measuring the corporate sector's contributive capacity to  the  EU,  they 
concluded that the profit or loss account could be a reasonable base.  However, it was 
found to be second best compared to the definition of  the corporate base in terms of the 
"real" corporate flow of funds29.  The latter, which is the equivalent of an expenditure 
tax in the area of corporate taxation, was found to be appealing from both the economic 
and  the  administrative  perspective.  Spahn  (1993)  is  also  favouring  this  concept30. 
However, even in this case significant difficulties would have first to be resolved before 
serious consideration is given to this candidate.  .. 
+  Assigning  corporate  taxation  to  the  level of the  EU reflects  several  concernsJI. 
Because of the lack of exact specificity of the incidence of corporate taxes, some 
degree of centralisation at  a higher level of authority can be optimal;  corporate 
taxes are invariably paid by consumers and producers whose residence does not 
necessarily coincide with the jurisdiction of the tax-imposing authority resulting in 
revenues  accruing  to  authorities  different  from  those  of the  country  where  the 
income originates. 
+  This is  also the case for taxes imposed on shareholders of corporations residing in 
different countries;  in  effect,  taxes on distributed corporate  profits  are  paid  by 
residents of  nations other than the tax-imposing ones. 
+  Corporate  tax  rates  have  declined  considerably  in  recent  years,  reflecting  both 
international competition for  investment and supply-side concerns.  It is  possible 
that  Member States  could  benefit  from  an  increase  in  corporate  taxation  even 
though none has incentive to act alone.  A collectively imposed increase at the level 
of  the EU could serve as a vehicle for such a policy. 
28 
29 
30 
31 
income  by  European  governments  made  necessary following  the  liberalization  and  integration  of 
capital markets in EU. 
For the diversity of the corporate income tax provisions in several, including some EU,  countries in 
1994 see Mintz (1996). 
This is defined in terms of all sales of real goods and services including proceeds from sale of fixed 
assets,  net  of  purchases  of  real  goods  and  services  and  of  wages,  salaries  social  security 
contributions and related charges. 
See Spahn (1993). 
See Begg et. al. (1997), p.  26-29. 
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•  There are  serious administrative hurdles  in operating the  tax  when multinational 
firms engage in transfer pricing or thin capitalisation32 practices.  Despite efforts to 
control  such  practices,  much  remains  beyond  the  control  of  national 
administrations. 
•  Different corporate tax systems impair economic efficiency while, with the Single 
Market, tax competition could lead to resource misallocation. 
•  With capital mobile and labour immobile, corporate taxes would tend to  be borne 
predominantly by the latter, thus pointing also to assigning the tax to a higher level 
of authority.  _Regarding  horizontal  equity  across  the  Member States,  corporate 
taxation  not  only  reflects  poorly  contributive  capacity  but  also  could  lead  to 
substantial distortions in the presence of  transfer pricing. 
•  A corporate tax would not be visible to citizens as consumers but only as owners of 
firms;  as a result, it would not enhance accountability. 
•  In terms of links to  other Community policies, clearly such a tax would advance 
integration in the context of the Single Market.  In addition, as in the case of the 
CO/energy tax, it could help shifting the burden of  taxation away from labour, thus 
contributing to better employment performances. 
•  Revenues  from  corporate  taxation  are  notoriously  highly  cyclical;  as  an  EU 
resource, it would cause contributions to  be variable.  Potential revenues  from  a 
corporate tax resource  would  undoubtedly  be  sufficient33  and  the  tax  could  be 
administered  through  the  Member  States.  However,  corporate  practices  could 
result in significant tax evasion and fraud. 
Developing. a corporate tax  system  assigned to  the  EU  would be  consistent with the 
Commission's view that taxes on labour ought to be replaced by taxes on corporations as 
a means to  encouraging employment growth.  However, a principal drawback of a new 
own resource in the form of corporate taxation is the absence of a harmonised base and 
32 
33 
Thin  capitalization  refers  to  the  practice where,  in  order to  take  advantage  of the  differential  tax 
treatment of debt and equity in different territories, and in view of the fact that interest on debt enjoys 
considerable tax relief, firms choose to  finance operations through debt rather than  equity, so  that 
they shift tax  liabilities ftom  the  high  to  low tax territories.  A thinly capitalized firm  is one whose 
debUequity ratio is  relatively high.  Given the differential tax treatment of corporate income across 
the Member States, this practice can  lead to  significant resource misallocation.  The term is due to 
Devereux and Pearson (1989). 
According to  the European Parliament (1990), the  proportion of corporate tax revenues accruing to 
the highest level of government in federal OECD  states varies between varies from  30  per cent to 
over 100 per cent.  If the average amount of 64 per cent of corporate tax revenues were to accrue to 
the EU  budget this would generate some Ecu  65  billion in  revenues (1988 prices), roughly "double 
the level of resources now available to the Community";  see European Parliament (1990), part C,  p. 
21. 
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the difficulties involved in developing fully such a base.  Should the harmonised base be 
defined differently from  the national ones, this could raise administrative, compliance 
and monitoring costs.  The integration of  the corporate and the personal tax schedules in 
some Member States would also  make it  politically unattractive,  although this  would 
not  be  a  concern  if the  Albi  et.  al.  (1997) I Spahn  (1993)  proposal  were  to  be 
implemented.  Overall, corporate taxation does not perform well when judged against 
key criteria for own resources. 
Box4 
Corporate income tax 
Criteria  Performance 
Corporate taxes levied on  profits are generally consistent with  equity, 
although trans-border input purchases and output sales,  together with 
transfer-pricing practices,  make  allocation of firms' profits  to  a  single 
Member  State  difficult.  To  the  extent  that  production  is  becoming 
Equity  globalised there is justification for levying corporate taxes at EU level. 
With an increasing number of  firms operating in more than one Member 
State  harmonisation  at a  higher level of the  corporate  tax  code  is 
appropriate.  Multiple corporate tax arrangements are an obstacle to full 
implementation of  the Single Market. 
Base harmonisation  Virtually non-existent. 
Limited visibility, not to consumers but only to  firms.  The  tax could be 
Visibility to taxpayers  presented as a contribution on  the part of firms for benefits they enjoy 
as a result of  the completion of  the internal market. 
Link to common policies  Linked to complementing the Single Market. 
Corporate  taxes  account  for  a  considerable  share  of revenues  in 
Revenue sufficiency, efficiency 
national budgets and,  thus,  they are likely to yield sufficient resources. 
and cost-effectiveness  Corporate  taxes  are  very cyclical.  Compliance  and efficiency costs, 
which will depend on the definition of  the EU and the national tax base, 
are likely to be substantial. 
3.5. Communications taxation 
The proposal to use taxation of communications services as a source of revenue for the 
EU budget was  made by Begg et.  al.  (1997)34  in  the context of taking  advantage of 
opportunities developing within the internal market.  On the one hand, closer integration 
and market liberalisation have given rise to an increasing volume of activities related to 
communications;  on the other, the presence of  externalities favours assigning new taxes 
to  the  EU level  and,  indeed,  regulation is  shifting in this  direction.  Arguing also  in 
favour of such taxes, is  the development of EU policies  to  improve  links  among the 
Member States.  The bases  for  communications taxes  are  road  and  air  transport and 
telecommunications  services  including  possibly  broadcasting,  areas  of  rapidly 
expanding economic activities. 
34  See Begg et. al. (1997), p. 43-46. 
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Begg et.  al.  ( 1997) suggest three bases for communications taxation.  First, telephones 
and mobile telephone services;  secondly, road transport, an area already suffering from 
congestion;  and,  third,  air  transport,  an  area  where  deregulation  will  boost  further 
growth. 
•  Road and  air traffic congestion suggest the need to  price  these activities more in 
accordance  with  environmental  objectives.  Increasing  integration,  following  the 
completion of the internal market, and the expansion of air travel indicate that it is 
not immediately possible to  determine the ultimate base of the tax.  Although the 
tax  would  belong  to  a  higher  level  of authority,  it  would  not  be  possible  to 
detem1ine how each Member State contributes.  At the  same time,  assuming that 
income  is  positively  correlated  with  air  travel  tax,  then  it  would be  progressive 
across individuals. 
•  Telecommunications services are highly correlated with GNP and,  as  a result, they 
are not inconsistent with equity considerations. 
•  The taxes would not be visible in the case of transport, but more so  in the case of 
air travel;  they would be clearly visible in the case of  telecommunications. 
•  The taxes are  linked to  common policies mainly through transport directives and 
through  initiatives  to  foster  EU  competitiveness  by  modernising  transport  and 
telecommunications infrastructure. 
•  Communications and transport services are already subject t0  VAT and/or excise 
duties. 
•  The base is well defined and harmonisation is  already de facto advanced or can be 
easily accomplished. 
•  Despite the  projected high  growth of communications services,  it  is  certain that 
revenues from this source will be adequate to  finance only part of the EU budget. 
Begg et.  a!.  (1997)  estimate that an  airport departure tax  of Ecu  15  would yield 
around  10 per cent of the EU budget, while an  annual average tax  per telephone 
line of Ecu 40 could finance another 10 per cent of  the budget. 
•  The  administrative  costs  involved  in  the  collection  of these  taxes  would  be 
substantially higher than under the present system; the taxation of communication 
would involve setting up a family of  new own resources and not just one. 
It  is  possible  that  communications  taxes  will  ultimately  militate  against  long-term 
progress in  competitiveness.  A further possible disadvantage is  the need to introduce 
new taxes as well as to change the rates currently charged by Member States.  Although 
politically  costly,  such  measures  may  encounter  objections  only  during  the  initial 
introductory period.  There is little to be done on base harmonisation in the case of road 
transport and  air travel but in the  case of telecommunications  it  will  be necessary to 
attain some harmonisation. 
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Begg et. a!.  (1997) propose that the communications tax becomes part of a broader set 
of own resources  over the  next  Financial  Perspective,  substituting gradually  for  the 
diminishing share of traditional  own resources in the EU budget.  Over the medium 
term, they see continuing use of these taxes provided that once introduced they prove to 
function weJJ35. 
Box5 
Communications taxes 
Criteria  Performance 
Uncertain whether equity is well served:  yes.  if road and air transport 
and telecommunications services are correlated with income;  no,  if the 
former are relatively more important in poorer regions.  By internalising 
Equity  congestion costs transport taxes could said to  belong to the EU /eve/. 
Moreover,  closer trade integration makes it difficult to  determine which 
Member  State  would  be  paying  the  tax  on  road  and  air  transport 
activities.  Taxes would be paid by both consumers and producers 
Base harmonisation  Already advanced or can be accomplished rather easily. 
Visibility to taxpayers 
For transport taxes, likely limited;  for air travel and telecommunications 
taxes highly visible. 
Link to common policies 
Consistent  with  transport  directives  and  with  strengthening 
competitiveness through the TEN initiatives. 
Given the growth potential of  communications services, revenue growth 
could be buoyant but sufficiency is  certainly not assured since  only 
Revenue sufficiency, efficiency  20%  of the  EU budget could be expected to  be financed  through  this 
and cost-effectiveness  source.  There  is  also  an  important  cyclical  component  in  such 
activities.  Revenues  could  be  collected  easily  through  existing 
structures, scope for evasion and fraud rather limited. 
3.6.  Personal income tax 
Personal taxes constitute the most direct and visible link between taxpayers/citizens and 
elected authorities.  The attraction of imposing surcharges on personal  income as  the 
EU's own resources partly rests on the opportunity to exploit this direct link in order to 
enhance  accountability  and  to  contribute  towards  mitigating  the  importance  of the 
"democratic  deficit".  Personal  tax  constitutes  a  buoyant .source  of revenues  but  its 
importance  differs  significantly  across  the  Member  States36.  Steps  towards 
harmonisation of indirect taxation at the EU level leave only personal income taxation 
35 
36 
See Begg et. al. (1997), p. 68-71  for a discussion of these issues. 
According  to  Eurostat  data.  taxes  on  personal  income  amounted  to  23.4  per  cent  of total  tax 
revenues in  1995, ranging  from  16.4 per cent in  France to  47.7 per cent in  Denmark.  In terms of 
GDP, revenues from taxation of personal income represented 9.7 per cent in  1995, ranging from 7.3 
per cent in France to 24.5 per cent in Denmark. 
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to  represent the limited discretionary room for Member States to  exercise stabilisation, 
budgetary and social policy37. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
37 
There  are  no  externalities favouring  assignment of personal taxation to  a higher 
level of authority.  The conventional argument for efficient taxation of mobile tax 
bases does not apply to  EU income earners who  are currently a highly immobile 
labour force. 
Income tax rules differ widely between the Member States and the complexity of 
the income tax schedule in terms of  thresholds, personal and family exemptions and 
allowances poses significant problems  for  base  harmonisation;  it  is  certain that 
horizontal equity, across individual and Member States, will not be respected under 
present rules.  Moreover, militating against base harmonisation is the very limited 
mobility of labour in  the  EU,  as  a result of which pressures  for convergence in 
income tax rules are very weak. 
There is  political opposition to  base harmonisation.  Moreover, differences in tax 
and overall economic policies would make it  impossible to  achieve consensus on 
these issues.  On at least these grounds, personal taxation ought to remain assigned 
at the national level. 
The visibility of the tax would be particularly high, as would be the link between 
the  financing  of the  EU  and  the  husbandry of resources  made _available  to  the 
budget;  it is certain that accountability would be enhanced. 
There is no direct link between such a tax and other EU policies  . 
It is possible that the co-occupancy of the same tax base by national authorities and 
the  EU  could  complicate  the  management  of national  economic  and  budgetary 
priorities.  As noted previously, the ability to influence stabilisation policy through 
interventions in  the personal tax  code would be reduced.  Moreover, the balance 
between direct and other taxes in national tax structure may be adversely affected. 
The  tax,  depending  on  its  design,  can  potentially  yield  sufficient  revenues  to 
finance completely the EU budget.  However, personal income is highly correlated 
with the business cycle and revenues could exhibit considerable co-variability with 
the business cycle although the  small  share of the EU budget in EU GNP would 
tend to mitigate the importance of  this effect. 
For  references  to  the  several  proposals  for  an  income  tax-based  EU  resource  see  Begg  et.  al. 
(1997). 
7-10-1998 ANNEX2 
-20-
•  There are no major obstacles to revenue collection on the basis of  current practices; 
however,  evasion  and  under-reporting of income  for  tax  purposes  is  a common 
problem in several Member States and will remain so in the case of  an EU tax. 
Begg et.  al.  ( 1991) discuss  some proposals for  designing a new own  resource on the 
basis of personal income tax.  A key conclusion is that, with progressivity as a central 
objective and assuming that 50 per cent of budget exper.diture is  financed through the 
progressive  resource,  the  resulting degree of progressivity  in  the  context  of Agenda 
2000 may be too sharply pronounced to be politically comfortableJs. 
Box6 
Personal income tax 
Criteria  Performance 
Differential taxation of various sources of income and interventions in 
the  form  of personal  and other allowances  have  led  to  significant 
Equity  differences In the tax base which, should this become an own resource, 
would  lead  to  horizontal  (across  individuals  and  Member  States) 
inequities.  Given the immobility of  EU taxpayers/workers, conventional 
arguments in favour of  centralisation of  income tax do not apply. 
Base harmonisation  Non·existent. 
Visibility to taxpayers  Highly visible tax. 
Link to common policies  No direct links. 
Revenue sufficiency,  Sufficient,  generally  stable,  albeit  variable,  and  likely  substantial 
efficiency and cost-
revenues.  Few  additional  costs  in  administering  the  system  and 
effectiveness  collecting tax revenues.  Depending on the exact design of the system, 
it is oossible that compliance and avoidance costs would increase. 
3.7. Withholding tax on interest income 
Differences in residence and the location of economic activities gives rise to potential 
avoidance of  taxation of income, a case particularly pronounced in flows of  interest and 
dividend income.  In practice, differences in the  tax  treatment of savings and capital 
income  has  the  potential  of allocating  capital  towards  the  lowest  tax jurisdiction,  a 
possibility that could cause harmful tax competition and could cause serious resource 
misallocation;  taxing at a higher level of  authority would limit such resource allocation 
costs. 
38  See Begg et. al. (1997), p. 23-24;  they estimate that on the basis of an EU budget of 1.27 per cent 
of EU-15  GNP  and  with  50  per cent of expenditure  financed  through  the  progressive  resource, 
Portugal would contribute as little as 0.47 per cent of GNP and  luxembourg as much as  2.07 per 
cent  of GNP  and  the  contribution  of the  remaining  Member  States  would  fall  in  between  these 
shares. 
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In the EU, Luxembourg the Netherlands and Denmark are exceptions in that they have 
no withholding tax.  All other Member States - except Belgium, Austria, Finland and 
Sweden - levy no withholding tax on non-residents.  As a result, following the removal 
of exchange controls,  it  is  possible  for  foreigners  to  avoid  taxes  altogether by using 
Member States where no withholding tax exists to channel their earnings. 
Following an invitation from  the Council, the Commission presented a proposal for  a 
Directive to ensure a minimum of effective taxation of savings income in the form of 
interest  payments  within  the  Community  on  20  May  199839.  The  Commission's 
proposal aims at  ensuring a minimum taxation on interest  income paid in  a Member 
State to a beneficiary in another Member State.  The proposed minimum rate is set at 20 
per cent and Member States can choose to  levy a higher rate if they so wish.  Member 
States can choose to either apply this withholding tax rate or to provide information on 
income earned to  all  other Member States where the beneficiary has his residency (in 
the commentary on the proposal, this  is  called the "coexistence model").  As  will be 
seen below, the proposal does not form a promising base for the establishment of  a new 
EU own resource. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
39 
40 
Economic efficiency would argue in favour of  assigning the tax to a higher level of 
authority. 
It is  unclear what the  equity implications of this  tax  would be,  and  there are  no 
immediately  available  data  to  evaluate  this  aspect  properly.  In  principle,  the 
imposition of the tax would not offend the equity criterion given that the level of 
savings, and wealth, are likely highly correlated wita the level of  income. 
The tax would be greatly visible to (perhaps a narro'.v group of) taxpayers . 
Base  harmonisation  is  inadequate.  In  some  cases  withholding  taxes  may  be 
imposed on interest and dividend income earned from investments abroad, in others 
on  income earned  from  investments  abroad  and  at  home,  and  yet in  other cases 
withholding taxes may be levied on interest but not on dividend income, and vice 
versa, while the tax treatment of  capital gains can be also diverse. 
The Commission's proposal for  a minimum withholding tax,  while it  defines the 
overall base on which the tax will be levied40, opens, at the same time, through the 
"coexistence model", the possibility of shifts between the individual national bases. 
The Commission's proposal for  a minimum withholding tax  has  a strong link to 
common policies.  Since the  logic  of a withholding tax  is  directly linked to  the 
See Commission of the European Communities (1998). 
See Commission of the European Communities (1998), Articles 4 and 5. 
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liberalisation of  capital and financial markets and the removal of  exchange controls 
in  recent years, it clearly complements the liberalisation policies by ensuring that 
capital does not enjoy undue advantage over the immobile factor labour in its tax 
treatment. 
•  It is  not  possible to  determine whether sufficient revenues would flow  from  this 
tax41.  Furthermore, interest rate and capital markets fluctuations could make these 
revenues  particularly  variable  and  unpredictable  especially  in  periods  of rapid 
structural change in the financial system as has been witnessed in recent years.  It is 
also possible that financial  institutions will develop new instruments to  avoid the 
tax. 
Box 7 
Withholding tax on interest income 
Criteria  Performance 
Because  of capital mobility the  tax  is  necessary  to  ensure  symmetric 
treatment of capital and labour for tax purposes.  Although  this  would 
suggest assigning the tax to  the  EU,  it is questionable whether it would 
Equity 
be  consistent with  horizontal equity.  The  level of savings is  positively 
correlated with  the  level of income,  so that  this  tax  could be  seen  as 
progressive.  However,  this  at the  moment is  only a conjecture  since 
there is no data concerning trans-border investment by Member State to 
evaluate this proposition. 
Base harmonisation  Incomplete, althoug"h progress has been made in this direction. 
Visibility to taxpayers  Greatly visible. 
Linked to the proposed Directive on a minimum withholding tax.  It would 
Link to common policies 
also  be  comp/ementinc  the  removal  of exchange  controls  and  the 
liberalisation .of capital and financial markets in that it ensures that capital 
does not enjoy preferential treatment relative to labour. 
Uncertain revenue, also variable and unpredictable.  Collection of the tax 
Revenue sufficiency,  by financial institutions is  simple and involves no  additional compliance 
efficiency and cost- costs.  Establishing  a  common  minimum  tax  would  require  the 
effectiveness  establishment of  a corresponding administrative apparatus for monitoring 
and compliance purposes. 
The purpose of the Commission's proposal is to  prevent harmful competition between 
national tax systems which could be contributing to  the erosion of the tax base in some 
Member States, to remove tax-induced distortions and to  ensure compatibility with the 
internal market rules.  Consequently, the proposal has not been made with a view to 
exploiting a potential new own resource.  Indeed, the proposal offers little promise for 
founding a new  own resource on a withholding tax since, first,  it applies only to non-
residents who  earn interest in  a given Member State and,  secondly,  the  "coexistence 
model" would make it difficult to quantify the base on which the tax would be levied. 
41  One  estimate,  put  forward  by  Dreze  and  Malinvaud  (1994),  section  9.2,  p.  98,  places  potential 
revenues  at  1 per cent of EU  GNP or more.  This  is  clearly sufficient to  meet a large part of the 
budgetary  needs.  However,  the  authors  offer  no  indication  of how  they  have  arrived  at  this 
estimate. 
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3.8. ECB seigniorage 
Seigniorage  derives  from  the  central  bank's  monopoly  position  as  note  issuer 
constituting legal tender, the liabilities of which are not remunerated or, in the case of 
compulsory  reserves,  they  are  remunerated  at  below-market  interest  rates.  These 
unremunerated  liabilities  constitute  the  monetary  base,  the  counterpart  of which 
(holdings of government bonds and of other assets such as  foreign exchange reserves) 
yields interest at market rates.  The profits so derived constitute the principal source of 
central bank revenue.  In  practice,  a tax  on seigniorage amounts to a tax  on ECB  or 
national central bank profits. 
Seigniorage does not accrue directly to  the treasury but to the central bank which,  in 
tum,  transfers  part of its  profits  to  the  government.  Seigniorage was  an  important 
source of government finance  in several Member States during years of high inflation 
and in countries where the  financial  system was regulated42.  Since the advent of the 
convergence process and the sharp decline of inflation in recent years seigniorage has 
become a  very  small  fraction  of the  revenue  in  the  budget of virtually  all  Member 
States.  Moreover, with the establishment of central bank independence in virtually all 
the Member States in recent years there can be no  presumption that the profits of the 
central  bank will  automatically accrue  to  the  government.  Finally,  in  future  years, 
according to the rules set out in the Treaty em European Union, seigniorage will accrue 
to the European Central Bank (ECB) as a result of its note-issuing monopoly position. 
This revenue will be distributed to  constituent central banks according to  their capital 
subscription  in the  ECB43  and  indirectly  to  the  governments  in  the  Member  States. 
Thus,  to  make  possible  the  transfer  of seigniorage  to  the  EU  budget  it  would  be 
necessary to tax directly the national central bank profits associated with this. 
42 
43 
There are many estimates of seigniorage revenues in the literature.  See, for example, the estimates 
reported  in  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  (1993a),  Table  32,  p.  90.  Gros  (1990) 
estimates that in 1982 seigniorage amounted to 5.86 per cent of GOP in Portugal but were only 0.80 
per cent of GNP in  1993;  the corresponding data for Greece are 3.39 per cent and  0.90 per cent; 
for  Italy,  1.45 per cent and  0.75  per  cent;  for Spain  1.87 per cent and  0.91  per cent;  and  for 
Germany, 0.48 per cent and  0.52 per cent;  see Gros (1990), Table 7.1, p.  165.  See also Rovelli 
(1994) for additional and more detailed estimates of the sources and role of seigniorage in the public 
finances of several  Member States.  Finally,  Suiter et.  al.  (1998), Table  10.1, p.  183, provide the 
most recent update concerning the role of seigniorage in the public finances of the Member States 
covering the period 1985 to 1994. 
See Article 33 of the Protocol on the  Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the 
European  Central Bank,  Treaty on  European  Union.  This article states that "The net profit of the 
ECB shall be transferred in the following order:  (a) an  amount to be determined by the Governing 
Council,  which  may  not exceed  20  per cent of the  net profit,  shall  be  transferred  to  the  general 
reserve fund subject to a limit equal to  100 per cent of the capital;  (b) the remaining net profit shall 
be distributed to the shareholders of the ECB in proportion to their paid-up shares". 
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•  Seigniorage belongs to the EU level since it derives from  the common monetary 
policy exercised by the ECB on a non-regional scale.  In this respect, seigniorage 
resembles  traditional  own  resources  revenues  deriving  from  the  exercise  of 
commercial policy through a common external tariff.  The issue of equity does not 
directly arise in the present case.  If  transactions technology is less advanced in the 
poorer  nations,  it  is  possible  that  there  may  be  elements  of regressivity  since 
seigniorage is a tax on cash holdings.  This may be of  minor importance, however, 
as  the  adoption  of the  same  transactions  technology  will  be widespread  under 
EMU. 
•  The tax base is completely harmonised, and is defined by the profits of the central 
banlc 
•  The  treatment  of Member  States  not  participating  in  EMU  poses  a  particular 
problem  for  the  transitional  period.  Moreover,  for  those  not  joining  for  an 
uncertain  period  of time  a  way  ought  to  be  devised  to  contribute  through  a 
corresponding tax.  The necessary arrangements to effectively exploit the potential 
of  seigniorage as an own resource could in this case be complex. 
•  Seigniorage is not visible to taxpayers. 
•  Seigniorage as an own resource would be simple to administer, would involve little 
administration, and would not be subject to fraud and avoidance. 
•  It is also possible that it may yield considerable revenue for the EU budget.  In the 
steady state seigniorage can be approximated by the tax on nominal balances, or the 
rate of inflation, and the ratio of holdings of nominal balances to  GNP.  If price 
stability is  interpreted to  mean an inflation rate of between 0 per cent and 2 per 
cent, and assuming that money holdings amount to  around  10 per cent of GNP, 
seigniorage revenues could amount to between zero and 0.2 per cent of GNP in the 
EU44.  However, it  is  clear that this can be  an  unreliable and unstable revenue, 
likely  subject  to  severe  shocks  emanating  from  changes  in  the  transactions 
techn._9logy. 
A principal drawback of seigniorage is its lack of visibility to taxpayers.  Although the 
underlying  source of revenue,  inflation,  would be very  visible,  it  would  convey  no 
information about  the  costs of the  EU and  its  financing.  Finally,  with transactions 
technology making it  increasingly possible to  hold cash balances  in  interest bearing 
assets, the tax base of  seigniorage will become very narrow indeed in future years. 
44  As  another  example,  Rovelli  (1994)  uses  a  similar  framework  to  estimate  potential  seigniorage 
revenues  under  different  combinations  of holdings  of sight  deposits  and  nominal  interest  rates 
(which stand for inflation);  he shows that these revenues could range from 0.004 per cent of GDP to 
as much as 0.3 per cent of GDP;  see Rovelli (1994), Table 6, p. 41. 
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BoxB 
Tax on seigniorage 
Criteria  Performance 
Equity  In EMU it will be impossible to allocate seigniorage to Member States. 
Base harmonisation  Complete;  identical in all Member States. 
Visibility to taxpayers  As an implicit tax, seigniorage is not visible. 
Link to common policies  Results directly from EMU. 
Likely  to  raise  considerable  revenue  which  could  be  particularly 
unstable  since  it  depends  on  the  demand  for  cash  balances,  itself 
affected by the business cycle.  Although price stability in EMU would 
Revenue sufficiency,  also  ensure  a  stable  base  for  seigniorage,  shocks  to  transactions 
efficiency and cost- technology as well as real income shocks could cause the seigniorage 
effectiveness  tax  base  to  narrow  and  could  make  revenues  unreliable  and 
unpredictable.  Administration  would  be  extremely simple.  It  would 
· involve the smallest number of •taxpayers• (national central banks) and 
compliance and monitoring costs would be negligible. 
4.  CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Economic theory provides criteria for  the  assignment of tax  instruments by level of 
government in a federal context.  Once it is determined that certain taxes belong to  a 
higher level of authority,  additional  secondary criteria can be  used to  determine the 
suitability of  the tax instruments to serve as own resources for the ;;nancing of the EU. 
The discussion in this Annex  has  shown that  while  several  taxes can be considered 
consistent with the economic criteria, they virtually all fail, to one degree or another, to 
fully  satisfy the  secondary  criteria.  Clearly,  some  taxes perform  better than  others 
according to certain criteria but, if it were the case to fully finance the EU budget with 
new own resources, none fulfils to the necessary degree all criteria. 
This is partly a reflection of  value judgements on the part of  the study about the relative 
importance  of each  criterion  to  be  applied  in  assessing  the  performance  of each 
candidate  resource.  Table  1 summarises the  assessment  of each  candidate  resource 
ranked according to the criteria in the three studies cited in the Table and mentioned 
throughout this Annex. 
The ranking is ordinal;  1 indicates the most preferred and 8 indicates the least favoured 
among the eight candidates;  identical marks  indicate that the candidates in question 
perform equally well under the specific criterion.  In contrast to the other studies under 
review, Spahn (1993) finds merits in all proposals without ranking them45.  It is clear 
that if,  a second-best choice had to be made, possibly a VAT tax  version of an own 
45  See Spahn (1993), especially section 5 (Concluding remarks), p. 580-581. 
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resource  may be  attractive;  this  proposal is  ranked  fir~t by two  of the  three  studies 
reported in the Table and  it also has the strong support of the European Parliament in 
the European Parliament (1994) report;  as noted previously, the Commission has also 
supported a CO/Energy tax.  This lack of  consensus is a reflection of  more fundamental 
difficulties at the present state of  European integration. 
Table 1 
Ordinal Ranking of Candidates for New Own Resources in Three Studies 
European Economyi21  !  Begg et. a/Jll  l  Keed41 
C021Energy tax(1J  1  6  2 
-----·--··-·------·-----··--------·-·-·--
Modulated VAT  3  1  1 
---·----------·----------· 
Excises on tobacco, alcohol and mineral oil  4  3  4 
------~  --··----------·-·-· 
Corporate income tax  2/3  4  3/4 
·-·-·------------------------~· 
·Communications taxes  - 2  -
-------------------·----·-----·----· 
Personal income tax  5  5  5 
---------------·-·-··-···--
Withholding tax on interest income(1l  4  7  2 
-----------------------··-------·-· 
ECB·seigniorage  2 
i  8  3 
-not ava,jlable;  (1) this does not refer to recent Commission proposals. 
Source:  (2)  Commission of the European Communities (1993a):  op.  cit.,  Table  31, p.  85,  line providing an  "overall appreciation"; 
(3) Begg et.  at. (1997): op.  cit.,  Table 6.1, p.  51;  (4) Keen (1995):  op. cit., Table 3.14, p.  81. 
It is clear that, while possible, introducing a new own resource will require substantial 
preparation  on  the  part  of all  actors  involved.  However,  it  is  not  evident  that 
introducing new own resources on grounds of strengthening financial  autonomy alone 
would suffice.  If  other, possibly wider political considerations, support it then new own 
resources could be introduced as part of  more fundamental and wide-ranging reforms. 
Finally, the present review suggests that it is unlikely to find one tax that alone respects 
all the criteria to become an EU own resource.  A more promising possibility could be 
that the desirable features of more than one resource will be taken into consideration in 
order to  form the ground for the development of new own resources in the future.  This 
could conceivably involve more fundamental changes in the EU's own resources system 
of  which the introduction of  new resources can be only one part.  ' 
One possibility, in the medium term, may be to introduce a modulated VAT system with 
strengthened  visibility,  much  along  the  lines  suggested  in  the  European  Parliament 
( 1994) report.  Over the long term, where an important objective would undoubtedly 
be  the  strengthening  of financial  autonomy,  several  alternatives  present  themselves. 
The ECB seigniorage, some form of  withholding tax on interest income, excises and the 
communication tax could realistically become own resources provided additional steps 
towards the integration of the EU took place.  Less positive are the prospects for a new 
own  resource  based  on  either corporate  or  personal  incomes.  If developments  in 
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environment or transport policy  called  for  the  introduction of specific taxes  in these 
areas,  their  yield  could be  usefully  attributed to  the  EU  budget thus  contributing  to 
financial autonomy. 
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The concept and measurement of the 
budgetary balance 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Budgetary balances1,  i.e.  the difference between payments made by a Member State to 
the EU budget and expenditure made by the EU in that Member State, are often seen as 
a simple way of capturing through a single figure the net financial benefits of being a 
member of  the European Union.  The Commission has repeatedly warned against such 
a simple and misleading approach that fails to capture the real balance of  the advantages 
and disadvantages of  belonging to the Union2• 
The present Annex addresses briefly the methodological issues raised by the calculation 
of  budgetary balances.  Section 2 examines difficulties associated with the measurement 
and  interpretation of budgetary balances;  section 3 discusses alternative measures of 
budgetary balances based on various definitions of  the expenditure and the contributions 
side;  and section 4 explains the two principal definitions - operational  balance and 
balance a  Ia UK rebate - used in the report. 
2.  PROBLEMS WITH THE CONCEPT OF BUDGETARY BALANCE3 
Budgetary balances, while appealing in their simplicity, either invariably misrepresent 
or are inadequate measures of  the benefits from membership in the EU. 
Budgetary  flows  do  not  capture  all  the  benefits  from  membership  in  the  EU.  EU 
membership,  which  gives  rise  to  financial  and  non-financial  advantages  as  well  as 
obligations,  has  a  non-budgetary  dimension  the  importance  of which  dwarfs  the 
budgetary one:  For example, the benefits from the pursuit of common objectives, such 
as trade liberalisation and European economic integration, cannot be evaluated in terms 
of budgetary flows  alone.  Moreover, flows  from the EU budget invariably benefit not 
only recipients but other Member States in the form  of return flows;  typical examples 
are  structural  funds  and  external  expenditure,  where  the  implementation  of projects 
often gives rise to purchases of  goods and services from other Member States. 
2 
3 
Budgetary balances are often  referred  to  as  net balances,  The  term budgetary balances  used  in  this report,  in 
preference to net balances, is more appealing because, first,  the  concept of a balance is by itself indicative of a 
difference and, secondly, it is redundant to characterize budgetary positions as net or gross,  What the concept is 
specifically meant to indicate is the difference between contributions to and receipts from the EU budget. 
These issues were reviewed in detail in Commission of the European Communities (1997):  "Budget Contributions, 
EU  Expenditure,  Budgetary  Balances  and  Relative  Prosperity  of  the  Member  States"  paper  presented  by 
President Santer to the Ecofin Council, October 13, 
This section is based substantially on  the  arguments put forward in  a 1997 Ecofin paper;  see Commission of the 
European Communities (1997): op, cit., footnote 2, part 4,  p, 7-9, 
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Conventionally measured budgetary balances fail to adequately represent the benefits of 
EU membership for at least three reasons: 
+  first,  recorded budgetary  flows  fail  to  account  for  positive  externalities  arising 
from  EU  policies;  for  example,  CAP,  structural  operations  and  external 
expenditure benefit not only the  immediate recipients but also give rise to  spill-
over effects transcending national borders; 
+  secondly,  there  are  often  difficulties  associated  with  the  identification  of the 
ultimate  beneficiaries  of EU  expenditure  policies.  CAP  spending  on  export 
restitution is  an example where expenditure may be recorded as  allocated to the 
Member  State  from  which  goods  are  exported  when  in  fact  the  ultimate 
beneficiaries  are  the  producers  in  other Member States;  research  expenditure, 
where multinational consortia ask for EU payments to be made to one member of 
the  consortium  or to  a bank account  opened  in  Belgium  or  Luxembourg,  also 
gives rise to similar difficulties;  and, 
+  thirdly,  EU  budget  expenditure  is  heterogeneous  and  comparisons  of  total 
amounts  received  have  often  limited  meaning  in  appreciating  the  "benefit" 
resulting from such payments.  Transfers under the structural operations increase 
the resources available in recipient countries by the exact amount of the recorded 
payment (although significant spillovers may result from the ultimate spending of 
these moneys);  on the other hand, payments made for the purchase of goods and 
services  (a  large  part  of ad:ninistrative  expenditure)  increase  the  resources 
available in the recipient country only for a part of their total amount (the value 
added  generated  in  the  couritry).  Between  these  two  extremes  lie  different 
categories of expenditure with different degrees of "benefit" for the recipient that 
make it difficult to either exclude some items of expenditure or to regroup them in 
meaningful categories. 
3.  PROBLEMS  OF  MEASUREMENT  AND  INTERPRETATION:  ALTERNATIVE 
DEFINITIONS OF BUDGETARY BALANCES 
The present section discusses  some important definitional  problems  that  qualify  and 
often undermine the reliability of  simple measures of  budgetary balances. 
To  calculate budgetary balances it  is  necessary to  make assumptions about four  main 
iSSUes: 
i)  the items to  be included in the calculation of the payments made by the Member 
States to the EU budget; 
ii)  the items to  be included in the calculation of the expenditure made by the  EU in 
each Member State; 
iii)  the use  of cash versus  accrual data (with the problem of how  to  account  for  the 
carry over of  the unspent balances from previous years); and 
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iv)  the possibility of adjusting the resulting set of  budgetary balances so that they sum 
to zero. 
On payments to  the EU budget an  assumption  must  be made  concerning  the  most 
appropriate  treatment  of customs  and  agricultural  duties  (traditional  own  resources, 
TOR).  There  are  certainly good  arguments  for  excluding  them  altogether  from  the 
calculations  as  these  contributions  result  from  common  policies  and  they  typically 
belong to a higher level of  government rather than to the region or the state that collects 
them.  While  this  may  be  formally  correct, 'it  is  often  preferred  to  find  a  way  of 
including them so as to mirror the reality of a balanced budget.  The inclusion may be 
done either on the basis of the actual cash flows  or by reallocating the total yield of 
TOR to  each Member State according to a given key (e.g.  according to shares in EU 
GNP). 
Of interest  is  the  treatment of TOR in the  UK rebate  mechanism.  Given  that  the 
calculation of  the rebate takes as a starting point the share .of the United Kingdom in the 
combined VAT and GNP payments4, the mechanism implicitly takes TOR into account 
but reallocates them among Member States in proportion to  their combined VAT and 
GNP payments (which, as it shown elsewhere in the report, is not very different from re-
allocating them according to a straightforward GNP key). 
Expenditure made by the European Union in the Member States must, by definition, 
be lower than total EU expenditure.  The expenditure made by the EU in third countries 
has  certainly  important  spill  over  effects  for  the  Member  States  and  is  often  paid 
directly to EU nationals.  However, it would be illogical - as well as nearly impossible 
from  a practical point of view - to attribute it explicitly to any specific Member State. 
In addition,  there are  some minor items which,  for  practical considerations,  are  also 
almost impossible to allocate to individual Member States (e.g. transfers relative to the 
Union's share  in the  European  Investment Fund capital,  mission expenditure by EU 
officials).  The remaining expenditure is usually referred to  as allocated expenditures 
and represents around 94 per cent of  total expenditure. 
Whereas there is a broad consensus on the exclusion of the items just mentioned, views 
differ  on  the  need  to  make  other  adjustments.  The  most .  contentious  issue  is  the 
inclusion of administrative expenditure.  The arguments  for  its exclusion rest on the 
non homogeneity of EU expenditure mentioned at the beginning of this Annex.  The 
subset of allocated expenditure which excludes administrative expenditure is called in 
4 
5 
Through  the  tortuous way  of initially calculating  the share on  the  pre-1988 VAT mechanism and  subsequently 
adding or deducting the change with respect to the present mechanism (the so called "advantage to the UK of the 
new system";  see Annex 4). 
The  definition  of allocated  expenditure  for  the  UK rebate  is established  in  "Method  of Calculation,  Financing, 
Payment and Entry in the Budget of the Correction of Budgetary Imbalances in Accordance with Articles 4 and 5 
of the  Council  Decision  on  the  System of the Communities'  Own  Resources",  Council  of the  European  Union, 
5455/94, March 9,  1994, chapter IV.2. 
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the EU terminology operational allocated expenditure 6 and is computed excluding the 
items  found  in Part A of the EU  budget and  spending of other EU Institutions.  The 
definition of budgetary balance measured by this concept of expenditure is called here 
operational budgetary balance. 
Some Member States calculate and  publish budgetary balance estimates based on  an 
even narrower definition of expenditure that takes into account only the financial flows 
which transit through the national treasuries  (and which are  easily identifiable by the 
Finance ministries).  This definition of expenditure excludes not  only administrative 
expenditure but also all the payments that the EU institutions make directly to the final 
beneficiaries  (e.g.  research  contracts,  grants  and  subsidies  under  various  so  called 
"internal" policies, etc.). 
Cash and accruals data are sometimes significantly different.  In particular, the need to 
adjust the VAT and GNP contributions of all Member States and the figures for the UK 
rebate on the basis of reliable statistical data which become available with a long delay 
implies that  non negligible payments - in both directions - can be made outside the 
reference year.  However, the most important distortion results  from  the existence of 
unspent balances from the previous years which show a high variability over time.  For 
instance, in 1995 there was an exceptionally large surplus at the end of  the year (Ecu 9.2 
billion) which turned out to  be more than the double the unspent surplus at the end of 
1996 (Ecu 4.4 billion).  As  a result, on the basis of cash figures,  the  1996 budgetary 
balances of all Member States were higher by a total amount of about Ecu 5 billion due 
to the fluctuation in the size of  the unspent surplus.  Such an effect can seriously distort 
the comparison of  the budgetary balance data of  different years. 
The definition of budgetary balance used in the calculation of the UK rebate eliminates 
the problem of the unspent surpluses.  Since the calculation of the balance is based on 
the difference between the share in contributions to the EU budget and the share in EU 
expenditure multiplied by the total amount of EU expenditure, the calculation implicitly 
assumes that every year the sum  of all  payments to  the EU  budget is identical to  the 
amount of  EU expenditure. 
Constraining the sum  of budgetary balances to  add up to  zero is  often proposed as  a 
way of focusing the debate on the  intra-EU distributional issue:  what is "paid" net by 
one country must be "received" net by another.  Unadjusted figures, however, will not 
add  up  to  zero.  They should add  up  to  a negative figure  equal to  the non-allocated 
expenditure (essentially expenditure made outside the EU).  This, it is argued, results in 
Member States claiming to  have  transferred to  other partners  financial  resources that 
have left the EU. 
6  Operating expenditure is defined in Article 19.1  of the Financial Regulation of 21  December 1977 (OJ n' L 356 of 
31.12.1997) as the expenditure for policies by the Commission contained in part B of the Budget. 
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Adjusting budgetary balances to add up to zero can be done in a number of  ways which 
inevitably  introduce  other distortions  and  complicate  the  comparisons  of budgetary 
balances  from  year to  year.  The  two  most  widely  used  methods  consist of either 
reducing contributions to  the EU budget to  the  level  of allocated expenditure (while 
maintaining the relative shares of each Member State constant) or increasing allocated 
expenditure to match the actual level of  payments.  The first method implicitly assumes 
that non allocated expenditure is shared out among Member States in proportion to their 
contributions to  the EU budget; the second assumes that non allocated expenditure is 
shared out in the same proportion as allocated expenditure.  In addition, both methods 
reduce the overall size of each of the budgetary balances (and the. sum of the absolute 
value of  all balances). 
The method underlying the  calculations for the UK rebate - based on the differences 
between shares in contributions and shares in expenditure - provides a set of  budgetary 
balances which add up to zero.  Implicitly it assumes that non allocated expenditure is 
shared out in the same proportions as allocated expenditure. 
4.  THE DEFINITIONS USED IN THE REPORT 
Combining only the two or three most important assumptions which can be made on the 
four issues discussed in the previous section produces no fewer than 30 to 40 perfectly 
defensible ilefinitions of budgetary balances.  While  the  estimates that emerge from 
these different definitions do not change substantially the picture for the larger Member 
States, the use of  different definitions can produce substantially different results for the 
smaller ones and may distort significantly the comparisons from year to year. 
In this report the Commission has used two definitions called the UK rebate budgetary 
balance and  the  operational budgetary balance.  The first  is  the  only one that has a 
degree of formal recognition, being based on the Fontainebleau agreement and also in 
the determination of  the UK rebate;  the second is  consistent with the information the 
Commission has been supplying to the Member States annually since 1995, albeit on a 
confidential basis. 
4.1.  The UK rebate balance 
This  definition  uses  cash  data,  i.e.  all  payments  made  in  a year to  or from  the  EU 
budget7.  Its most important implications are: 
7  For  the  sake  of simplicity  the  calculations  have  been  performed  without  taking  into  account  the  so  called 
"advantage to the UK of the new system• and using cash instead of accruals data. 
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•  TOR payments are  implicitly reallocated among Member States in  proportion to 
their VAT and GNP payments; 
•  the estimates  are  restricted  to  sum to  zero  and  the  overall  absolute  size of the 
balances  is  reduced  by  exclusion  of those  items  of expenditure  that  cannot  be 
allocated (i. e. by about 5 to 6 per cent); 
•  the  data are  influenced by the  adjustments  to  contributions relating  to  previous 
years but insulated from  the fluctuation of the size of the unspent surplus of the 
current year. 
•  the expenditure flows  taken into consideration are those of the so-called allocated 
expenditure.  This  means  that  about  6  per  cent  of expenditure  is  excluded 
(essentially expenditure made outside the Union plus some very small items which, 
for technical or conceptual reasons, are too difficult to  allocate).  Included also is 
administrative expenditure and expenditure in favour of  the other EU institutions. 
4.2.  The operational balance 
This definition also uses cash data.  The most important implications of this definition 
are: 
+  The  co~cept of EU expenditure used is operational allocated expenditure, that is, 
allocated expenditure excluding administrative expenditure referred to in part A of 
the EU budget and expenditure relating to  the European Parliament, the Council, 
the Court of Justice, the Court of Auditors, the Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of  the RegionsS; 
•  TOR payments are considered as  paid wholly by the Member State that transfers 
them to the EU budget; 
•  the estimates are not restricted to sum to zero; 
•  the  estimates  show  significant  variability  because  of adjustments  relating  to 
previous years and,  above  all,  because of the  carry over of the unspent balances 
from previous years. 
•  no  corrections are made to  the  expenditure flows  which are integrally taken into 
account. 
Ideally, these estimates ought to be presented in a table including a 16th line for the Rest 
of the World and a 17th line which would correspond to payments to the surplus of the 
current  year and  the  drawing  from  the  previous  year's  surplus  (with  corresponding 
adjustments to the 15 lines for the Member States) as well as the amount of  expenditure 
corresponding to part A of  the budget. 
8  See footnote 6. 
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ANNEX 4 
The budgetary compensation for the United Kingdom 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
This  annex  reviews  the  performance  of the  compensation  mechanism  for  the  United 
Kingdom set up with the 1984 Fontainebleau agreement.  It starts by recalling the steps 
which led to this decision and its contents.  Subsequently it reviews the past trend of the 
budgetary imbalance of the United Kingdom and discusses its possible future  evolution 
in the light of the reform proposals presented by the Commission (Agenda 2000).  The 
third section assesses the operation of  the mechanism and discusses some issues it raises. 
The fmal section examines its consequences for the rate of call of the VAT resource and 
analyses the possibility of  permanently fixing this rate. 
Graph 1 
Budget~ry imbalance of the UK and compensation 
("operational" balance before and after compensation; percentage of the GNP of the UK) 
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2.  ORIGIN OF THE MECHANISM 
The question of the budgetary imbalance of the United Kingdom appeared immediately 
after the accession of  the country to the European Community.  The large imbalance was 
essentially due to two factors: 
i)  an agricultural sector relatively smaller and structurally different from those of other 
Member States, which results in lower CAP spending in the United Kingdom; 
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ii)  a proportionally larger contribution to the financing of  the Community budget due to 
the  fact  that the United Kingdom has  a relatively higher share in the  harmonised  • 
VAT base than in the total GNP of the Community. 
A  first  mechanism  aimed  at  addressing  the  issue  of the  budgetary  imbalance  of the 
United Kingdom was agreed in March 1975 in Dublin.  This mechanism- known as the 
"dynamic brakes"- aimed at preventing the size of the United Kingdom contribution to 
the  EU  budget from  becoming too  large.  The  contribution would be  capped if three 
conditions  were  met  simultaneously  (GDP  per  capita  lower  than  85  per  cent  of the 
Community average, rate of economic growth less than 120 per cent of the Community 
Graph 2 
Budgetary balance of the United Kingdom 
(UK rebate definition, percentages of GNP; actual data, see table 7, Mnex 8 and this .Allnex;1998: forecast) 
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average, share in own resource payment more than 1  0 per cent higher than the share in 
GDP). The three conditions never applied for any Member State and the mechanism was 
never triggered. 
A second arrangement was introduced at another Dublin Council in November 1979.  It 
provided for a compensation on the expenditure side in the form of specific measures for 
the United Kingdom. 
The current mechanism was decided in Fontainebleau in June 1984 and given effect by 
the Decision of May 7,  1985.  This decision contained a transitional arrangement- a 
reduction of  one billion Ecu in the VAT contribution of the United Kingdom for 1985 -
and the rules governing the calculation of  future rebates, i.e., 
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the contribution of the United Kingdom to the Community budget is reduced by an 
amount  equal  to  66  per cent  of its  budgetary  imbalance.  This  imbalance  is 
calculated by multiplying the difference between the UK's percentage share in VAT 
payments to  the  Community budget and  its  share  in allocated expenditure times 
allocated  expenditure  (see  below).  Given  that  some  expenditure  (e.g.  external 
expenditure)  cannot  be  considered  to  have  been  made  for  the  benefit  of any 
particular Member States, in the calculation of the share of the United Kingdom in 
the payments made by the Community and in that of the overall  imbalance, total 
Community payments are replaced by the total of all payments that can be allocated 
to  an  individual  country  (usually  referred  to  as  "allocp.ted  expenditure"  - see 
footnote 5 of  Annex 3). 
the shortfall in financing is made up by all  the Member states in accordance with 
their  respective  percentage  shares  of VAT  payments  (with  the  exception  of 
Germany, which pays only two thirds of  its normal share, the balance being divided 
up between the other Member States). 
The  Own  Resource  Decision  of 1988  modified  substantially  the  system  of Own 
Resources through the introduction of  a new resource based on GNP and the reduction in 
the importance of  the one based on VAT.  These changes, which went in the direction of 
reducing  the  causes of the budgetary imbalance of the United Kingdom,  necessitated 
some adjustments in the compensation mechanism.  These were: 
i)  The calculation of  the amount of  the refund as if  the budget were still fully financed 
by non-capped VAT (pre-1.988 system); 
ii)  the  reduction  of the  resulting  amount  of the  rebate  by  the  "savings"!  in  its 
contribution that the United Kingdom derives from the modifications introduced in 
1988 (the so called "UK advantage from the new system"); 
iii)  the financing of the UK correction by the other Member States according to  their 
shares in the GNP of the Community.  The one-third reduction for Germany was 
maintained~ 
3.  DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UK REBATE SINCE ITS INCEPTION 
There  is  no  clear trend  characterizing  either  the  budgetary  imbalance of the  United 
Kingdom or the rebate (see· graph 1). 
All  budgetary balances show a high degree of variability for  the  reasons  indicated in 
Annex 3 (underlying expenditure trends, different rates of economic growth, exchange 
These savings  are  equal  to  the  difference  between  the  amount the  United  Kingdom  pays on  the  basis  of the 
(capped) VAT and GNP resources under the  1988 system, and what the  United Kingdom would have paid under 
the pre-1988 system (only uncapped VAT). 
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rate  fluctuations,  carry over of unspent surpluses from  previous. years,  adjustments  for 
previous years, etc.).  The budgetary balance of  the United Kingdom, however, shows an 
even greater variability because of  the operation of  the correction mechanism itselfwhich 
foresees  the payment of the  compensation with a one year lag  (an exceptionally large 
imbalance in one year leads to a large compensation which is paid in the following. year, 
thus reducing further what may have been a normal imbalance, and so on).  Furthermore, 
budgeting rules require that in the budget of year t under the heading "UK correction", 
two  different corrections are recorded:  the provisional correction for  year t-1  and the 
definitive  correction  for  year  t-4.  Clearly,  the  sum  of the  two  corrections  has  no 
economic  meaning.  Table  7 of Annex  8 shows  in  column  (5)  the  UK  correction  as 
reported in the budget in year t (that is, the sum of  the UK correction for year t-4 plus the 
provisional correction for  year t-1)  and,  in column (2)  the definitive UK correction for 
year t-4. 
Budgetary rules also  require that,  in order to  calculate the definitive UK correction for 
year  t-4,  to  construct  a UK imbalance  on  the  basis  of the  GNP,  VAT  and  allocated 
expenditure outturns for year t (tha~ is, four years later).  These data permit the estimation 
of the UK imbalance for year t-4 shown in column (1) of Table 7, Annex 8.  Note also 
that  the  imbalance  of the  UK  measured  in  this  manner  differs  from  the  imbalances 
repo.rted in Tables 6a and 6b of Annex 8;  the latter are estimated on the basis of GNP, 
VAT and allocated expenditure outturns as they are known one year after the budgetary 
year.  The use of  the definition implicit in the rebate mechanism (graph 2) itself provides 
a more stable picture as this definition is not influenced by the carry over of the unspent 
surpluses (see Annex 3). 
Beyond short-term fluctuations,  the budgetary imbalance of the  United Kingdom since 
1985 has been relatively stable with the imbalance before correction averaging about half 
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a  point of the  country's  GNP.  Correspondingly,  the  amount  of the  rebate  has  also 
remained relatively stable. 
Various factors have been at  work, which appear to  have broadly offset each other.  As 
already indicated, the origin of the budgetary imbalance of the United Kingdom is  to  be 
found in two  factors:  its relative high share of the combined VAT  and GNP base on the 
revenue side, and the low agricultural returns on the expenditure side. 
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The reduction in the relative weight of the VAT resource brought about by  the decisions 
of 1988  and  1992  should have contributed to  a reduction in  the  imbalance  and  in  the 
rebate.  However, the effect on the rebate was explicitly excluded by the provision which 
imposed the continuation of its computation on the basis of the pre-1988 system and of 
the reduction of the result by an amount corresponding to the so-called "advantage" that 
the  United Kingdom  was  obtaining  from  the  new  system.  The  calculations  of this 
"advantage"  done  every  year  show  that  until  now  the  effect  of the  changes  on  the 
imbalance have been very small.  They may have become more significant over the last 
two or three  years in  correspondence with the effective reduction of the weight of the 
VAT resource, but even so their order of magnitude is not large enough to be discernible 
in the overall trend. 
More fundamental changes have taken place on the expenditure side of the  EU budget. 
Agricultural  spending,  which  in  1984  represented  about  70  per  cent  of allocated 
expenditure,  is  now  down  to  about  50  per  cent.  Per  se,  this  change  should  have 
contributed to reducing the imbalance of the United Kingdom.  However, over the same 
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period, the component of expenditure that grew most rapidly was the Structural Funds. 
Given the explicit redistributive nature of this type of spending and of its concentration 
on  the  so  called  "cohesion  countries",  the  share  of the  United  Kingdom  in  total  EU 
spending could not increase.  In fact, since 1992 the redistributive component in total EU 
spending has become stronger. 
The factors which have played the greatest role in determining the trend of the rebate -
and especially its fluctuations  from  year to year - have been the difference between the 
rate of growth of the economy of the United Kingdom and that of the other Member 
States and the instability of exchange rates.  Since the end of the  1980s, the economic 
cycle of the United Kingdom  has  been markedly different from  that of the rest of the 
Union.  In  addition, the pound sterling has  fluctuated significantly vis-a-vis the other 
European currencies between 1992 and 1997. 
Underlying  expenditure  trends  have  also  played  a  significant  role,  although  in 
quantitative  terms  they  have  been  less  important  and  have  been  overshadowed  by 
macroeconomic  developmt:nts  just  mentioned.  For  instance,  in  1994  the  United 
Kingdom was very successful in drawing on structural funds spending and in 1997-98 the 
BSE crisis led to increased agricultural spending in the country. 
Over the  next years  the· imbalance of the United Kingdom (and its compensation) are 
expected to increase somewhat.  This will be essentially the result of  the enlargement of 
the Union to a number of  countries that will certainly be net beneficiaries. 
4.  ASSESSMENT OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE MECHANISM 
The rebate mechanism has  been effective in achieving its intended goal:  a significant 
reduction in the United Kingdom's budgetary imbalance.  As graph 1 shows, over recent 
years  the  negative  budgetary  balance  of this  country,  after  correction,  has  averaged 
around 0.2-0.3 per cent of GNP. 
However, some of the conditions that prevailed at the time the mechanism was decided 
do not apply any more: 
i)  The changes in the composition of EU spending have modified the rationale of the 
compensation.  Whereas in 1984, it had essentially the nature of a correction for the 
specific agricultural problem (CAP represented about 70 per cent of total allocated 
expenditure),  it  has  now  lost  to  a great  extent this  characteristic since it  corrects 
equally  the  persistent  agricultural  problem  as  well  as  the  United  Kingdom's 
contribution to the solidarity effort of  the EU and to its other policies. 
ii)  The budgetary imbalance  of the  United  Kingdom  is  not  unique  any  longer.  In 
recent  years,  as  graph  5  shows,  the  imbalance  of the  United  Kingdom,  before 
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correction, was the largest of the Community.  In 1997, four more countries have 
budgetary imbalances as large as or even larger than t}Je United Kingdom's. 
The gap  in relative prosperity between the United Kingdom and the other largest 
contributors to' the EU budget has ·narrowed.  Depending on the measure used, the 
United Kingdom has a relative prosperity or a relative capacity to pay around the EU 
average and will certainly be above this mark after the forthcoming enlargement of 
the EU. 
The mechanism has also  some drawbacks, which although  ~ot new or unexpected, are 
worth recalling at this stage. 
•  The existence of the rebate leads  to  the contribution paid by the United Kingdom 
representing a lower proportion of its income than those paid by the_ other Member 
States.  This  situation  contrasts  with  the  principle of horizontal  equity.  At the 
.national  level,  this  would  be  analogous  to  granting  tax  relief to  individuals  who 
cannot use some public services or who are not recipients of  public assistance. 
0 
G'aph  5 
Budgetary balances of the UK, 
Germany, and the Netherlands 
(UK rebate definition ; before UK rebate ; percentages of GNP) 
1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
•  The compensation mechanism  works  as  a  shock  absorber  for  all  changes  in the 
imbalance of the United Kingdom and places this country in a unique position with 
respect to  common budgetary decisions.  For example, a budgetary decision that 
would have a net cost of Ecu 100 to  a Member State in fact costs the UK Ecu 33. 
Conversely, a measure that would improve the balance of another country by 100, 
improves the balance of the United Kingdom again by only one third of  this amount. 
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This situation, not only risks decoupling the UK from  budgetary decision making, 
but  will  also  have  significant  adverse  effects  at  the  time  of enlargement.  The 
accession of  a large number of  new Member States with very low standards of  living 
is  expected  to  have  a  negative  effect  on  the  budgetary  balances  of the  current 
Member States.  But the United Kingdom will see its budgetary balance deteriorate 
by only one third of what would have happened in the  absence  of the  correction 
mechanism.  This puts into question a fair sharing out of the burden resulting from 
enlargement. 
•  Also  in  this  context,  it  will  be  necessary  to  adapt  the  definition  of allocated 
expenditure to  prevent the United Kingdom from  benefiting from  purely statistical 
factors.  In effect, at the time of accession of  the new Member States some items of 
present  expenditure  in  these  countries  (e.g.  PHARE)  will  be  replaced  by  full 
participation in EU policies.  This would lead to  their recl~ssification from external 
expenditure (excluded  from  the  calculation of the  rebate)  to  internal  expenditure  . 
(included in the calculation) leading to  a mechanical increase in the size of the UK 
rebate. 
•  The  Commission  indicated  that  it  would  take  into  consideration,  on  the  re-
examination of  the correction system, the opposition of  Belgium and Luxembourg to 
current  procedures  governing  the  entry  in  the  accounts  and  the  allocation  of 
administrative expenditure.  The position of  the Commission was that administrative 
expenditure could not be treated  diffen~ntly from  other expenditure  and  that it  is, 
therefore,  appropriate to  include it  in the determination of allocated expenditure to 
any given country.  This position was based on the consideration that if  it is true that 
administrative expenditure is, in economic terms, very different from the unrequited 
transfers typical of  the structural funds, there exist various other items of  expenditure 
whose economic nature lays between these two extremes.  It would be arbitrary to 
make  a distinction  only  for  administrative  expenditure  when,  for  instance,  some 
items of  research spending have a very similar nature. 
5.  THE IMPACT OF THE UK REBATE MECHANISM ON THE RATE OF CALL OF VAT 
The  rules  determining  the  calculation  of the  UK rebate  and  of its  financing  contain 
provisions that affect the rate of  call of  the VAT resource.  In 1984, when the mechanism 
was established, the VAT resource played the role of the complementary resource to  be 
called  up  on  the  occasion  needed  to  finance  the  budget  of the  Community.  It was 
therefore logical that the rebate be financed according to the share of  each country in this 
resource (with the exception of  Germany that was granted a reduction). 
The  1988  Own  Resources  Decision provided for  a reduction  in  the  role  of the  VAT 
resource and for the introduction of a new one based on GNP.  As  a result, the role of 
complementary resource was assigned  to  GNP  and  it was  decided that  the  UK rebate 
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would be financed  according to  the  share of each country in this  new,  more equitable, 
resource. 
However, the shares of the Member States in the VAT and GNP bases are not equal and 
the introduction of the  GNP resource favoured  some countries relative to  others.  The 
countries which desired to reduce further the role ofthe VAT resource, failing to obtain a 
reduction in its maximum call rate,  obtained some reduction indirectly through the  UK 
rebate  mechanism.  It  was,  in  effect,  decided  to  calculate  the  amount  of VAT 
theoretically necessary to  finance the UK rebate and not to call a corresponding amount 
ofVAT2. 
The  provisions  of the  Mode  de  Calcuf3  determine  an  amount  (called  the  "gross 
equivalent" and which is actually larger than the UK rebate) that must be left aside for the 
notional  financing  of the  UK  rebate.  The  percentage  of the  total  EU  VAT  base 
necessary  to  generate  this  amount  (called  the  ''frozen  rate'')  is  deducted  from  the 
maximum rate foreseen in the Own Resources decision to  obtain the yearly rate of call. 
This rate of call changes every year depending on the size of, and shows the same high 
variability as, the UK rebate. 
This situation generates additional complications every time the amount of  the UK rebate 
is revised4.  An upward or a downward revision of the UK rebate provokes a change in 
the opposite direction of the rate of call of VAT and in the amount to be called (or that 
should have been called).  Given that the size of the budget to  be financed remains the 
same, a change in the amount of  VAT called must be compensated by a corresponding 
change of opposite  sign  in  the  amount  of GNP  called.  Since  Member States  have 
different shares in the  bases of the  two  resources,  these changes  are  not neutral  (this 
effect of the rebate on the VAT and GNP contributions of the Member states is usually 
called the "indirect effect').  If the amount of  the UK rebate must be revised, it becomes 
necessary to  compensate Member States for the incorrect amount of the VAT and GNP 
contributions that have been called.  This calls  for  complicated calculations  for  each 
revision of the UK rebate and  its  budgeting in  two  different chapters (Chapter  15  and 
chapter  35)  which  produces  the  somewhat  surprising  result  that  the  United  Kingdom 
appears to participate in the financing (albeit for very small amounts) of its own rebate. 
In  1992,  the  Commission  argued  forcefully  that the  same reduction in  the role  of the 
VAT  resource could be obtained through a straightforward reduction in  the  maximum 
call rate equal to the average frozen rate of  the last years.  The maximum rate of  call was 
indeed reduced from  1.4 in  1994 to  1.00 per cent in 1999, but the notional financing of 
2 
3 
4 
See  Article  5 of the  Council  Decision  881376/EEC.  Euratom on  the  system of the  Communities'  own  resources, 
June 24, 1988;  Official Journal of  the European Communities L 185, July 15, 1988. 
See "Method of Calculation, Financing, Payment and Entry in the Budget of the Correction of Budgetary Imbalances 
in  Accordance with Articles 4 and 5 of the Council Decision on  the System of the Communities' Own Resources", 
Council of the European Union, 5455/94, March 9,  1994. 
This is done at least twice during the budgetary process, once in the first supplementary amending budget of the 
year in which the rebate is paid and three years later when the final calculations are made. 
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the rebate through VAT (with its  "gross equivalent",  ''frozen  rate",  "indirect financing" 
and two budgetary chapters) has remained. 
The Commission hopes that on the occasion of  a revision of  the Own Resources Decision 
it  will be possible to  suppress these unnecessary complications.  Over recent years the 
amount frozen  for the notional financing of the rebate has averaged 0.12 per cent of the 
total EU VAT base. 
•  ••••••••  •  •  • 
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ANNEX 5 
The effects of a partial reimbursement of 
CAP direct aids 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The budgetary imbalances which have emerged in recent years are fundamentally due to 
the structure of the expenditure rather than to  the revenue side of the  EU budget (see 
Graph  1  and  table  1  ).  As  underlined  on  several  occasions  in  the  report,  gross 
contributions to the EU budget are broadly equitable, and are expected to become more 
so  in coming years  as  the  weight  of GNP  resource  increases  and  that  of the  VAT 
resource diminishes.  The principal source of imbalances is the expenditure side of the 
EU  budget.  Graph  1  shows  that  while  VAT  and  GNP  contributions  respect  a 
proportional  relationship  with  the  Member  States'  GNP,  EU  expenditure  bears  no 
relations to GNP. 
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The  uneven  distribution  of EU  spending  across  the  Member  States  is  the  result  of 
deliberate policy decisions.  Some 85% of EU spending is  concentrated in  two  main 
categories  of  expenditure:  Common  Agricultural  Policy  (CAP)  and  Structural 
expenditure.  While  it  is  clearly incoherent to  interfere with  the budgetary outcomes 
resulting from Structural expenditure, it is conceivable to intervene in the area of CAP 
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spending.  Section 2 of this annex examines a possibility which has been put forward 
recently of  modifying the financing of  direct aids to farmers, and section 3 illustrates the 
effect of such a modification on  the budgetary balances of the Member States on the 
basis of results from a representative simulation. 
Table 1 
Member States' shares in EU financing and in spending 
under the CAP and structural operations, 1997 
(percentage shares in EU total, cash data) 
B  DK  D  GR  E  F  IRL  I  L  NL  A  p  FIN  s  UK 
Financing 
Total  3.9  2.0  28.2  1.6  7.1  17.5  0.9  11.5  0.2  6.4  2.8  1.4  1.4  3.1  11.9 
)>  VAT/GNP  3.1  2.0  29.1  1.7  7.7  19.0  0.8  12.3  0.2  5.1  3.0  1.5  1.5  3.2  9.6 
)>  TOR  7.4  2.0  24.2  1.1  4.5  10.9  1.6  7.9  0.2  12.2  1.8  1.1  1.0  2.6  21.5 
Spending 
Total(11  2.5  2.2  14.2  7.8  15.8  17.1  4.7  11.8  0.2  3.5  1.9  5.3  1.5  1.7  9.9 
)l>  CAP  2.4  3.0  14.2  6.7  11.3  22.5  5.0  12.5  0.1  4.3  2.1  1.6  1.4  1.8  10.8 
)>  Structural 
1.4  . 0.7  14.0  10.2  24.5  9.4  4.7  11.1  0.1  1.6  1.4  11.3  1.5  0.9  7.4  Operations 
(1) Total operational expenditure (net of administrative expenditure). 
2.  A PARTIAL REIMBURSEMENT OF CAP DIRECT AIDS TO FARMERS 
CAP spending consists essentially of expenditure to support market prices and of direct 
aids to farmers.  Market expenditure, which is allocative in nature, aims at redistributing 
income  from  consumers  towards  the  farm  economy.  Direct  aids  to  farmers  are 
intrinsically a redistributive policy that transfers income to farmers  from the taxpayers 
at large  1•  It is has been proposed that this last type of  expenditure be partly financed by 
the Member States concerned.  Member States would continue to pay direct aids on the 
basis of Community legislation as  at  present, but instead of receiving a 100 per cent 
reimbursement  from  the  EU  budget  they  would  receive  only  a  partial  one.  The 
rationale for the partial reimbursement would be that direct aids to  farmers constitute 
strict interpersonal redistribution, with no allocative aim.  According to the subsidiarity 
principle,  interpersonal-redistribution  is  better implemented  at  the  level  of Member 
States rather than at the level of  the EU. 
If  implemented,  this  option  would  be  consistent  with  and  would  represent  a 
generalisation of the principles currently governing Structural Funds expenditure.  In 
this  area,  there  is  already  a  system  for  sharing  the  financial  burden  between  the 
The overall redistribution induced by the CAP is greater than the reported budget costs.  According to the OECD, 
in  1990 the transfers to farmers associated with the CAP were equivalent to  Ecu 64 billion consisting of Ecu  50 
billion from  consumers and  Ecu  14 billion  from  European  taxpayers;  see OECD  (1990):  Agricultural Policies, 
Markets and Trade  Monitoring and Outlook, Paris. 
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Community and  national  exchequers  since Member States  are  required to  match EU 
spending. 
Proponents of  such a modification of  current CAP arrangements stress that it should not 
be seen as a dismantling of the CAP or a move towards its re-nationalisation.  Farmers 
would receive the same support since CAP expenditure by Member State is compulsory. 
The  level  and  the  conditions  attached  to  the  payments  of these  direct  aids  would 
continue  to  be  an  integral  part  of the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  and  would  be 
. determined  only  through  EU  decisions.  The  overall  amount  of financial  resources 
available would also remain the same, but would be shared between the EU budget and 
the national exchequers. 
A partial reimbursement of direct aids along these lines whi-le not reducing the overall 
amount of  spending would reduce the amount of financial resources channelled through 
the EU budget.  For instance, if  such a measure were introduced from next year and the 
level  of partial  reimbursement  was  set  at  75  per  cent,  the  level  of payments 
appropriations of the EU budget in  1999 could be automatically reduced by about 8 per 
cent.  Given that the shares of individual Member States in the financing of the EU 
budget  and  in  direct  aids  spending  are  very different,  a reduction in the  part of this 
expenditure to  be financed through the common budget will influence their budgetary 
balances.  Table 2 presents the relevant figures:  the shares of each Member States in 
total GNP, which is equal to its share in the marginal financing of the EU budget, and 
the shares in spending for direct aids.  Given the importance of the current reform for 
the amount of  direct aids the table presents also figures for 2006; these are calculated on 
the assumption of full  implementation of the proposals that the Commission presented 
on 18 March 1998.  · 
Table 2 
B 
3.0 
1.1 
1.7 
Member States' shares in total GNP and in direct aids spending 
(percentage shares in the EU-15 total). 
GNP 1999/2006 1 1l 
UK 
17.1 
12.3 
11.0 
(1) based on the assumption that all Member States will experience the same rate of growth and the same rate of inflation. 
All the Member States presenting large budgetary imbalances have a share in financing 
higher than the share in direct aids receipts and would therefore see a reduction in their 
imbalance  if  such  a  measure  were  implemented.  For  this  reason,  a  partial 
reimbursement of CAP  direct aids  can be  seen  as  a way of defusing the  issue of the 
budgetary imbalances; moreover, this policy would be consistent with the Fontainebleau 
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principles which stressed that the preferred way to  address any budgetary imbalances 
was through the expenditure side of  the budget. 
From the administrative point of view, the option of a partial reimbursement would be 
very simple and would entail no  additional costs.  In addition, the decision could be 
taken under the same voting procedures used to modify the CAP and would therefore be 
easier  to  put  into  practice  than  any  solution  requiring  a  modification  of the  Own 
Resources decision.  Should a measure of  this type be adopted, it would be appropriate 
to  lower correspondingly the  agricultural guideline to  maintain its effectiveness.  It 
would also be necessary to  lower the own resources ceiling.  If a  r~vision of the Own 
Resources decision were not possible, it would be necessary to find a sufficiently strong 
form of  engagement not to use the margins liberated by the redu<:tion in CAP spending. 
3.  EFFECTS OF A REIMBURSEMENT LIMITED TO 75 PER CENT OF EXPENDITURE 
To give an idea of  the quantitative impact of  the introduction of  a partial reimbursement 
this section presents the results of a simulation based on the assumption that Member 
States would receive a reimbursement equal to 75 per cent of the expenditure incurred. 
In  1999,  agricultural  expenditure  under  H;eading  1  of the  Financial  Perspective, 
excluding the monetary reserve, should amount to Euro 40.4 billion (at current prices)  2 
of which 27.9 would be due  to  direct  aids.  Under the  assumption of 75  per cent 
reimbursement, Member States would have to finance directly about Euro 7 billion and 
the size of  the EU budget would be reduced correspondingly.  However, if  the proposal 
of the· Commission for the reform of the CAP were implemented, by 2006 direct aids 
spending  would  reach  Euro  36.6  billion  (current  prices)  and,  if  the  partial 
reimbursement option were implemented, Member States would have to  finance  Euro 
9.15 billion. 
Tables 3 (data for 1999) and 4 (data for 2006) illustrate the financial consequences on 
the budgetary balances of each Member State of such a measure3.  To allow a. correct 
appreciation  of the  impact  of the  modification,  the  data  are  presented  before  the 
application of  the UK correction mechanism.  The first two columns of  the tables show 
the amounts of  direct aids spending that Member States would have to finance directly. 
These amounts would have to be entered into the national budgets and would increase 
correspondingly  national  spending.  At  the  same  time,  however,  the  national 
contributions to the EU budget would be reduced by the amounts indicated in columns 
(3) and (4).  The overall net effects of  the measure are shown in columns (5) and (6).  A 
positive  (negative)  figure  indicates  an  improvement  (deterioration)  in  the budgetary 
balance relative to the current situation.  The same results are presented in Graphs 2 and 
2 
3 
Preliminary Draft Budget of the European Union for the financial year 1999, COM (98) 300. 
The simulation is based on the assumption of a linear partial reimbursement, i.e. irrespective of the product  All 
other CAP rules would  remain  unchanged.  This means that market support expenditure would  continue to  be 
integrally  reimbursed  to  Member  States.  Export  refunds,  market  intervention  expenditure,  storage  costs, 
promotion measures and other minor items, such as monitoring and preventative measures would not be covered 
by this proposal, as they do not constitute expenditure paid directly to farmers.  Finally, those type of agricultural 
expenditure which are  already co-financed, such as rural and accompanying measures and  some other income 
supports, are also excluded from this proposal, as they would lead to supplementary national co-financing beyond 
the level which is agreed upon for structural operations. 
7-10-1998 
• ANNEX 5 
- 5 -
3 where the Member States are  ranked  from that with the largest improvement in the 
budgetary balance  to that with the largest deterioration, in absolute terms (Graph 2) and 
as a percentage of  GNP (Graph 3). 
Table 3 
Implications of a partial reimbursement (75%) of CAP direct aids 
(Year 1999, in Euro million and in percent of GNP, at current prices, before UK correction) 
National financing 
EU budget financing 
Share in CAP direct aid  Difference 
payments 11l  Share in the GNP resource <2l 
Euro million  Percent of GNP  Euro million  Percent of GNP  Euro million  Percent of GNP 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
B  77.8  0.03  208.6  0.09  130.9  0.06 
OK  201.3  0.13  138.5  0.09  • 62.8  -0.04 
0  1 057.8  0.05  1 762.0  0.09  704.3  0.04 
GR  551.5  0.50  99.2  0.09  • 452.3  • 0.41 
E  993.5  0.19  463.7  0.09  • 529".8  • 0.10 
F  1 663.0  0.13  1 184.5  0.09  • 478.5  -0.04 
IRL  163.0  0.26  56.4  0.09  • 108.8  • 0.17 
I  877.3  0.08  972.7  0.09  95.4  0.01 
L  3.8  0.02  14.8  0.09  11.1  0.07 
NL  90.3  0.03  315.9  0.09  225.6  0.06 
0  120.5  0.06  175.6  0.09  55.1  0.03 
p  106.5  0.11  87.8  0.09  ·18.7  -0.02 
SF  72.0  0.06  100.5  0.09  28.5  0.03 
s  134.8  0.06  191.7  0.09  58.9  0.03 
UK  854.0  0.06  1 194.8  0.09  340.8  0.03 
Total  8 988.8  0.09  8 966.8  0.09  0.0  0.00 
(1) Determined according· to  the projected CAP refunds for each Member State in  1999;  (2)  determined according to  the  share of 
each Member State in EU GNP (Preliminary Draft Budget 1999). 
The results presented in tables 3 and 4 are not surprising and correspond to what could 
have been derived from a simple inspection of  the figures of  table 2:  the relatively large 
beneficiaries of CAP spending see a deterioration of their budgetary balances while the 
five Member States with the largest imbalances would experience an improvement. 
Two  elements need be  underlined.  The  first  is  that the operation of the  correction 
mechanism will reduce by two thirds the gains of  the United Kingdom that appear in the 
tables  with  corresponding small improvements for  the  other Member States (in  most 
cases small enough not to change the figures expressed as  a percentage of GNP).  The 
second is  that in 2006 the new Member States would see a significant improvement in 
their budgetary imbalance since they would see a reduction in their contributions made 
possible by  the  lower  amount  of CAP  spending which  would  not be  offset  by  any 
increase  in  spending  at  the  national  level  (direct  aids  are  not  foreseen  for  these 
countries). 
The  results  of this  simulation  are  proportional  to  the  initial  assumption  and  can  be 
extrapolated to different assumptions about the rate of  partial reimbursement (e. g.  a rate 
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of national  co-financing  fifty  per  cent  higher  would  give  changes  m  the  budgetary 
balances which would also be fifty per cent larger). 
Table4 
Implications of a partial reimbursement (75%) of CAP direct aids 
(Year 2006, in Euro million and in percent of GNP, at current prices, before UK correction) 
National financing 
EU budget financing 
Share in CAP direct aid  Share in the GNP resource 1 2l  Difference 
payments Ill 
Euro million  Percent of GNP  Euro million  Percent of GNP  Euro million  Percent of GNP 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
B  157.4  0.05  268.1  0.08  110.7  0.03 
OK  278.7  0.13  178.1  0.08  ·100.8  -0.05 
0  1586.6  0.06  2 264.8  0.08  878.2  0.03 
GR  579.5  0.38  127.8  0.08  • 451.7  ·0.30 
E  1123.7  0.16  595.5  0.08  • 528.2  ·0.07 
F  2 169.7  0.12  1521.2  0.08  • 848.5  ·0.04 
IRL  268.4  0.31  72.6  0.08  ·195.8  ·0.23 
I  1115.2  0.07  1249.7  0.08  134.5  0.01 
L  7.5  0.03  19.1  0.08  11.8  0.05 
NL  237.2  0.05  406.0  0.06  188.8  0.03 
0  181.9  0.07  225.7  0.08  43.8  0.02 
p·  136.6  0.10  112.8  0.08  ·23.9  -0.02 
SF  106.3  0.07  129.1'  0.06  22.8  0.01 
s  185.9- 0.06  248.2  0.08  82.3  0.02 
UK  1010.7  0.06  1440.3  0.08  429.8  0.03 
N-8  0.0  0.00  286.4  0.08  288.4  0.07 
Total  9 145.3  0.08  9145.3  0.08  0.0  0.00 
(1) Determined according to the  projected CAP refunds for each Member State in 1999;  (2) determined according to the share of 
each  Member State  in  EU  GNP;  the  under1ying  macro-economic assumptions  are  those  in  European Commission  (1998), 
(COM(1998)164 final, p.2). 
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A generalised budgetary compensation mechanism: 
Evidence from simulations 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The  emergence  of what  some  Member  States  consider  as  large  negative  budgetary 
balances in recent years has led Ministers of Finance from  Germany, the Netherlands, 
Austria  and  Sweden  to  write  to  the  President  of the  Commission  putting  forward 
proposals  for  granting  budgetary  corrections,  in  a  non-discriminatory  manner,  to  all 
Member States that qualify1• 
This Annex  reviews  the  generic proposal made by these  four  countries and  provides 
estimates of its implications for the EU budget and for the distribution of the financing 
burden  across  the  Member  States.  Section  2  of the  Annex  presents  the  proposal; 
section 3  examines  an  unconstrained  scenario  where  a  simple  extension  of the  UK 
rebate is granted to other Member States;  section 4 reviews a scenario where a  modified 
version of the  generalisation of the UK rebate  along the  line proposed by these  four 
Member States is  assumed to  be applied;  this scenario involves essentially a partial 
compensation of the excess of the measured negative budgetary balances above a pre-
determined  threshold;  and,  finally,  section  5  presents  a  graphical  summary  of the 
results. 
2.  A  PROPOSAL TO GENERALIZE THE UK  CORRECTION MECHANISM 
Minister Waigel submitted to  the President of the European Commission on March 5, 
1998 a proposal with the view to correcting the perceived large budgetary imbalance of 
Germany.  In  subsequent  days,  the  Austrian,  the  Dutch  and  the  Swedish  Finance 
Minister also wrote to  President Santer with virtually identical proposals favouring the 
introduction of  such a correction mechanism. 
Minister Waigel's proposal is based on the Conclusions of the Fontainebleau European 
Council of June  1984, according to  which  "any Member State sustaining a budgetary 
burden  which  is  excessive  in  relation  to  its  relative prosperity  may benefit from  a 
correction  at  the  appropriate  time"2•  The  Minister  argues  that  while  initially  this 
principle  benefited  only  the  UK,  it  should  now  form  the  basis  for  introducing  a 
generalised  correction  mechanism  to  benefit  those  Member  States  experiencing 
disproportionate budgetary imbalances.  Accordingly; the proposal is intended 
2 
•  to be non-discriminatory, by being available to all eligible Member States; 
See the discussion in part 2 of the report. 
See Fontainebleau European  Council,  Conclusions of the  Presidency,  Bulletin  of the  European Communities 6-
1984. 
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•  to take into account each Member State's capacity to pay3; 
•  to correct not all  but only those budgetary imbalances considered as  excessive 
(in order to respect the fundamental policy decisions on the expenditure side of 
the budget); 
•  to foster budgetary discipline for both net contributors and net beneficiaries; 
•  to be sufficiently flexible to facilitate the achievement of  fair solutions. 
The precise framework of  the proposed correction mechanism is defined as follows: 
Amount of  compensation =  (Net burden- threshold) • coefficient of  compensation 
Three parameters determine the amount of  compensation.  First, the budgetary position 
or net burden, secondly, the threshold beyond which compensation applies and, third, 
the coefficient of  compensation.  The first two variables are measured in current Ecu, 
and the third in percentage points. 
It is  suggested that the budgetary balance, or net burden, be calculated in  accordance 
with the UK correction mechanism4. 
The  threshold beyond  which  compensation  applies  is  a  measure  of the  maximum 
solidarity among the Member States and can be determined as a function of the relative 
prosperity of the Member State in question.  In the proposal under review, only a part of 
the budgetary imbalance will be corrected, that is, the excess of the budgetary position 
above a pre-determined threshold value.  In the case of the UK rebate this threshold is 
zero, that is, the total of the budgetary imbala.:1.ce is used as the base for the estimation 
of the compensation.  In the most general form of the proposal, the threshold can vary 
from one case to another. 
Finally, the amount of compensation is determined by the coefficient of  compensation. 
The coefficient will be  bound in  the range between greater than zero and  less than or 
equal  to one.  In  the case of the  UK rebate,  the  coefficient is  0.66.  In  the proposed 
scheme, alternative values of this coefficient are also conceivable.  The threshold and 
the coefficient constitute the flexible parameters of  the proposed mechanisms. 
The proposal does not specifically deal with the issue of the financing of the rebates 
that are granted.  In  the  present system, the UK does  not finance  its  own rebate.  A 
3 
4 
5 
In the original:  "Leistungsfahigkeit". 
The  Commission  has  argued  on  several  occasions that  there  is  no  single best definition  of the  concept of net 
burden and Annex 3 of the present report deals specifically with this point.  Clearly, if the proposed mechanism is 
to be a generalisation of the current UK correction, it seems logical to apply the  same procedure and to use the 
same concept of net burden that has been used in the last 15 years for the calculation of the UK correction. 
In  sections 3 and 4 of the Annex  two  simulations,  that differ according to the  threshold used  but have the same 
coefficient of compensation  (0.66),  have  been  prepared.  The  threshold  determines  which  Member States are 
eligible for the rebate and which are not, while the  coefficient of compensation is a simple arithmetic factor which 
scales  the  magnitude of the  results  (e.g.  using  a  coefficient of compensation  equal  to  0.33  one  would  obtain 
results which are half of those obtained by using 0.66). 
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straightforward  extension  of the  present  model  could  be  seen  as  implying  that  the 
Member  States  benefiting  from  the  system  should  not  finance  their  own  rebates. 
However,  this  solution  would  not  only  be  very  costly  in  a  situation  where  many 
Member States benefit from the system, but is also fraught with risks.  In particular, a 
threshold effect could appear whereby a country with a negative balance just exceeding 
the threshold would receive a (small) rebate, but would be exempted from the burden of 
financing  the  rebate  of others.  A  small  difference  between the  net  burden of two 
Member States before application of the mechanism could be converted into a  much 
larger once the correction has been applied.  It appears coherent, therefore, to  assume 
that a Member State should not finance its own rebate, but that it should finance all the 
others.  This would eliminate any unwanted "threshold effect". 
Eliminating the threshold effect also helps to  reduce (but not to eliminate) the second 
round problem.  This refers to  Member States that are below the solidarity threshold 
before the mechanism is  applied but find  themselves above after the mechanism as  a 
result of their participation in the financing of the other Member States' rebates.  The 
simulations in the following sections are calculated without taking into account possible 
second round effects which - while  eliminating  possible  inequities  arising  from  the 
mechanism  - would  lead  to  an  additional  increase  in  complexity  and  a  further 
diminishing of  transparency in the EU budgetary relationships. 
As in the UK rebate, it is proposed that the compensation should be financed according 
to the respective share of  each Member State in EU GNP6. 
3.  AN UNCONSTRAINED GENERALIZED CORRECTION MECHANISM 7 
This section examines the  cost  and  financing  implications of a  generalisation of the 
current UK rebate system to all Member States presenting negative budgetary balances. 
In  this case, the threshold is  set to  zero  and  the coefficient of compensation  to  0.66. 
Member States participate in the financing of all rebates except their own according to 
their share in EU GNP. 
The definition of the net burden is an important element in the exercise since the cost of 
the  mechanism depends on how  the  budgetary  balance  is  defined.  For purposes of 
illustration the concept used here is the same as in the UK correction mechanisms. 
6 
7 
In  these simulations. a reduction of Germany's share in the financing of the UK correction, as laid down in Article 5 
of the  Own  Resources  Decision,  is  ignored.  Therefore,  it is  assumed  that  Germany  would  participate  in  the 
financing of the rebates of all other Member States eligible for compensation, according to  its actual share in  EU 
GNP. 
The Court of Auditors in its recent special report on  the own resources system has presented some evidence. for 
the year 1996 on  the implications of an unconstrained generalized correction mechanism.  See European Court of 
Auditors (1998):  Rapport special no.  6198  relatif au  bilan  du  systeme  des  ressources fondees  sur Ia  TVA  et le 
PNB,  June and  Official Journal  of the  European  Communities  C 241,  July  31,  1998.  The  Court's  evidence  is 
mentioned in section 3.27 of the report.  The present Annex extends and  qualifies the Court's results for 1999.  It 
is clear that an  unconstrained generalized  correction mechanism is not the  system proposed by the  ministers of 
Finance of Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and  Sweden. 
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Table 1 
Implications for budgetary balances of an unconstrained generalised 
correction mechanism 
Projections for 1999; "UK rebate" balance 1 (data in Euro million and in %of  GNP) 
Budgetary balance "ala 
Total 
MS eligible  Amount of  l"fllistributive 
UK correction"  for a rebate  compensation 
Financing 
effect 
New budgetary balance 
(before UK correction) 
(4) + (S) 
Tbresbold  Coefficient  GNPsba"' 
GaiDsllosses from  Euro million  'll>  ofGI'ol'  Euro  million  'll>ofGI'ol'  0,0% of GNP  0,66  tbe mechanism  (1)+(6) 
(I).  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
B  2131,7  0,92  0,0  0,0  -538,9  -538,9  1592,7  0,68 
DK  188,8  0,12  0,0  0,0  -357,7  -357,7  -168,9  .Q,11 
D  -9 804,8  -0,50  -9 804,8  6 471,2  -2 361,1  4110,1  -5694,7  -0,29 
GR  5 221,0  4.71  0,0  0,0  • 256.4  • 256.4  4 964,6  4.48 
E  8 006,8  1,55  0,0  0,0  -1197,8  -1197,8  6 808,9  1,32 
F  -516,8  -D,04  -516,8  341,1  -2 990,1  -2649,1  -3165,8  .Q,24 
IRL  2 570.4  4,08  0,0  0,0  -145,7  -145,7  2  424,6  3,85 
I  -649,5  -D,06  -649,5  428,6  -2443,1  -2 014,5  -2 664,0  .Q,25 
L  717,8  4,33  0,0  0,0  -38,3  -38,3  679,5  4,10 
NL  -1342,0  ·0,38  -1342,0  885,7  • 773,9  111,8  ·1230,2  ·0,35 
A  • 770,2  -0,39  -170,2  508,4  -440,5  67,9  • 102,3  -0,36 
p  3173,1  3,24  0,0  0,0  -226,7  • 226.7  2  946,4  3,01 
FIN  -124,9  .Q,11  -124,9  82.4  -258.4  -176,0  -300,9  .Q,27 
s  -1001,6  -0,41  -1 001,6  661,1  -416,5  184,6  -817,1  ·0,38 
UKI2J  -7 799,8  -D,58  -7 799,8  5147,9  -2021,0  3126,9  -4 672,9  .Q,35 
TOTAL  0,0  0,00  -22 009,6  f4 526,3  -14 526,3  0,0  0,0  0,00 
(1 ).  In order to avoid distortions due to fluctuations in the size of the UK rebate , the projected amount of the UK correction for 1999, 
instead of the one of 1998, has been chosen for comparison purposes (in principle the financing is lagged one year); 
(2) the UK correction for 1999 is estimated at Euro 4 952 million;  the difference between this amount and Column (4) is due to the 
procedure foreseen in Article 4, paragraph 2 d) of the Own Resources Decision which takes into account the so-called "advantage" 
that the UK enjoys due to the changeover to a capped VAT own resource and the introduction of the GNP-based own resource. 
The  results  reported  in  Tables  1 and  2  refer  to  19999,  the  last  year of the  current 
Financial Perspective.  The final results are presented in terms of  the difference relative 
to  the present system;  that is, the results show the improvement (deterioration) of the 
budgetary balance of  each Member State relative to the current regime. 
8 
9 
The  budgetary  balance a Ia  UK  correction  is  a cash  concept  defined  by the  difference  between  the  share  in 
financing  and  the  share  in  allocated  operational  expenditure;  traditional  own  resources  (TOR)  are  reallocated 
among  Member States according to their VAT and  GNP shares, while the sum of all  balances is restricted to be 
zero.  See Annex 3 for a discussion of the definitions of the budgetary balance used in this report. 
Data  based on  the  Preliminary Draft Budget of the European  Union for the  financial  year 1999, COM  (98) 300. 
The  concept  of  EU  expenditure  used  in  the  simulations  is  allocated  expenditure  including  administrative 
expenditure;  if the  estimates  were  prepared  on  the  basis  of operating  expenditure,  excluding  administrative 
expenditure. the order of magnitude by which the rebates and their financing would be modified is somewhat less 
than 5 per cent. 
7-10-1998 ANNEX 6 
- 5 -
Table 2 
Implications for budgetary balances by applying an unconstrained generalised 
correction mechanism 
(data for 1999 in Euro million and in percent of GNP) 
Budgetary balance a  Ia UK correction  "Operational" budgetary balance 
Redistributive effects  Difference to the  Redistributive effects  Difference to the 
of the mechanism  current system  of the mechanism  current system 
Euro mio.  %of GNP  Euro mio.  %of GNP  Euro mio.  %of GNP  Euro mio.  %of GNP 
8  -538.9  -0.23  -333.7  -0.14  237  0.10  400  0.17 
OK  -357.7  -0.23  -221.5  -0.14  -440  -0.29  -332  -0.22 
D  4110.1  0.21  5 117.9  0.26  3 980  0.20  4 780  0.24 
GR  -256.4  -0.23  -158.8  -0.14  -318  -0.29  -241  -0.22 
E  -1197.8  -0.23  -741.8  -0.14  -1  502  -0.29  -1139  -0.22 
F  -2649.1  -0.20  -1 483.9  -0.11  -3 235  -0.24  -2 310  -0.17 
IRL  - 145.7  -0.23  . 90.2  . 0 14  -184  -0.29  -140  -0.22 
I  . 2 014.5  . 0 19  -1 057.8  . 0.10  -2 510  -0.23  -1  750  -0 16 
L  . 38.3  . 0.23  -23.7  -0.14  38  0.23  49  0.30 
NL  111.8  0.03  422.5  0.12  760  0.22  1007  0.29 
A  67.9  0.03  240.6  0.12  -6  0.00  131  0.07 
p  - 226.7  -0.23  -140.4  -0.14  -281  -0.29  -212  -0.22 
FIN  .  176.0  -0.16  . 77.2  . 0.07  -230  -0.20  -151  -0.13 
s  184.6  0.09  373.1  0.17  174  0.08  324  0.15 
UK  3 126.9  0.23  -1 825.2  . 0.13  3 517  0.27  -414  -0.03 
The  parameters of the  correction mechanism are:  Threshold= 0.0% of GNP;  coefficient oi oompensation  = 0.66;  the 
definition of the budgetary balance as "a Ia UK correction· and as "operational" is provided in Annex 3. 
Graph 1 
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The budgetary balance of the Member States for  1999 (calculated "a !a UK correction") 
appears in  column  1,  the  gross amounts of the  rebates to  the eligible Member States 
appear in column 4,  the  financing of the rebates in  column 5,  and  the amount net of 
financing in colump 6.  Columns 7 and 8 give in absolute value and in percentage terms 
the  new  budgetary balances.  The changes  in the  budgetary balance of each  Member 
State in  1999, both in Euro and in percent of GNP, are presented in Table 2 where also 
data with respect to  the  current regime are shown.  The last two columns in Table 2, 
which cannot be reconstructed from the data in Table 1, give the difference with respect 
to the present system (which includes the UK correction).  In particular, the difference 
relative to  the present system,  for  each Member State, is  equal to  the  new  budgetary 
balance resulting from the application of  the proposed mechanism (column (7) of Table 
I) minus the sum of the budgetary balance reported in column (1) of Table 1 (which is 
reported before the UK correction) and the financing of  the UK correction. 
Whereas the application of the present correction mechanism would redistribute in 1999 
Euro  4.9  billion  towards  the  United  Kingdom  alone,  the  unconstrained  correction 
mechanism  would redistribute  Euro  7.6 ·billion towards  five  countries  (Germany,  the 
Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and the United Kingdom).  This amount would have to 
be financed by the other 10 Member States that would pay Euro 4.3  billion more than 
under  the  present  correction  mechanism  (Euro  3.3  billion).  The  United  Kingdom 
would  be  worse  off by  Euro  1.8  billion.  The  new  beneficiaries  of the  system 
(Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, and Sweden) would therefore see an improvement 
in their aggregate budgetary balance by Euro 6.1  billion (5.1  billion for Germany alone). 
Graph  1 helps to  visualise the redistribution induced BY  this unconstrained generalised 
mechanism.  The shaded area corresponds to the difference between the unconstrained 
mechanism and the present system and includes all financing effects for the UK rebate; 
the  bars  refer  only  to  the  redistribution  (corresponding  to  column  (6)  of Table  1) 
induced by the new unconstrained system.  The Member States are ranked from the one 
with  the  greatest  improvement  in  the  budgetary  balance  to  that  with  the  greatest 
deterioration. 
Those  Member  States  that  are  currently  recording  a  postttve  budgetary  balance 
(Belgium,  Denmark,  Greece,  Spain,  Ireland,  Luxembourg  and  Portugal)  would  not 
receive any rebate but would only participate in the financing of the mechanism.  They 
will  all witness an equal deterioration in their budgetary balance in  terms of national 
GNP. 
Those Member States who  are net payers would, on the contrary, receive a rebate for 
their budgetary imbalance.  In some cases this rebate would more than compensate the 
financing of others' rebate, in other cases not.  This obviously depends on the size of  the 
initial budgetary imbalance. 
The  case  of the  United  Kingdom  is  somewhat  more  complex.  The  UK would  be 
entitled to the same rebate as under the current rebate mechanism but it would also have 
to  contribute  its  share  in  the  financing  of the  unconstrained  generalised  mechanism. 
7-10-1998 ANNEX 6 
- 7-
Thus, relative to  the present system, the UK finds  its  budgetary balance deteriorating 
due to the financing of the others' rebate;  in the new system, as shown by the bars, the 
UK would be as big a beneficiary as Germany (as a percentage of GNP). 
4.  A CONSTRAINED GENERALIZED CORRECTION MECHANISM 
As  discussed  in section  2,  a constrained generalised correction mechanism  has  been 
explicitly proposed by  Germany,  Austria,  Sweden and  the Netherlands.  This section 
examines the implications of this proposal.  The constraint in the mechanism is given by 
the threshold;  budgetary imbalances exceeding the threshold ought to be corrected.  In 
the proposal, a threshold of  0.30 per cent or 0.40 per cent of GNP has been suggested. 
Table 3 
Implications for budgetary balances of a constrained generalised 
correction mechanism· 
Projections for the year 1999; "UK rebate" balance 1 (data in Euro million and in% of GNP) 
Budgetary balance "a Ia  Total 
UK correction" 
MS eligible ror  Amount or  Financing  redistributive 
New budgetary balance  a rebate  compensation  effect 
(berore UK correction) 
(4) + (5) 
%of GNP 
Threshold  Coefficient 
GNP share  Gairuflosses from  Euro million 
%  orG~'P  Euro million  0,3% of GNP  0,66  the mechanism  (I)+ (6) 
(I)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
B  2131,7  0,92  0,0  0,0  -210,8  -210.8  1 920,9  0,82 ·-
DK  188,8  0,12  0,0  0,0  - 139,9  -139,9  48,9  0,03  --
D  -9 804,8  -0,50  -3 90_3,8  2 576,5  •  907,9  1 668,6  -8 136,2  ..  o,~..  .. 1 
GR  5 221,0  4,71  0,0  0,0  -100,3  -100,3  5 120.7  4,62 
E  8 006,8  1,55  0,0  0,0  - 468,5  - 468,5  7 538,3  1,4j 
··-
F  -516.8  -0,04  0,0  0,0  -1  196,7  -1  196,7  -1  713,5  -0,13 
IRL  2 570,4  4,08  0,0  0,0  - 57,0  •  57,0  2 513.4  3,99 
I  -649.5  -0,06  0,0  0.0  - 982.7  .  982.7  -1  632.1  -0,15 
L  717.8  4,33  0,0  0,0  -15,0  -15,0  702.9  4,24 
NL  -1  342,0  -0,38  •  284,2  187;6  • 310,2  • 122,6  ·1464,7  -0,42 
A  • 770,2  -0,39  • 182,2  120,2  • 174,3  •  54,0  • 824,3  -0,42 
p  3 173,1  3,24  0,0  0,0  - 88,7  -88,7  3 084,5  3,15 
FIN  -124.9  -0.11  0,0  0.0  -101.5  -101,5  - 226.4  -0,20 
s  -1  001,6  -0,47  •  359,6  237.4  • 187,0  50,4  • 951,2  -0,44 
UK  -7 799.8  -0,58  -3 798,3  2 506,9  -688,2  1 818,7  -5 981,1  -0,45 
TOTAL  0,0  0,00  -8 528,1  5 628,5  ·5 628,5  0,0  0,0  0,00 
(1) See footnote (1) of Table 1. 
Table 3 shows the results of a simulation for the year 1999 of the constrained correction 
mechanism.  The net burden is calculated as in the UK rebate, and a threshold of 0.30 
per cent of GNP and  a coefficient of compensation of 0.66 have been assumed.  The 
principal effects of the  mechanism,  both in  terms  of the redistributive  impact and  in 
terms of  differences with respect to the current regime, are summarised in Table 4. 
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Table 4 
Implications for budgetary balances by applying a constrained 
generalised correction mechanism 
(data for 1999 in Euro million and in percent of GNP) 
Budgetary balance a  Ia UK correction  "Operational" budgetary balance 
Redistributive effects  Difference to the  Redistributive effects  Difference to the 
of  the mechanism  current system  of the mechanism  current system 
Euro mio.  %of GNP  Euro mio.  %of GNP  Euro mio.  %of GNP  Euro mio.  %of GNP 
B  -210.8  -0.091  -5.6  -0.002  114  0.05  277  0.12 
DK  -139.9  -0.091  -3.7  -0.002  -209  ..0.14  -101  ..Q  07 
D  1 668.6  0.085  2 676.4  0.136  1727  0.09  2 527  0.13 
GR  - 100.3  -0.091  -2.6  -0.002  -151  -{).14  -74  ..0.07 
E  -4685  -0091  -12.4  -0.002  -714  ..Q  14  -352  ..007 
F  -1196.7  -0.091  - 31.6  -0.002  -1  827  ..0.14  -902  ..Q.Q7 
IRL  -57.0  -0.091  - 1.5  -0 002  -88  -0.14  -43  ..0.07 
I  -982.7  -0.091  -25.9  -0.002  -1  504  ..Q  14  -744  -0.07 
L  - 15.0  -0.091  - 0.4  -0.002  30  0.18  42  0.25 
NL  -122.6  -0.035  188.0  0.053  563  0.16  809  0.23 
A  • 54.0  • 0.028  118.7  0.061  -108  ·0.05  29  0.01 
p  -88.7  -0.091  -2.3  -0.002  -134  ..0.14  -b5  ..Q 07 
FIN  - 101.5  -0.091  -2.7  -0.002  -156  ..0.14  -77  ..Q.Q7 
s  50.4  0.024.  239.0  0.112  63  0.03  213  0.10 
UK  1  818.7  0.136  -3 133.4  -0.235  2  393  0.18  -1  538  ..Q  12 
The  parameters of the correction mechanism are:  Threshold= 0.30%  of GNP; coefficient of compensation = 0.66;  the 
definition of the budgetary balance as  "a Ia  UK correction" and as "operational" is provided in Annex 3. 
The  results  show that  the  constrained  version  of the  correction mechanism  entails  a 
significantly lower redistribution of budgetary resources.  Only three countries would 
benefit from the system (Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom) since in the case 
of the Netherlands and Austria, the benefit from the capping of  their budgetary balances 
would be smaller than their contributions to the financing of the system.  On the whole, 
the  12  Member States financing the rebates would be paying Euro 3.5 billion which is 
0.2  billion  less  than  what  they  would  have  paid  to  finance  the  current  UK rebate 
mechanism.  The United Kingdom, on the other hand, would be worse off by Euro 3.1 
billion.  This  amount  would  be  divided  between  the  12  Member  States  already 
mentioned  (Euro  0.2  billion),  Sweden,  (Euro  0.2  billion)  and  Germany  (Euro  2.7 
billion). 
The results of Table 4 are  also  shown in Graph 2.  Here,  the shaded area shows the 
differences  in  the  Member  States'  budgetary  balances  between  the  present  system, 
which  includes  the  UK  correction,  and  the  system  of the  constrained  generalised 
mechanism.  In the Graph, the Member States are again ranked from the one with the 
greatest improvement in  the  budgetary balance to  that with the greatest deterioration. 
The changes in the budgetary balances are identical for all the financing Member States 
that are not eligible for the rebate.  Their budgetary balance is projected to deteriorate by 
some 0.002 per cent of  GNP in  1999. 
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Graph 2 
Implications of a constrained generalized correction mechanism: 
(Threshold: 0,3% of GNP, "UK rebate" balance)  . 
Projections for 1999, in percent of GNP 
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The  UK,  on  the  contrary,  will  find  itself  substantially  worse  off.  Under  the 
unconstrained version of the mechanism the  UK rebate was determined in a manner 
identical to  the current system and, therefore, the UK saw a deterioration only because 
of its  participation  in  the  financing  of the  rebate  of the  others.  In  the  present, 
constrained,  simulation  the  UK  rebate  is  restricted  to  the  excess  of its  negative 
budgetary balance above the 0.30 per cent of GNP threshold.  As a consequence, the 
budgetary imbalance of the UK,  as  measured by the "UK rebate" budgetary balance, 
would worsen by some 0.24 per cent of GNP in 1999. 
5.  A GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE RESULTS 
Budgetary correction mechanisms  similar to  the  current  one in  favour of the  United 
Kingdom are imperfect and, since they operate on the revenue side of the budget, do not 
affect  the  fundamental source of imbalances, the expenditure side.  Moreover, beyond 
the conceptual and practical difficulties involved, they require an  agreed definition of 
budgetary  imbalance.  Notwithstanding these  imperfections,  an  explicit  proposal has 
been made by Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden to  address concerns about 
excessive budgetary imbalances. 
The  analysis  in  this  Annex  reviewed  two  versions  of a  correction  mechanism:  an 
unconstrained correction mechanism and a constrained one.  It is clear that, given the 
complexity  and  lack  of transparency  of the  present  system  involving  only  the  UK 
rebate, extending it to other Member States would inhibit further the comprehension and 
clarity of EU budgetary relationships. 
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Graph  3 
Redistributive effects of the two correction mechanisms under review 
(Projections for 1999, budgetary balances defined as in the UK 
%of GNP 
rebate, percentages of GNP) 
UK  D  ·  S  A  NL  FIN  F  OK  B  GR  E  IRL  L  p 
Applying the present mechanism to all Member States that record a negative budgetary 
balance, or simply extending to  the  four countries that have made  the  request, would 
increase the sum of all  rebates by about 50  per cent compared to  the  present system 
involving only the UK rebate.  A constrained mo;:chanism would involve a lesser amount 
of  resources to be. 
Graph  4 
Changes in budgetary balances with respect to the current regime 
due to the two correction mechanisms under review 
%of GNP 
D  s 
(Projections for 1999, budgetary balances defined as  in the UK 
rebate, percentages of GNP) 
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The results of the various  simulations are summarised in Graphs  3 and  4.  Graph 3 
shows  the  redistributive  effect  of the  introduction  of the  generalised  correction 
mechanisms (this corresponds to the bars of  Graphs 1 and 2) and Graph 4 compares the 
changes that either of  the, two correction systems would entail with respect to the current 
situation (this corresponds to the shaded area of Graphs  1 and 2).  The imposition of 
constraints  limits the resources to  be redistributed as well  as  the ,number of Member 
States benefiting from these dwindling resources . 
•••  •••  •••  •  •  • 
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Progressivity in budget contributions 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
On  July  1,  1998  Mr Rodrigo Rato,  Spain's Economics  Minister and  second  Deputy 
Prime  Minister,  and  Mr Abel  Matutes,  Foreign Minister wrote  a joint  letter  to  the 
Commission  President  proposing  the  introduction  of a  new  own  resource  based  on 
progressivity and requesting the Commission to examine this proposal in the framework 
of  the Own Resources Report.  The Spanish delegation reiterated the proposal during the 
EcoFin meeting of  July 6,  while Portugal and Greece voiced their support.  Some days 
later, the Portuguese and the Greek authorities also wrote to President Santer to express 
their support for the Spanish proposal. 
As  in  the  case  of the  suggestion  of the  four  Finance  Ministers  (of Germany,  the 
Netherlands,  Austria  and  Sweden)  who  have  asked  for  an  extension  of  the 
Fontainebleau  rebate  to  their  countries,  the  Spanish  authorities  do  not  propose  one 
specific course of action, but indicate a number of  ways - all based on the GNP resource 
-in which the objective ofprogressivity in contributions could be achieved. 
The Spanish authorities base their initiative on the text of the.Protocol on Economic and 
Social Cohesion where the  high contracting parties  "declare their intention  of taking 
greater account of  the contributive capacity of  individual Member States in  the system 
of own  resources,  and of examining  means  of correcting,  for  the  less  prosperous 
Member States, regressive elements existing in the present own resources system". 
Ministers  Matutes  and  Rato  acknowledge  that  the  introduction of the  GNP  resource 
represents a marked improvement with respect to the previous situation.  However, they 
regret that proportionality of contributions to income, characterizing the present system, 
does not take into account sufficiently the contributive capacity of Member States.  The 
Ministers  state  clearly  that  a  fair  system  of contributions  ought  to  be  based  on 
progressivity as are the fiscal  systems of all the Member States.  They believe that the 
phase  of integration  reached  by  the  European  Union  with  the  signature  of the 
Amsterdam Treaty clearly warrants a move towards a financing system based on "equity 
and progressivity". 
The present Annex, which together with the introduction, includes five sections, reviews 
the proposal and its implications.  Section 2 presents the proposal;  section 3 provides a 
brief review  of the  history  of the  concept  of progressivity;  section  4  examines 
progressivity in relation to economic and social cohesion;  and section 5 provides some 
final remarks. 
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2.  THE PROPOSAL CONCERNING PROGRESSIVITY AND SOME IMPLICATIONS 
Spain  proposes  to  achieve  progressivity  by  applying  "modulation  coefficients"  (to 
reflect "relative wealth" and "relative prosperity", two terms used interchangeably) to 
the actual GNP bases so as to derive new GNP bases to be used in the calculation of the 
GNP  resource  contributions.  No  clear  mention  is  made  of which  "modulation 
coefficients" are to be used, but it is said that the measure of  "relative wealth" should be 
GNP per capita in ECU. 
The proposal involves a fundamental adjustment to be applied in either of two ways in 
order to achieve progressivity. 
A)  To use  as  coefficient for  the  construction of the new GNP  bases an index of 
GNP per capita in ECU (with EU= 100, in  1996 this was 124.9% for Germany, 
64.5% for Spain, 85.8% for the U.K. and 114.2% for France etc.). 
B)  To apply the correction coefficients only to a part of the GNP bases (e.g. 50 per 
cent) leaving the remaining unaffected.  In this case, the GNP resource would be 
disaggregated into a proportional and into a progressive component, each with 
its own uniform contributions rate. 
C)  To  group  countries  on  the  basis  of GNP  per  capita  and  to  apply  the  same 
coefficients for  all  the countries in the same group;  no  indication is given of 
what these coefficients should be and how they should be calculated. 
Finally, it is suggested that the current VAT resource could be replaced by this modified 
GNP resource.  The proposal amounts  to  substituting the actual  GNP keys with keys 
more favourable to poorer Member States, and to apply the new keys either to less than 
40% of contributions to the EU budget1 (version B), or to about 40% of  them (version B 
and possibly C), or even to more than 80 per cent of the total, if the VAT resource were 
to be suppressed. 
It is clear that, in terms of redistributing the burden of the financing of the EU budget, 
the  proposal  would make  those  countries  whose  GNP  per  capita  in  ECU  is  higher 
(lower) than the average pay more (less) than under the current rule.  This is because the 
proposal amplifies (reduces) the  GNP  base of the  Member States with a GNP higher 
(lower) than the average. 
Under  either  option  Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,  France,  Luxembourg,  the 
Netherlands, Austria and Sweden, would be expected to  contribute significantly more 
than under the present system.  Table 1 presents results (in Ecu million and in percent of 
total  contributions) of the  application  to  the  data of 1996  and  1997  of the  idea of 
modifying  the  GNP  bases  according  the  ECU  index  of GNP  per head  (option  A). 
According  to  the  results,  in  1997  Belgium  would  have  paid  Ecu  70  million  more, 
Which is the current importance of the GNP resource in the EU budget. 
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Denmark  Ecu  180  million,  Germany  Ecu  1043  million,  France  Ecu  260  million, 
Luxembourg Ecu 48 million, the Netherlands Ecu 45  million, Austria Ecu 102 million, 
and Sweden Ecu 70 million.  Greece would have seen its contributions fall by Ecu 204 
million, Spain by Ecu 803 million, Ireland by Ecu 45 million, Italy by Ecu 465 million, 
Portugal by Ecu 200 million and the UK by Ecu  100 million.  Finland's contributions 
would have been largely unchanged. 
Table 1 
Modifications of the national contributions relative to the present system 
Proposal applied to the total of the GNP resource 
(adaptation of the GNP bases using the ECU index of GNP per head, in Ecu million and in per cent of 
total contributions) 
1996  1997 
Ecu million  %  Ecu million  % 
B  75.9  2.7  70.0  2.3 
OK  134.9  9.6  178.6  11.6 
D  1105.6  5.2  1043.4  4.8 
GR  -155.4  -13.8  -204.1  -17.1 
E  -551.1  -11.9  -803.9  -14.8 
F  311.0  2.5  259.1  1.9 
IRL  -45.4  -6.5  -45.4  -6.4 
I  -404.0  -4.4  -466.4  -5.3 
L  38.2  23.5  47.9  27.7 
NL  55.3  1.2  44.5  0.9 
A  102.3  5.4  102.0  4.8 
p  -152.2  -17.6  -199.3  -18.2 
FIN  -6.7  -0.7  1.3  0.1 
s  67.9  3.4  71.1  3.0 
UK  -576.2  -6.8  -98.9  -1.1 
Total  0.0  0.0 
1)  The technicalities of the proposal result in these countries marginally benefiting from the operation of the 
progressivity mechanism even if their index of GNP per head is slightly above 100 (see section 4 of this Annex) 
Option B would clearly give the same results as option A but scaled in proportion to the 
· part of  the GNP base to which the "modulation coefficients" are to apply. 
Table 2 presents results of the application of the same adjustment to the GNP base after 
suppressing the VAT resource.  In this case, the suppression of  the VAT resource and its 
replacement by the progressive GNP resource results in larger differences compared to 
both  the  previous  simulation  and,  clearly,  to  the  present  system.  Finally,  it  is  not 
possible  to  simulate  the  third  option  since  it  would  be  necessary  to  determine  the 
"modulation coefficients" for each group of Member States.  Nevertheless, it should be 
clear  that  with  plausible  values  the  simulation  would  give  quantitative  results  not 
differing substantially from those shown in Tables 1 and 2. 
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The  implications of the proposal for  contributions are  consistent with what could be 
predicted a priori.  However, the fact that under progressivity there will be a significant 
redistribution of the  burden of financing  EU expenditure,  from  the  more wealthy in 
favour to the less wealthy Member States, cannot constitute a criticism of the proposal 
since,  indeed,  this  redistribution  is  its  fundamental  purpose.  The proposal,  with  its 
prima  facie  appeal,  ought  to  be examined  principally  in  terms  of its  consistency  in 
relation to the predictions of  economic theory as well as against its consistency with the 
practice of  implementing progressivity in the EU through expenditure policies. 
Table 2 
Modifications of the national contributions relative to the present system 
Proposal applied to the GNP resource, VAT resource suppressed 
(adaptation of the GNP bases using the ECU index of GNP per head, in Ecu million and in per cent of 
total contributions) 
1996  1997 
Ecu million  %  Ecu million  % 
B  310.4  10.9  303.0  9.8 
OK  450.5  32.2  493.7  32.1 
0  2 034.4  9.6  1 396.0  6.5 
GR  -445.2  -39.7  -471.3  -39.4 
E  -1  396.9  -30.2  -1  758.9  -32.4 
F·  821.9  6.53  504.3  3.8 
IRL  -137.3  -19.5  -117.6  -16.5 
I  -234.5  --2.57  11.8  0.1 
L  89.4  55.0  98.6  56.9 
NL  128.6  2.8  115.3  2.3 
A  263.8  13.9  184.9  8.6 
p  -432.9  -49.9  -475.5  -43.4 
FIN  35.3  3.6  39.5  3.7 
s  323.7  16.1  259.8  11 
UK  -1  811.2  -21.3  -583.8  -6.3 
Total  0.0  0.0 
These considerations are  examined  in the  next two  sections.  Section  3  reviews  the 
argument for the adoption ofprogre!lsiv.ity for personal taxation, while !>ection 4 reviews 
the argument for the transposition of  the concept ofprogressivity from personal taxation 
to  the  Member  States'  contributions  to  the  EU  budget;  and  the  closing  section  5 
presents some final remarks. 
3.  A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE CONCEPT OF PROGRESSIVITY IN PERSONAL TAXATION 
The  concept of progressivity  is  well  known in  the  optimal  taxation  literature.  It is 
closely linked with the concept of equity.  The debate on equity in taxation has revolved 
around  two  doctrines,  the  benefit  doctrine  (taxes  should  be  paid  according  to  one's 
interests in the public estate) and the ability to pay doctrine (one should pay according 
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to  her/his  means)2.  One  of the  desirable characteristics of the tax  system,  argued by 
Adam  Smith,  is  that  some  progressivity  is  desirable  (~specially for  income  from 
capital).  However, this was not subscribed to unanimously by benefit theorists. 
The  ability  to  pay'  doctrine  can be  said  to  originate  with  John  Stuart  MilP  and  his 
concept of "equality of sacrifice".  Mill,  concerned  about  the  disincentive  effect of 
progressive taxation, argued for  a proportional taxation of income.  Having stated the 
equity  issue  in  terms  of equal  sacrifice,  Mill  initiated  the  debate  concerning  equal 
absolute and equal marginal sacrifice, the former calling for proportional and the latter 
for progressive taxation. 
Both  the  benefit  doctrine  and  the  ability  to  pay  doctrine  need  an  index  to  define 
inequality among individuals.  Since Adam Smith, the emphasis has traditionally been 
on the income and wealth base (with higher taxation concentrated on the latter), but a 
comprehensive and  global  income  tax,  as  the  current used  in  most Member  States4, 
emerged only in this century.  However, a consumption base for taxation was also in the 
mind of  several theorists beginning with A.dam Smith. 
Mirrlees'  (1971)  seminal  contribution  extended  further  the  analysis  of these  issuess. 
Here, to _ensure that vertical equity is respected, a constraint is imposed so that the order 
of the  gross  income  cannot  be  different  from  the  order  of the  net  income.  The 
government is choosing the  tax  schedule that maximises social welfare subject to  an 
exogenous state revenue requirement and the constraint.  Mirrlees concluded that, 
o  First,  "an approximately  !inear  income-tax  schedule,  with  all  the  administrative 
advantages it would bring, is desirable"6.  This corresponds to proportional taxation 
across  individuals.  This  is  not  contrary  to  the  desirability  of progressivity. 
Progressivity should be related to  the average tax, and it  is  attained  as  long as the 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Curiously enough, Adam Smith, the father of the laissez-faire doctrine, deserves credit for linking taxation to ability 
to  pay  (or,  in  our context,  contributive  capacity)  but tempering  it by  a  benefit  principle.  The  importance  he 
attached to proportionality is also worth  noting.  His first "maxim" (The  Wealth of Nations,  G.  P.  Putnam's Sons, 
New York,  1904, Vol.  II,  p.  310) reads: "The subject of every State ought to contribute towards the support of the 
government, as  nearly as  possible  in  proportion to their respective abilities;  that is in proportion to  the  revenue 
which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state. The expense of the Government to the individuals 
of a great nation, is like the expense of management to the joint tenants of a great estate, who are all obliged to 
contribute  in  proportion  to  their respective  interests  in  the estate.  In  the observation or neglect of this  maxim 
consists what is called equality or inequality of taxation"  (italics added).  Whether this is more supportive of the 
benefit principle or of the ability to pay principle is not easy to answer. 
See John Stuart Mill, Principles of  Political Economy, Collier and Son, New Yorlk, 1900. 
Scandinavian  countries  that  have  adopted  the  so-called  Dual  Income Tax  are  a notable exception.  The  Dual 
Income Tax levies more taxes on  labour income than capital income on simple efficiency grounds (labour is less 
mobile than capital). For a discussion of the Dual Income Tax see S.  Cnossen (1998): "Taxing Capital Income in 
the  European  Union,  the  Case  for  Adopting  the  Dual  Income Tax",  mimeo presented  at a conference on  "Tax 
Competition and Co-ordina\ion of Tax Policy in the European Union" organised by the Austrian Federal Ministry of 
Finance in co-operation with the Austrian Institute of Economic Research, Vienna, July 13-14. 
See  J.  A.  Mirrlees  (1971):  "An  Exploration  in  the  Theory of Optimum  Income Taxation",  Review of Economic 
Studies, vol. 38, p.  175-208. 
Mirrlees (1971 ):  op. cit., p. 208. 
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marginal tax rate exceeds the  average one.  It  is, however, clear that there are few 
arguments in favour of a strong progressivity of the tax system in terms of a steeply 
increasing marginal tax rate H. 
o  Second,  "the income tax is a much less effective tool for reducing inequalities than 
has often been thought"9. 
o  Third,  marginal  tax  rates  are  quite  low,  which  implies  a  reduced  use  of 
progressivityiO. 
The  idea  that  relative  (among  individuals)  prosperity  must  be  an  element  in  the 
determination  of the  tax  burden  is,  therefore,  confirmed  and  while  progressivity  is 
accepted, its "optimal" magnitude is lower than initially thought. 
The evolution of  most European tax systems since the beginning of  the 1970s appears to 
suggest  that  most  of Mirrlees'  points  have  been  very  well  understood  and  widely 
adopted  in  public  policy.  Marginal  rates  on  personal  taxation  have  been  reduced 
dramatically  across  Europe  accompanied  by  a  widening  of the  tax  base.  Income 
redistribution has been pursued via targeted expenditure policy.  A lesson generally well 
understood is that the more inelastic the labour supply is, the higher labour can be taxed, 
but when the labour supply  is  elastic  the  disincentives  contained  in  the  progressive 
income  tax  are  powerful.  Later  studies  in  this  area  have  further  confirmed  the 
robustness ofMirrlees' conclusions. 
4.  PROGRESSIVITY  OF  MEMBER  STATES  CONTRIBUTIONS  AND  ECONOMIC  AND 
SOCIAL COHESION 
When taxpayers are Member States instead of single individuals the issues at hand are 
different.  A transposition of the optimal taxation rule from the area of  personal taxation 
to  a  national  level  is  not  possible,  essentially  because  it  involves  the  problem  of 
aggregation across individuals.  Moreover, it is  not even clear that it is meaningful to 
apply principles of  personal taxation to national states as a whole. 
7 
8 
9 
Mirrlees (1971 ):  op.cit. obtained three technical results.  1) The marginal tax rate is always between zero and one: 
2) at the top income the  marginal tax rate is zero:  3) At the  bottom, if the lowest paid is working, the marginal tax 
rate is zero.  For a thorough discussion of the  optimal non-linear income taxation seeN. Stem (1984):  "Optimum 
Taxation and Tax Policy", IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 31, no.2, June. 
M. Tuomala ("On the Optimal Income Taxation, Some Further Numerical Results" Journal of  Public Economics 23, 
1984) proved that zero taxation at the 'top" applies to  an  e)(tremely limited subset of individuals (much  less than 
the last centile). Other interesting numerical results are  also reported in  M.  Tuomala (1990):  Optima/Income Tax 
and Redistribution, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
Mirrlees (1971): op. cit., p. 208. 
10  Mirrlees himself was surprised by this result.  'I must confess that I had expected the rigorous analysis of income 
taxation in the utilitarian manner to provide arguments for high tax rates.  It has not done so":  Mirrlees (1971):  op. 
cit.. p.  207 
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In the EU, steps towards reducing the regressive elements of  the own resources system, 
in accordance with the Protocol on Economic and  Social Cohesion, have already been 
put in place. 
This  Protocol  reads  "The  high  contracting  parties ...  NOTING  the  proposal  to  take 
greater  account  of the  relative prosperity of Member  States  in  the  system  of own 
resources ...  DECLARE  their  intention  to  take  greater  account  of the  contributive 
capacity of  individual Member States in the system of own resources, and of  examining 
means of  correcting, for the less prosperous Member States regressive elements existing 
in the present own resource system" (italics added, capital letters in the original). 
The High Contracting Parties have, therefore, established through this protocol that the 
proper way to  take greater account of the  Member States'  relative prosperity in  the 
system of  own resources is by considering their contributive capacity and by eliminating 
any regressive elements for the less prosperous Member States  .. 
Graph  1 
Actual GNP own resources payments in 1996, GNP payments 
under the progressivity proposal,  index of GNP per head 
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The  Own  Resource  Decision  of 31  October  1994, .  which  transposes  into  law  the 
declaration  of Protocol  15,  has  indeed  taken  greater  account  of Member  States' 
contributive capacity by reducing progressively the VAT maximum rate (thus increasing 
the weight of the GNP resource) and has corrected the regressive elements for the less 
prosperous Member States by immediately reducing the maximum VAT share to 50% 
of GNP for the Cohesion Member States.  Both measures are aimed at making Member 
States' contributions proportional to their GNP. 
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Proportionality  of contributions  to  Member  States'  GNP  ensures  at  the  same  time 
proportionality with GNP contributions per head, as  Graph  1 shows.  Substituting for 
the  proportional GNP  resource  a progressive one means tilting  payments  around the 
average, imposing higher charges on those above and lower charges on those below the 
average.  This raises several problems of  technical and conceptual nature. 
~  Progressivity is generally achieved by differentiating the tax rates which taxpayers 
face, but not by enlarging or restricting the base on which taxes· are  levied.  This is 
due to the need to avoid offending the principle of  horizontal equity and to respect 
the principle of  base invariance  which guaranties respect of  vertical equity.  On the 
contrary,  the  Spanish proposal  to  use  Ecu  GNP  per capita as  the  coefficient of 
progressivity to  be applied to  the GNP shares, amounts to  achieving progressivity 
by enlarging or restricting ones' base' 1 and leaving the rate (GNP call rate), at least 
in one variants of  the proposal, equal for all.  Affecting the GNP bases amounts to 
artificially widening the differences in total income among the Member States. 
Two Member States with the same "true" GNP base will appear to have different 
"fictitious" bases.  Clearly, determining contributions by the adjusted bases would 
offend horizontal equity. 
~  The  resulting  adjustment  in  the  base  is  not  without  other,  more  significant, 
consequences.  Since the weights used in the construction of  the new GNP bases are 
GNP per head, the weighted sum of  the GNP base on  which the GNP resource is 
levied will not be  equal,  except by  coincidence,  to  the  unweighted sum of the 
original GNP base.  Furthermore, it is inevitable that the adjusted GNP base will be 
greater than the original one since the richer Member States are invariably the larger 
ones too.  For example, in 1997 the original GNP base is estimated at Ecu 70 202 
million;  the weighted GNP base becomes Ecu 73  418 million.  As a result of this, 
and given the fixed amount to be financed through the GNP resource, the GNP call 
rate is lower than the original one- in 1997 the original one was 0.403  and the 
one obtained from the adjusted base is  0.385.  The implicit reduction in the GNP 
call rate implies that those Member States with an index of  GNP per capita less than 
100 (the EU average) will see their contributions on the GNP resource reduced by 
the  influence  of two  effects,  first,  the  reduction  in  the  base  as  a  result  of the 
adjustment and,  second,  a reduction due  to  the  fall  in  the  call  rate.  The  richer 
Member States with per capita GNP  higher than  100,  on the other hand, will see 
their increased contributions somewhat compensated by the reduction in the GNP 
call  rate.  One of the  clear difficulties  of the  proposal  is  those  Member  States 
around  the  EU  average  may  see  their  GNP  contributions  fall,  compared  to  the 
present regime, if the  increase in the  GNP  base is  more  than compensated by a 
reduction in the GNP call rate.  This occurs in the case of  Finland and the UK in the 
years reported in Table 1 and in. Table 2 below. 
11  It would be as if the taxable base of the affluent (poor) taxpayers would be multiplied by a coefficient higher than 1 
because of their affluence (poverty) and  this would widen the  differences between taxpayers beyond reality.  To 
the best of our knowledge, there are no significant examples of this type of procedure for income taxation in any 
fiscal code. 
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:r  Substituting proportionality with respect to  the  GNP  resource  with  progressivity 
may not necessarily foster real convergence and economic and social cohesion. 
+  Whether progressivity in budgetary contributions is an efficient way to  achieve 
economic  convergence  is  an  open  question.  Solidarity  and  convergence 
policies in the EU take the form of a common effort to  improve the structural 
endowment of the less prosperous regions, not of money redistribution.  These 
EU  policies  direct  aid  to  less  wealthy  Member  States  in  areas  where 
development needs  and  convergence gaps  are  greatest.  The  EU  contributes 
significantly through its Structural Funds and through many of  its other policies 
to improving the level of infrastructure, education, and scientific research in the 
less prosperous regions and Member States.  This differs significantly in both 
political  and  economic  terms  from  forms  of financial  redistribution  like,  for 
instance, the "Finanzausgleich" mechanism existing in the Federal Republic of 
Germany,  which  require  as  political  background  a  much  greater  sense  of 
solidarity and common purpose than currently present in European integration. 
+  If  solidarity were to  take the form of redistributing moneys, and assuming that 
present consumption and future consumption (investment) are normal goodsl2, 
it is  certain that aid would be partly used to  finance current consumption.  By 
implementing redistribution on the  expenditure side, this potential "waste" is 
minimised.  Policy financing rather than money redistribution is  presumed to 
be  a superior way  to  ensure that solidarity and real  convergence are  pursued 
both  consistently  and  efficiently  and  that  money  is  channelled  towards 
investment, rath·~r than consumption, thus increasing the recipients' growth rate 
and reducing development gaps. 
+  Progressivity  could  foster  convergence,  ceteris  paribus,  if the  funds  made 
available  were  to  supplement  existing,  expenditure  based,  convergence 
expenditure.  However,  it  is  possible  that  those  Member  States,  who  have 
prominently displayed what might be called "contributions fatigue" (Germany, 
the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden) may not accept a further deterioration of 
their budgetary position, but instead they demand a corresponding decrease of 
expenditure policy to  offset the money made available to  benefiting Member 
States through progressivity in contributions.  Under these circumstances, the 
convergence process could undoubtedly be retarded since a part of the  newly 
available funds will be spent on current consumption. 
:r  The  present  system  of expenditure-based progressivity may be thought  of as  a 
rules-based system in which convergence expenditure is "tied" to specific projects 
and  to  explicit  financial  and  other  procedures  and  parameters.  A  system  of 
12  Normal  goods  are  those  whose  consumption  increases  as  income  increases.  This  means  that  for  a given  t1X 
increase  in  income a proportion  a.c'.x  is  spent in  good  X and  the  remaining  (1·a)t1X  is  spent  for  good  Y,  where 
O<a<1. 
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progressive contributions would introduce  a  degree of discretion  in  convergence 
policy which structural expenditure has so far not possessed. 
A  prediction of economic theory  is  that  policy implementation characterised by 
discretion leads to suboptimal macroeconomic outcomes compared to policy based 
on rulesl3.  Although this prediction was initially restricted to the study of  monetary 
policy, its applicability is more general and can be readily applied to the questions 
under review.  The sub-optimality has much to do with myopic behaviour on the 
part of those responsible for the policy-making as  well as  with pressures arising 
from  electoral  cycles  in  democratic  societies;  with  the  possibility  that  under 
discretionary conditions policy makers  may pursue objectives  in addition to,  or 
even other than,  those consistent with  maximising social welfare;  and with the 
possibility that they may even make systematic errors in  their assessment of the 
economic  situation and  in  deciding  the  appropriate policy.  Rules,  by contrast, 
introduce predictability and  certainty  about the  future  course of policy and they 
minimise the interference of political concerns with the optimal policy.  Moreover, 
rules enforce time consistency in policy by ensuring that the optimal policy over a 
given horizon is not revised halfway in favour of  a sub-optimal policy. 
Pursuing the objective of real convergence, financed through the taxes of European 
citizens,  requires  an  unwavering  commitment  to  dedicated  policies.  This 
commitment cannot be ensured under a regime of discretionary spending for  the 
same reasons that it  cannot be  guaranteed (indeed, the  opposite)  in a  regime of 
discretionary monetary or fiscal policy. 
);;>  An important component of expenditure-based progressivity as practised in the EU 
is  the  multilateral  surveillance  an.tJ  monitoring  function  performed  in  a 
framework  where  both  benefiting  Member  States  and  the  EU  through  the 
Commission  _agree  on  the  Community  Support  Framework  (CSF)  and  its 
implementation.  One  reason for  this  framework  is to  provide a surveillance and 
monitoring function ensuring, however successfully, that convergence aid is indeed 
used as intended.  This provides a guarantee to the taxpayers of  Europe concerning 
the  use  of convergence  aid.  The  involvement  of recipient  Member  States  is 
intended  to  respect  subsidiarity  in  that  it  acknowledges  that  recipient  Member 
States are in the best position to propose projects and to judge the appropriateness 
of  convergence expenditure.  Under progressivity-related discretionary expenditure, 
this surveillance and monitoring function would be lost. 
13  The  debate about rules  versus discretion  in  economic policy,  which  has  been  particularly  applied  to  monetary 
policy, was initiated by  F.  Kydland  and  E.  Prescott (1977):  "Rules rather than  Discretion:  The Inconsistency of 
Optimal Plans", Journal of Political Economy, June, p. 473-491;  the model was further refined in R.  Barre and D. 
Gordon  (1983):  "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in  a Natural-Rate Model",  Journal ofPolilical Economy, 
August, p.  589-610.  This literature is now large;  see finally,  as an example, A.  Alesina and L.  Summers (1993): 
"Central Bank Independence and  Macroeconomic Performance", Journal of Money,  Credit and Banking, vol.  25, 
no. 2. May. 
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>- A  final  issue  relates  to  the  character of solidarity  in  the  EU.  The  objective of 
solidarity and real convergence has a horizontal dimension and is  pursued through 
transfers to regions, irrespective of  whether they are in the more or the less wealthy 
Member States.  By contrast, the proposal under review would establish a vertical 
dimension in solidarity and convergence assistance, directing it to  Member States 
themselves rather than to regions within Member States.  This is  inconsistent with 
the present acquis in Community practice. 
5.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
While the proposal to  establish progressivity in  the EU contributions system is  prima 
facie appealing, it has nevertheless some significant drawbacks. 
First,  it  does not respect horizontal equity.  This arises from  the  fact  that,  instead of 
calculating  contributions  according  to  the  true  GNP  bases,  it  proposes  to  establish 
contributions  on  different  bas,es,  which  correspond  to  an  artificial  expansion  or 
reduction of the true  GNP bases.  No  tax  system  in  the  world knows this  procedure. 
Progressivity  in  national  tax  systems  is  pursued  through  differential  tax  parameters 
without affecting the tax base.  Furthermore, in the case of financing  the EU the base 
adjustment can have other unwarranted effects for those Member States around the EU 
average in GNP per capita terms. 
Second,  the proposal disregards the importance and the virtue of practising solidarity in 
the ComP1unity through the expenditure side of the EU budget rather than through the 
equivalent  of simple  cash  transfers.  Expenditure-based  progressivity  enhances  the 
probability of allocating expenditure for  the purpose of real  convergence, as  intended, 
rather than  for  the purpose of present,  and  possibly future,  consumption.  Thus,  the 
present, rules-based, system produces, in principle, superior convergence outcomes than 
the proposed alternative. 
Third,  the present system provides ex  ante assurance to  the  taxpayers of the  EU who 
finance  convergence  expenditure  that  the  funds  are  indeed  used  for  the  intended 
purpose. 
Finally,  the proposal implies higher gross budgetary contributions from  those Member 
States already voicing concerns about their budgetary burden under the present system. 
One possible outcome would be that the proposal could be acceptable to these Member 
States  if there  is  a  corresponding  and  offsetting  reduction  in  structural  expenditure. 
Under these circumstances, this will  inhibit progress in  cohesion and solidarity in the 
short run and in the long run it reduce the real convergence prospects of the benefiting 
Member States. 
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Table 1a 
EU expenditure in the Member States: FEOGA Guarantee  1 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  % 
B  1 374.2  4.3  1 286.5  3.7  1 17 4.4  3.5  1 623.4  4.7  1152.8  2.9  983.4  2.4 
DK  1168.0  3.6  1 318.3  3.8  1 287.9  3.8  1 403.6  4.1  1 358.4  3.5  1 235.7  3.0 
D  4 817.6  15.0  4 901.9  14.2  5 271.6  15.7  5 385.1  15.6  6 050.3  15.5  5 778.4  14.2 
GR  2 237.4  7.0  2 710.2  7.9  2 723.5  8.1  2 425.5  7.0  2 801.6  7.2  2 730.8  6.7 
E  3 668.3  11.4  4172.7  12.1  4 426.9  13.2  4 575.0  13.3  4 054.6  10.4  4 605.6  11.3 
F  6 924.7  21.6  8 072.6  23.4  8 048.8  24.0  8 423.3  24.4  9 572.3  24.5  9149.0  22.5 
IRL  1 435.6  4.5  1 635.8  4.7  1 527.1  4.5  1 419.7  4.1  1 700.0  4.4  2 034.0  5.0 
I  5151.4  16.1  4 825.4  14.0  3 481.4  10.4  3 390.7  9.8  4 231.3  10.8  5 090.8  12.5 
L  1.0  0.0  7.3  0.0  12.7  0.0  14.4  0.0  20.0  0.1  22.8  0.1 
NL  2 380.6  7.4  2 324.8  6.7  1 935.9  5.8  1 944.6.  5.6  1 536.2  3.9  1 757.3  4.3 
A  - - - - - 87.5  0.3  1 214.1  3.1  861.3  2.1 
p  476.0  1.5  478.1  1.4  713.3  2.1  708.1  2.1  646.0  1.7  656.9  1.6 
FIN  - - 63.3  0.2  649.2  1.7  570.6  1.4 
s  - - 76.5  0.2  624.1  1.6  747.0  1.8 
UK  2 459.4  7.7  2 762.8  8.0  3 001.9  8.9  2 955.9  8.6  3 470.0  8.9  4 399.7  10.8 
Total  32 094.1  .100.0  34496.4  100.0  33 605.3  100.0  34 496.6  100.0  39 080.9  100.0  40 623.2  100.0 
1) Heading 1 of the Financial Perspective (Subsection 81 of the Community Budget). 
Table 1b 
EU expenditure in the Member States: Structural Operations  1 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  % 
8  236.1  1.4  236.0  1.2  2660  1.7  236.1  1.2  437.0  1.8  357.9  1.4 
DK  66.6  0.4  119.2  0.6  127.3  0.8  120.4  0.6  103.7  0.4  169.6  0.7 
D  2 096.6  12.5  1 939.4  10.0  2 041.8  130  2 130.1  11.1  3 423.9  14.0  3 636.0  14.0 
GR  1 811.3  10.8  2 261.7  11.7  2 034.0  13.0  1 969.1  10.3  2 221.9  9.1  2 643.7  10.2 
E  3 704.9  22.1  3 743.8  19.4  3 221.8  20.6  6101.i'  31.9  6 304.8  25.8  6 376.8  24.5 
F  1 664.7  9.9  1 891.0  9.8  1 413.6  9.0  1 283.3  6.7  1 958.7  8.0  2460.3  9.4 
IRL  1 075.2  6.4  1 255.2  6.5  794.5  5.1  1 069.1  5.6  1189.3  4.9  1 211.2  4.7 
I  2 196.9  13.1  3 585.9  18.6  1 494.4  9.5  1 926.9  10.1  3 037.1  12.4  2 895.0  11.1 
L  13.4  0.1  15.8  0.1  13.9  0.1  16.9  0.1  15.2  0.1  19.9  0.1 
NL  136.3  0.8  223.7  1.2  274.6  1.8  231.8  1.2  262.4  1.1  421.3  1.6 
A  - - 175.1  0.9  270.6  1.1  364.0  1.4 
p  2 316.0  138  2 711.4  14.0  2 252.2  14.4  2 485.4  13.0  2 941.3  12.0  2 941.5  11.3 
FIN  - 173.8  0.9  155.9  0.6  379.9  1.5 
s  - - - 125.6  0.7  132.7  0.5  2306  0.9 
UK  1 462.7  8.7  1 325.7  6.9  1 728.0  11.0  1103.6  5.8  1 963.9  8.0  1 928.9  7.4 
Total  16 780.8  100.0  19 308.8  100.0  15 661.9  100.0  19149.0  100.0  24 418.4  100.0  26 036.7  100.0 
1) Heading 2 of the Financial Perspective. 
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Table 1c 
EU expenditure in the Member States: Internal policies  1 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  % 
B  348.6  10.5  414.1  11.8  458.8  14.0  439.4  13.5  524.8  12.6  492.5  10.5 
OK  75.3  2.3  101.6  2.9  89.4  2.7  82.9  2.5  122.7  2.9  137.2  2.9 
0  437.7  131  475.3  13.6  512.9  15.6  493.7  15.2  614.6  14.8  726.7  15.5 
GR  260.5  7.8  124.7  3.6  97.6  3.0  106.4  33  152.0  3.7  163.7  3.5 
E  139.8  4.2  271.1  7.7  216.3  6.6  195.0  6.0  275.6  6.6  296.2  6.3 
F  510.6  15.3  466.9  13.3  520.3  15.8  486.5  15.0  579.8  13.9  604.9  12.9 
IRL  58.6  1.8  63.7  1.8  76.4  2.3  78.3  2.4  96.9  2.3  105.7  2.3 
I  654.0  19.6  656.3  18.8  364.6  11.1  344.7  106  496.6  11.9  528.1  11.3 
L  38.7  1.2  51.5  1.5  69.9  2.1  75.5  2.3  88.2  2.1  75.6  1.6 
NL  173.0  5.2  187.7  5.4  248.0  7.5  210.4  6.5  265.8  6.4  341.9  7.3 
A  - - - - 53.7  1.7  58.7  1.4  78.2  1.7 
p  159.0  4.8  162.4  4.6  84.2  2.6  99.6  3.1  1030  2.5  190.2  4.1 
FIN  - - - - - - 37.7  1.2  69.9  1.7  88.7  1.9 
s  - - - - - 67.3  2.1  108.0  2.6  127.7  2.7 
UK  478.6  14.4  524.4  15.0  547.5  16.7  480.7  14.8  606.9  14.6  716.8  1~.3 
Total  3 334.3  100.0  3  499.8  100.0  3 285.8  100.0  3 251.9  100.0  4 163.4  100.0  4 674.0  100.0 
1) Heading 3 of the Financial Perspective. 
Table 1d 
Operational expenditure in the Member States 1 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  % 
B  1  958.9  3.8  1  936.6  3.4  1  899.2  36  2 2989  3.9  2114.5  3.1  1  833.8  2.6 
OK  1 309.8  2.5  1  539.1  2.7  1  504.5  2.9  1 606.9  2.7  1  584.8  2.3  1  542.4  2.2 
0  7 351.9  14.1  7 316.7  12.8  7 826.3  14.9  8 008.9  13.7  10 088.8  14.8  10 141.1  14.2 
GR  4 309.2  8.3  5 096.7  89  4 855.0  9.2  4 501.0  7.7  5175.5  7.6  5 538.2  7.7 
E  7 513.1  14.4  8187.6  14.3  7 865.0  15.0  10 871.7  18.6  10 635 0  15.6  11  278.6  15.8 
F  9100.0  17.4  10 430.5  18.2  9 982.7  19.0  10 193.2  17.4  12110.8  17.7  12 214.2  17.1 
IRL  2 569.4  4.9  2 954.7  52  2 398.0  4.6  2 567.1  4.4  2  986.2  4.4  3 350.9  4.7 
I  8 002.3  15.3  9 067.6  15.8  5 340.4  10.2  5 662.3  9.7  7 765.0  11.4  8 514.0  11.9 
L  53.1  0.1  74.6  0.1  96.5  0.2  106.8  0.2  123.4  0.2  118.3  0.2 
NL  2 689.9  52  2 736.2  4.8  2 458.4  4.7  2 386.9  4.1  2  064.3  3.0  2 520.4  3.5 
A  - - - - - - 899.3  1.5  1  649.4  2.4  1 374.6  1.9 
p  2 951.0  5.7  3 351.9  5.8  3 049.6  5.8  3 293.0  5.6  3 6903  5.4  3 788.6  5.3 
FIN  - - - 750.8  1.3  1038.0  1.5  1104.2  1.5 
s  - - - - - - 757.5  1.3  1296.8  1.9  1 181.3  1.7 
UK  4 400.6  8.4  4 612.9  8.0  5 277.4  10.0  4 540.1  7.8  6 040.8  8.8  7  045.4  9.8 
Total  52 209.2  100.0  57 305.0  100.0  52 553.1  100.0  58 444.5  100.0  68 363.7  100.0  71  545.9  100.0 
1) Table 1  d equals the sum of tables 1  a, 1  b,  1  c plus the budgetary compensation for the new Member States 
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Table 1e  t 
EU expenditure in the Member States: Administrative expenditure  1 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  % 
B  1 504.4  58.9  1  791.4  58.9  2062.6  65.6  2 099.4  61.5  2 052.2  58.5  2 217.1  60.4 
OK  20.4  0.8  24.3  0.8  28.3  0.9  33.5  1.0  31.9  0.9  31.9  0.9 
0  84.0  3.3  100.0  3.3  74.4  2.4  116.9  3.4  125.6  3.6  132.7  3.6 
GR  7.7  0.3  9.1  0.3  11.1  0.4  12.3  0.4  11.5  0.3  12.0  0.3 
E  23.0  0.9  27.4  0.9  24.7  0.8  26.7  0.8  26.5  0.8  25.0  0.7 
F  74.0  2.9  88.1  2.9  102.9  3.3  143.5  4.2  174.9  5.0  190.6  5.2 
IRL  12.8  0.5  15.2  0.5  8.8  0.3  11.2  0.3  11.4  0.3  12.8  0.3 
I  45.9  1.8  54.7  1.8  53.2  1.7  78.7  2.3  87.2  2.5  91.8  2.5 
L  696.6  27.3  829.4  27.3  676.4  21.5  754.9  22.1  825.0  23.5  777.8  21.2 
NL  25.5  1.0  30.4  1.0  24.6  0.8  41.5  1.2  39.4  1.1  41.0  1.1 
A  - - - - 3.0  0.1  11.1  0.3  12.2  0.3 
p  12.8  0.5  15.2  0.5  10.9  0.3  13.0  0.4  11.2  0.3  11.0  0.3 
FIN  - - - - - 2.6  0.1  14.0  0.4  13.8  0.4 
s  - - - - 3.1  0.1  15.7  0.4  15.3  0.4 
UK  45.7  1.8  54.4  1.8  66.0  2.1  72.3  2.1  71.6  2.0  83.9  2.3 
Total  2 552.4  100.0  3 039.3  100.0  3143.8  100.0  3 412.6  100.0  3 509.0  100.0  3 669.1  100.0 
1) Heading 5 of the Financial Perspective. 
Table 1f 
Total EU expenditure  1 
1992  1993  1994  1995  19~16  1997 
Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  % 
B  3 463.3  5.9  3 728.0  5.8  3 961.8  6.6  4 398.3  6.6  4 166.8 i  5.4  4 050.9  5.0 
OK  1 330.3  2.3  1 563.4  2.4  1 532.8  2.5  1 640.4  2.5  1 616.7  2.1  1 574.4  2.0 
0  7 435.9  12.7  7 416.7  11.6  7 900.6  13.1  8125.7  12.1  10 214.4  13.3  10 273.8  12.8 
GR  4 316.9  7.4  5105.8  8.0  4 866.2  8.1  4 513.4  6.7  5187.0  6.7  5 550.2  6.9 
E  7 536.0  12.9  8 2150  12.8  7 889.7  13.1  10 898.4  16.3  10 661.5  13.9  11  303.6  14.1 
F  9174.1  15.6  10518.7  16.4  10 085.6  16.7  10 336.7  15.5  12 285.7  16.0  12 404.8  15.5 
IRL  2 582.2  4.4  2 969.9  4.6  2 406.8  4.0  2 578.3  3.9  2 997.7  3.9  3 363.7  4.2 
I  8 048.2  13.7  9 122.3  14.2  5 393.5  8.9  5 741.0  8.6  7 852.2  10.2  8 605.8  10.7 
L  749.7  1.3  904.0  1.4  772.9  1.3  861.7  1.3  948.4  1.2  896.1  1.1 
NL  2 715.4  4.6  2 766.6  4.3  2 483.1  4.1  2 428.3  3.6  2 103.7  2.7  2 561.4  3.2 
A  - - - - - 902.3  1.3  1660.5  2.2  1 386.8  1.7 
p  2 963.8  5.1  3 367.1  5.2  3 060.5  5.1  3 306.0  4.9  3 701.4  4.8  3 799.6  4.7 
FIN  - - - - - 753.4  1.1  1 052.0  1.4  1118.0  1.4 
s  - - - 760.7  1.1  1 312.5  1.7  1196.6  1.5 
UK  4 446.4  7.6  4 667.3  7.3  5 343.4  8.9  4 612.4  6.9  6 112.4  8.0  7129.3  8.9 
Tot. EU  54 761.7  93.4  60 344.3  94.1  55 696.9  92.4  61  857.1  92.5  71  872.7  93.5  75 214.9  93.7 
Non-EU2  3 864.7  6.6  3 807.5  5.9  4 607.8  7.6  5 043.9  7.5  4 993.9  6.5  5 021.5  6.3 
Total  58 626.4  100.0  64152.2  100.0  60 !04.8  100.0  66 901.0  100.0  76 866.6  100.0  80 236.4  100.0 
1) Heading 1 - Heading 7 of the Financial Perspective (the flows taken into a=unt  are those which actually took 
place during the year, i.e. appropriations used in a given financial year and those carried over from year n-1 ). 
not included is the cash balance at the end of a period. 2) Expenditure made outside the EU, guarantees and 
reserves plus some minor amounts which cannot be allocated. 
7-10-1998 ~ 
ANNEXB 
-4-
Table2a 
Payments to the EU budget: Traditional own resources 1 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  19982  19992 
Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  Mecus  Meuros  % 
B  887.1  6.7  873.7  6.7  958.5  7.2  1 003.5  6.9  .985.9  7.3  1 048.9  7.4  1 079.6  7.9  1128.6  8.2 
OK  272.9  2.1  260.5  2.0  275.7  2.1  286.4  2.0  265.6  2.0  288.6  2.0  293.9  2.1  287.4  2.1 
D  3928.9  29.6  3894.0  30.0  3 872.7  29.2  3879.9  26.8  3500.2  25.8  3 432.5  24.2  3280.8  23.9  3 216.2  23.3 
GR  173.4  1.3  176.5  1.4  150.3  1.1  152.2  1.1  149.8  1.1  163.7  1.1  167.5  1.2  161.4  1.2 
E  775.1  5.8  597.7  4.6  592.7  4.5  727.1  5.0  622.6  4.6  631.7  4.5  695.4  5.1  709.5  5.1 
F  1680.4  12.7  1 695.2  13.1  1683.0  12.7  1711.4  11.8  1542.6  11.4  1550.8  10.9  1 566.5  11.4  1546.8  11.2 
IRL  156.2  1.2  186.0  1.4  219.0  1.7  228.1  1.6  206.7  1.5.  224.7  1.6  220.2  1.6  214.9  1.6 
I  1 318.1  9.9  1134.4  8.7  1155.2  8.7  1186.0  8.2  1047.5  7.7  1120.4  7.9  1103.8  8.0  1 205.6  8.7 
L  15.2  0.1  15.2  0.1  18.1  0.1  19.9  0.1  18.3  0.1  22.0  0.2  20.8  0.2  19.9  0.1 
NL  1 455.1  11.0  1 470.8  11.3  1 546.9  11.7  1 663.7  11.5  1609.3  11.8  1728.5  12.2  1 597.4  11.6  1 589.3  11.5 
A  - - - - - - 221.9  1.5  263.8  1.9  254.4  1.8  257.2  1.9  273.2  2.0 
p  209.4  1.6  188.2  1.5  202.8  1.5  205.8  1.4  135.6  1.0  155.1  1.1  160.2  1.2  167.7  1.2 
FIN  - - - - - - 137.1  0.9  151.8  1.1  144.3  1.0  138.8  1.0  128.8  0.9 
s  - - - - - - 351.3  2.4  383.5  2.8  362.9  2.6  365.9  2.7  381.5  2.8 
UK  2408.3  18.1  2493.2  19.2  2 577.2  19.5  2678.8  18.5  2700.2  19.9  3043.9  21.5  2795.1  20.3  2 784.2  20.2 
Total  13 280.2  100.0  12 985.5  100.0  13 252.2  100.0  14453.2  100.0  13 583.6  100.0  14172.3  100.0  13 743.2  100.0  13 814.9  100.0 
1) Customs duties, agricultural duties and sugar levies after deduction of the collection fees. 
2) Figures entered into the draft SAB for 1998 and the draft budget for 1999 
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Table 2b 
Payments to the EU budget: VAT own resource  1 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  19982  19992 
Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  Mecus  Meuros  % 
B  982.8  2.8  910.0  2.6  1 121.6  3.4  1 143.4  2.9  951.5  2.6  907.0  2.6  851.3  2.6  782.5  2.6 
OK  537.0  1.5  558.9  1.6  580.3  1.8  691.7  1.8  619.3  1.7  616.3  1.8  569.7  1.7  529.9  1.7 
D  10 329.2  29.7  9 897.4  28.5  11419.9  34.4  12 862.1  32.9  10 885 4  29.8  10 009.9  29.1  8 786.0  26.8  8 079.0  26.6 
GR  431.1  1.2  568.8  1.6  535.2  1.6  584.4  1.5  556.1  1.5  552.3  1.6  541.8  1.7  467.6  1.5 
E  3 082.5  8.9  2 965.1  8.5  2 469.6  7.4  2 058.9  5.3  2 327.5  6.4  2 576.3  7.5  2 226.4  6.8  2 082.3  6.9 
F  6 585.6  18.9  6 018.9  17.4  6 633.4  20.0  7 216.5  18.4  6 452.3  17.7  6 282.3  18.3  5 663.6  17.3  5 192.7  17.1 
IRL  233.9  0.7  258.8  0.7  277.1  0.8  321.0  0.8  315.1  0.9  250.8  0.7  279.5  0.9  265.8  0.9 
I  4 857.1  14.0  5 593.8  16.1  3 725.7  11.2  3377.2  ~.6  4 450.0  12.2  3 447.6  10.0  3 661.2  11.2  3 390.0  11.2 
L  83.9  0.2  106.3  0.3  95.6  0.3  109.0  0.3  89.7  0.2  82.5  0.2  75.8  0.2  70.0  0.2 
NL  1 553.7  4.5  1 624.7  4.7  1 648.5  5.0  1 887.3  4.8  1 663.5  4.6  1 681.2  4.9  1 549.1  4.7  1 439.8  4.7 
A  - - - - - - 1 105.6  2.8  947.2  2.6  1 035.6  3.0  894.3  2.7  825.3  2.7 
p  487.5  1.4  477.1  1.4  689.5  2.1  488.2  1.3  465.7  1.3  530.3  1.5  431.9  1.3  413.5  1.4 
FIN  - - - - - - 529.2  1.4  444.8  1.2  469.5  1.4  421.9  1.3  389.4  1.3 
s  - - - - - - 891.3  2.3  900.6  2.5  1 084.7  3.2  861.8  2.6  816.2  2.7 
UK  5 598.7  16.1  5 709.4  16.5  4 021.4  12.1  5 861.6  15.0  5 466.5  15.0  4 825.3  14.0  5 938.6  18.1  5 630.2  18.5 
Total  34 763.2  100.0  34 689.3  100.0  33 217.9  100.0  39127.3  100.0  36 535.0  100.0  34 351.5  100.0  32 752.8  100.0  30 374.2  100.0 
1)  VA Town resources payments at the uniform rate (excluding the UK correction); balances of VAT own resources  for previous years are included. 
2) Figures entered into the draft SAB for 1998 and the draft budget for 1999 
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Table2c 
Payments to the EU budget: GNP own resource  1 
1992  1993  199~  1995  1996  1997  19982  19992 
Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  Mecus  Meuros  % 
B  255.5  3.1  484.7  3.0  636.8  3.6  467.4  3.3  693.2  3.3  917.9  3.4  1 090.6  3.0  1243.6  3.0 
OK  154.0  1.9  306.0  1.9  374.7  2.1  275.9  1.9  408.5  1.9  538.2  2.0  714.2  2.0  825A  2.0 
0  2188.1  26.8  4 617.2  28.1  5 537.3  31.4  4 243.9  29.9  5 745.3  27.3  7 281.3  27.1  9 208.4  25.6  10 503.8  25.3 
GR  82.2  1.0  217.9  1.3  267.0  1.5  221.4  1.6  345.8  1.6  416.4  1.5  555.7  1.5  591.6  1.4 
E  671.4  8.2  1 290.2  7.9  1 392.6  7.9  723.9  5.1  1 350.7  6.4  1940.0  7.2  2381.2  6.6  2 764.1  6.7 
F  1 543.4  18.9  3 037.4  18.5  3 600.8  20.4  2 569.9  18.1  3 741.9  17.8  4 793.1  17.8  6159.4  17.1  7061.2  17.0 
IRL  50.8  0.6  99.0  0.6  123.4  0.7  102.5  0.7  133.2  0.6  190.3  0.7  286.6  0.8  336.3  0.8 
I  1469.8  18.0  2 800.8  17.1  2370.1  13.4  1 586.6  11.2  2 959.8  14.0  3 666.2  13.6  5 058.4  14.1  5 798.3  14.0 
L  17.5  0.2  37.5  0.2  44.8  0.3  34.2  0.2  44.5  0.2  59.5  0.2  76.2  0.2  88.5  0.2 
NL  367.1  4.5  746.3  4.5  898.0  5.1  704.1  5.0  990.1  4.7  1 283.1  4.8  1635.5  4.5  1 883.0  4.5 
A  - - - - - - 378.8  2.7  559.5  2.7  738.0  2.7  910.5  2.5  1 046.7  2.5 
p  99.7  1.2  193.5  1.2  279.2  1.6  145.5  1.0  202.3  1.0  353.0  1.3  442.9  1.2  523.1  1.3 
FIN  - - - - - - 192.4  1.4  312.5  1.5  402.8  1.5  519.3  1.4  599.2  1.4 
s  - - - - - - 361.9  2.6  582.5  2.8  793.0  2.9  974.8  2.7  1142.8  2.8 
UK  1 268.8  15.5  2 584.0  15.7  2132.1  12.1  2179.3  15.4  2997.2  14.2  3 517.8  13.1  5 971.4  16.6  7122.8  17.2 
Total  8168.2  100.0  16 414.4  100.0  17 657.0  100.0  14187.7  100.0  21 067.1  100.0  26 890.6  100.0  35 985.2  100.0  41530.4  100.0 
1) including "reserves" and balances of GNP own resources for previous years 
2) Figures entered into the draft SAB for 1998 and the draft budget for 1999 
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Table 2d  -
Payments to the EU budget: Correction of budgetary imbalances 1 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  19984  19994 
Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  Mecus  Meuros  % 
B  113.7  4.4  126.5  4.0  105.2  4.5  65.8  4.5  120.4  4.1  97.7  4.0  134.7  4.2  162.9  4.1 
OK  71.0  2.8  81.1  2.6  65.5  2.8  41.4  2.8  75.5  2.6  62.7  2.5  88.2  2.7  108.1  2.8 
o2  551.2  21.4  667.9  21.1  536.4  23.2  338.1  23.0  611.7  20.8  493.6  20.1  660.8  20.5  800.1  20.4 
GR  41.9  1.6  47.9  1.5  39.7  1.7  27.1  1.8  54.2  1.8  46.0  1.9  68.6  2.1  77.5  2.0 
E  299.0  11.6  339.6  10.7  263.2  11.4  135.3  9.2  246.4  8.4  219.6  8.9  294.1  9.1  362.1  9.2 
F  683.9  26.6  794.0  25.1  633.6  27.4  378.9  25.8  686.5  23.3  559.7  22.8  760.8  23.5  924.9  23.5 
IRL  21.5  0.8  23.6  0.7  19.5  0.8  13.2  0.9  26.5  0.9  21.2  0.9  35.4  1.1  44.1  1.1 
I  634.8  24.7  736.1  23.3  508.6  22.0  263.9  18.0  547.3  18.6  432.8  17.6  624.8  19.3  759.5  19.3 
L  6.9  0.3  8.0  0.3  6.9  0.3  4.6  0.3  8.1  0.3  6.7  0.3  9.4  0.3  11.6  0.3 
NL  158.0  6.1  188.8  6.0  152.5  6.6  94.5  6.4  172.6  5.9  144.9  5.9  202.0  6.3  246.6  6.3 
A  - - - - - - 56.6  3.9  103.5  3.5  82.4  3.4  112.5  3.5  137.1  3.5 
p  41.5  1.6  50.6  1.6  44.1  1.9  25.4  1.7  48.2  1.6  39.4  1.6  54.7  1.7  68.5  1.7 
FIN  - - - - - - 28.8  2.0  55.0  1.9  45.3  1.8  64.1  2.0  78.5  2.0 
s  - - - - - - 53.8  3.7  102.4  3.5  85.4  3.5  120.4  3.7  149.7  3.8 
UK  -2 573.3  -100.0  -3 160.0  -100.0  - 2 313.3  -100.0  -1 468.1  -100.0  -2 945.3  -100.0  -2 458.8  -100.0  -3 230.6  -100.0  -3 931.2  -100.0 
TotaP  50.1  1.9  .  96.0  .  3.0  61.8  2.7  59.4  4.0  .  87.0  .  3.0  .  121.4  .  4.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
I 
1) The figures include the financing of the UK correction for the previous year as well as the adjustment of that for the year "n-4". 
2) The share of Germany in financing the UK rebate is restricted to two-thirds of its normal share. 
3) Variations in exchange rates, "reserves" and balances of GNP own resources from  previous years explain the non-zero sum in the total in certain years. 
4) Figures entered into the draft SAB for 1998 and the draft budget for 1999. 
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Table 2e 
Own resources: Na":onal contributions  1 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  19982  19992 
Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  Mecus  Meuros  % 
B  1352.0  3.1  1 521.3  3.0  1 863.6  3.7  1 676.6  3.1  1 765.1  3.1  1 922.5  3.1  2 076.7  3.0  2189.1  3.0 
OK  762.0  1.8  946.0  1.9  1 020.5  2.0  1 009.0  1.9  1103.3  1.9  1 217.2  2.0  1 372.2  2.0  1 463.4  2.0 
0  13 068.5  30.4  15 182.4  29.8  17 493.7  34.3  17 444.1  32.7  17 242.4  30.0  17 784.7  29.1  18 655.2  27.1  19 382.9  27.0 
GR  555.3  1.3  834.6  1.6  842.0  1.7  833.0  1.6  956.1  1.7  1 014.7  1.7  1166.1  1.7  1136.7  1.6 
E  4 052.9  9.4  4 594.9  9.0  4 125.4  8.1  2 918.1  5.5  3 924.6  6.8  4 736.0  7.7  4 901.7  7.1  5 208.5  7.2 
F  8 813.0  20.5  9 850.3  19.3  10 867.9  21.3  10 165.4  19.0  10 880.7  18.9  11  635.1  19.0  12 583.7  18.3  13178.9  18.3 
IRL  306.1  0.7  381.4  0.7  419.9  0.8  436.7  0.8  474.8  0.8  462.3  0.8  601.5  0.9  646.2  0.9 
I  6 961.8  16.2  9130.6  17.9  6 604.4  13.0  5 227.7  9.8  7 957.1  13.8  7 546.7  12.3  9 344.5  13.6  9 947.8  13.8 
L  108.3  0.3  151.8  0.3  147.3  0.3  147.7  0.3  142.3  0.2  148.7  0.2  161.4  0.2  170.0  0.2 
NL  2 078.8  4.8  2 559.9  5.0  2 699.0  5.3  2 685.9  5.0  2 826.2  4.9  3 109.2  5.1  3 386.6  4.9  3 569.4  5.0 
A  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1 541.0  2.9  1 610.2  2.8  1 856.0  3.0  1 917.2  2.8  2 009.1  2.8 
p  628.7  1.5  721.3  1.4  1 012.8  2.0  659.1  1.2  716.1  1.2  922.7  1.5  929.5  1.4  1 005.2  1.4 
FIN  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  750.3  1.4  812.2  1.4  917.6  1.5  1 005.3  1.5  1 067.0  1.5 
s  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1 307.0  2.4  1 585.6  2.8  1 963.1  3.2  1 957.0  2.8  2108.7  2.9 
UK  4 294.1  10.0  5 133.4  10.1  3 840.2  7.5  6 572.8  12.3  5 518.3  9.6  5 884.2  9.6  8 679.4  12.6  8 821.7  12.3 
1  Total  42 981.5  100.0  51 007.7  100.0  50 936.7  100.0  53 374.4  100.0  57 515.1  100.0  61120.7  100.0  68 738.0  100.0  71904.6  100.0 
1) Sum of tables 2b, 2c and 2d including "reserves" and balances of GNP own resources for previous years 
2) Figures entered into the draft SAB for 1998 and the draft budget for 1999 
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Table 2f 
Total own resources  1 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  19982  19992 
Mecus  %  Mecus  o/o  Mecus  o/o  Mecus  o/o  Mecus  o/o  Mecus  Mecus  Meuros  o/o 
B  2239.1  4.0  2 394.9  3.7  2 822.1  4.4  2 680.1  4.0  2750.9  3.9  2 971.4  3.9  3156.3  3.8  3317.7  3.9 
DK  1034.8  1.8  1206.5  1.9  1 296.2  2.0  1295.4  1.9  1368.9  1.9  1 505.8  2.0  1 666.0  2.0  1 750.8  2.0 
D  16 997.5  30.2  19 076.4  29.8  21  366.3  33.3  21 324.1  31.4  20 742.6  29.2  21  217.3  28.2  21935.9  26.6  22 599.1  26.4 
GR  728.6  1.3  1 011.2  1.6  992.3  1.5  985.2  1.5  1106.0  1.6  1178.4  1.6  1 333.5  1.6  1 298.1  1.5 
E  4 828.0  8.6  5192.6  8.1  4 718.1  7.4  3 645.2  5.4  4 547.2  6.4  5 367.6  7.1  5 597.1  6.8  5 918.0  6.9 
F  10493.4  18.7  11  545.5  18.0  12 550.9  19.5  11 876.8  17.5  12 423.3  17.5  13185.9  17.5  14150.3  17.2  14 725.7  17.2 
IRL  462.3  0.8  567.4  0.9  638.9  1.0  664.8  1.0  681.5  1.0  687.0  0.9  821.7  1.0  861.1  1.0 
I  8 279.9  14.7  10 265.0  16.0  7759.6  12.1  6 413.7  9.5  9 004.7  12.7  8667.1  11.5  10 448.2  12.7  11153.5  13.0 
L  123.5  0.2  167.0  0.3  .165.4  0.3  167.6  0.3  160.7  0.2  170.7  0.2  182.2  0.2  189.9  0.2 
NL  3 534.0  6.3  4030.6  6.3  4 245.9  6.6  4349.6  6.4  4435.5  6.2  4837.6  6.4  4984.0  6.0  5158.7  6.0 
A  - - - - .  - 1 762.9  2.6  1 874.0  2.6  2 11D.4  2.8  2174.4  2.6  2282.2  2.7 
p  838.1  1.5  909.4  1.4  1 215.6  1.9  864.9  1.3  851.7  1.2  1 on.8  1.4  1 089.7  1.3  1172.8  1.4 
FIN  .  - - .  - - 887.4  1.3  964.0  1.4  1 061.9  1.4  1144.1  1.4  1195.8  1.4 
s  - - .  - - - 1 658.3  2.4  1969.0  2.8  2 326.0  3.1  2323.0  2.8  2490.2  2.9 
UK  6 702.4  11.9  7626.6  11.9  6 417.4  10.0  9 251.6  13.6  8 218.6  11.6  8 928.1  11.9  11474.5  13.9  11 605.9  13.5 
Total  56 261.7  100.0  63 993.2  100.0  64188.8  100.0  67 827.6  100.0  71 098.7  100.0  75 293.0  100.0  82 481.1  100.0  85 719.5  100.0 
1) Sum of  ta~s  2a, 2b, 2c and 2d including "reserves" and balances of GNP own resources for previous years 
2) Figures ent~red into the draft SAB for 1998 and the draft budget for 1999 
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Table 3a 
Structure of EU  exper:~diture 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  - % 
EAGGF 
guarantee  31 234.3  53.3  34 423.3  53.7  33 605.3  55.7  34 497.7  51.6  39080.9  50.8  40 623.2  50.6 
Structural Funds  17 748.8  30.3  20 084.8  31.3  15 767.0  26.2  19 292.0  28.8  24 426.8  31.8  26 059.2  32.5 
Internal policies  4008.3  6.8  3 618.0  5.6  3 907.1  6.5  4 004.5  6.0  4 544.4  5.9  4934.7  6.2 
External expenditure 
1  857.5  3.2  2 718.1  4.2  3 459.7  5.7  3700.2  5.5  4 040.1  5.3  4 278.0  5.3 
Administrative  2 900.9  5.0  3 308.0  5.2  3 565.6  5.9  3 859.7  5.8  4073.3  5.3  4129.2  5.1  expenditure 
Compensations to MS  876.8  1.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1 547.0  2.3  701.0  0.9  212.0  0.3 
Total  58 626.6  100.0  64152.2  100.0  60 304.8  100.0  66 901.0  100.0  76 866.6  100.0  80 236.4  100.0 
Rate of increase  + 8.6%  + 9.4%  - 6.0%  +10.9%  +14.9%  +4.4% 
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Table 3b 
Structure of payments to the EU budget 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  19982  19992 
Mecus  o/o  Mecus  o/o  Mecus  %  Mecus  o/o  Mecus  o/o  Mecus  Mecus  Meuros  o/o 
TOR  13 280.2  23.6  12 985.5  20.3  13 252.2  20.6  14 453.2  21.3  13 583.6  19.1  14172.3  18.8  13 743.2  16.7  13 814.9  16.1 
VAT  34 763.2  61.8  34 689.3  54.2  33 217.9  51.8  39127.3  57.7  36 535.0  51.4  34 351.5  45.6  32752.8  39.7  30374.2  35.4 
-
GNP  8168.2  14.5  16 414.4  25.7  17 657.0  27.5  14 187.7  20.9  21  067.1  29.6  26890.6  35.7  35985.2  43.6  41 530.4  48.4 
UK rebate  50.1  0.1  -96.0  -0.2  61.8  0.1  59.4  0.1  -87.0  -0.1  -121.4  -0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Total OR  56 261.7  100.0  63 993.2  100.0  64188.8  100.0  67 827.6  100.0  71 098.7  100.0  75 293.0  100.0  82 481.1  100.0  85 719.5  100.0 
%increase  + 6.5%  +13.7%  +  0.3%  + 5.7%  + 4.8%  + 5.9%  +9.5%  +3.9% 
Other  3450.1  - 1679.5  - 1 813.3  - 7249.5  - 10176.4  - 5254.7  - 1 628.0  - 630.9  -
Revenue 1 
Total  59 711.8  - 65 672.7  - 66 002.1  - 75 077.1  - 81275.1  -- 80547.7  - 84109.1  -- 86350.4  -
1)  Other miscellaneous revenues, such as surpluses from  previous years,  interests on  late payments,  fines,  taxes on salaries of the employees of European  Institutions, 
proceeds 'rom borrowing and lending operations, etc. 
2)  Figures entered into the draft SAB for 1998 and the draft budget for 1999 
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Table 3c 
Member States shares in EU financing and in EU-15 GNP 
(in percent of total, data for 1997) 
B  DK  D  GR  E  F  IRL  I  L  NL  A  p  FIN  s  UK 
Financing share  3.9  2.0  28.2  1.6  7.1  17.5  0.9  11.5  0.2  6.4  2.8  1.4  1.4  3.1  11.9 
~TOR  7.4  2.0  24.2  1.2  4.5  10.9  1.6  7.9  0.2  12.2  1.8  1.1  1.0  2.6  21.5 
~VAT/GNP  3.1  2.0  29.1  1.7  7.8  19.0  0.8  12.4  0.2  5.1  3.0  1.5  1.5  3.2  9.6 
GNP share  3.1  1.9  26.0  1.5  6.6  17.2  0.8  14.2  0.2  4.5  2.6  1.2  1.4  2.7  16.1 
Table 4 
Accounting budgetary balancesl1l: "Table 1f' less "Table 2f' 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  % 
GNP  GNP  GNP  GNP  GNP  GNP 
B  1224.2  0.71  1  333.1  0.72  1139.6  0.58  1 718.2  0.81  1 415.8  0.66  1 079.5  0.50 
DK  295.4  0.29  356.9  0.33  236.6  0.20  345.1  0.27  247.8  0.19  68.6  0.05 
D  -9 561.6  .0.62  -11659.7  -0.71  -13 465.7  -0.78  -13198.3  -0.72  -10 528.3  -0.57  -10 943.5  -0.60 
GR  3 588.2  4.66  4094.7  5.17  3873.9  4.62  3 528.5  3.99  4081.0  4.20  4371.8  4.13 
E  2 708.1  0.61  3022.4  0.74  3171.6  0.79  7 253.2  1.70  6114.3  1.34  5 936.0  1.28 
F  -1 319.3  -0.13  -1026.9  -0.10  -2 465.3  -0.22  -1 540.1  -0.13  - 137.6  -0.01  - 781.1  -0.06 
IRL  2119.8  5.88  2402.5  6.58  1 767.9  4.45  1 913.7  4.48  2 316.1  4.86  2 676.7  4.84 
I  - 231.7  -0.03  -1142.8  -0.14  -2 366.0  -0.28  - 672.7  -0.08  -1152.5  -0.12  - 61.3  -0.01 
L  626.2  5.24  737.0  5.91  607.6  4.55  694.1  4.88  787.8  5.49  725.4  4.89 
NL  - 818.6  -0.33  -1 263.9  -0.48  -1 762.9  -0.62  -1 921.2  -0.64  -2 331.8  -0.75  -2 276.2  -0.71 
A  - - - - - - - 860.5  -0.49  - 213.5  -0.12  - 723.6  -0.40 
p  2124.4  2.93  2 457.7  3.44  1  844.9  2.50  2 441.1  3.08  2 849.7  3.41  2721.8  3.12 
FIN  - - - - - - - 133.9  -0.14  88.0  0.09  56.1  0.06 
s  - - - - - - - 897.7  -0.53  - 656.6  -0.35  -1129.5  -0.59 
UK  -2256.1  -0.28  -2 959.3  -0.37  -1 074.0  -0.13  -4 639.1  -0.55  -2106.1  -0.23  -1798.8  -0.16 
Total  ·1 501.2  -0.03  -3 648.6  -0.07  • 8 491.9  -0.15  • 5 969.7  -0.09  774.0  0.01  .  78.0  ·0.00 
(1) For an explanation of the concepts see Annex 3. 
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Table 5 
Operational budgetary balances<1): "Table 1d" less "Table 2f'  r 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  % 
GNP  GNP  GNP  GNP  GNP.  GNP 
8  -280.2  ~.16  -458.3  ~.25  -922.9  ~.47  -381.2  ~.18  -636.4  ~.30  -1137.6  ~.52 
DK  275.0  0.27  332.7  0.30  208.3  0.18  311.5  0.25  215.9  0.16  36.6  0.03 
D  -9 645.6  ~.62  -11  759.7  ~.72  -13 540.0  ~.78  -13 315.2  ~.72  -10 653.8  ~.58  -11 076.2  ~.60 
GR  3 580.6  4.65  4085.5  5.16  3 862.7  4.61  3 515.8  3.98  4069.6  4.19  4 359.8  4.12 
E  2685.1  0.60  2995.0  0.73  3146.9  0.78  7 226;5  1.69  6087.8  1.34  5 911.0  1.27 
F  -1  393.4  ~.14  -1115.0  ~.11  -2 568.2  ~.23  -1  683.6  ~.14  -312.5  ~.03  -971.7  ~.08 
IRL  2107.1  5.84  2 387.3  6.54  1 759.1  4.42  1 902.3  4.45  2 304.7  4.84  2 663.9  4.82 
I  -277.6  ~.03  -1197.4  ~.14  -2 419.2  ~.29  -751.4  ~.09  -1239.7  ~.13  -153.1  ~.02 
L  -70.4  ~.59  -92.4  ~.74  -68.9  ~.52  -60.8  ~.43  -37.3  ~.26  -52.4  ~.35 
NL  -844.1  ~.34  -1  294.4  ~.49  -1787.5  ~.63  -1  962.7  ~.65  -2 371.2  ~.76  -2 317.2  ~.73 
A  - - - - - - -863.6  ~.49  -224.6  ~.12  -735.8  ~.41 
p  2112.9  2.91  2442.4  3.42  1834.0  2.48  2 428.1  3.06  2838.6  3.40  2 710.8  3.11 
FIN  - - - - - - -136.6  ~.15  74.0  0.08  42.3  0.04 
s  - - - - - - -900.8  ~.53  -672.2  ~.35  -1144.7  ~.59 
UK  -2 301.8  ~.29  -3 013.7  ~.38  -1140.0  ~.13  -4 711.5  ~.56  -2177.8  ~.24  -1882.7  ~.17 
Total  -4 052.5  -0.07  -6 688.2  ·0.12  ·11 635.7  ·0.20  ·9 383.1  ·0.15  ·2 735.0  ·0.04  ·3 747.1  ·0.05 
(1) For an explanation of the concepts see Annex 3. 
Table 6a 
"UK rebate" budgetary balance {before UK correction)<1) 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  % 
GNP  GNP  GNP  GNP  GNP  GNP 
8  1884.9  1.09  2 078.9  1.13  2037.5  1.03  2 530.5  1.20  2113.4  0.99  1 809.7  0.83 
DK  448.8  0.43  540.3  0.49  488.6  0.42  518.2  0.41  333.0  0.25  156.5  0.11 
D  -8 515.9  ~.55  -9762.2  ~.60  -10 643.8  -0.62  -11  704.5  -0.64  -10 559.3  -0.57  -10 962.5  -0.60 
GR  3 665.2  4.76  4176.6  5.27  3 990.2  4.76  3 580.3  4.05  4 058.8  4.18  4 360.5  4.12 
E  2 759.5  0.62  3 207.7  0.79  3 665.6  0.91  7 674.3  1.80  6067.1  1.33  5 756.9  1.24 
F  -1194.6  -0.12  - 201.2  -0.02  -1104.7  -0.10  -1 009.0  -0.09  - 448.8  -0.04  -1197.6  -0.10 
IRL  2 219.4  6.15  2 548.7  6.98  1969.0  4.95  2087.9  4.88  2 436.5  5.11  2 822.0  5.11 
I  3.1  0.00  - 784.4  -0.09  -1 274.2  -0.15  6.0  0.00  -1 440.4  -0.15  - 131.2  -0.01 
L  620.4  5.19  733.9  5.88  619.3  4.64  695.7  4.90  780.8  5.44  721.7  4.87 
NL  267.0  0.11  - 40.5  -0.02  - 301.7  -0.11  - 576.4  -0.19  -1 209.5  -0.39  -1 079.1  -0.34 
A  - - - - - - - 818.8  -0.46  - 220.9  -0.12  - 791.5  -0.44 
p  2 214.2  3.05  2 576.9  3.61  2 001.4  2.71  2 571.7  3.24  2 866.7  3.43  2714.8  3.12 
FIN  - - - - - - - 83.2  -0.09  107.2  0.11  46.7  0.05 
s  - - - - - - - 691.0  -0.41  - 543.3  -0.29  -1109.6  -0.58 
UK  -4371.7  -0.54  -5 074.4  -0.63  -1'447.1  -0.17  -4 781.7  -0.57  -4341.2  -0.48  -3117.3  -0.27 
Total  0.0  -·  0.0  - 0.0  ·- 0.0  - 0.0  - 0.0  -
1) Simplified calculation, see Annex 3, point 4.1. 
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Table 6b 
"UK rebate" budgetary balance (after UK correction)<1> 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  %  Mecus  % 
GNP  GNP  GNP  GNP  GNP  GNP 
B  1 740.8  1.00  1 928.4  1.05  1 924.0  0.97  2 455.2  1.16  1 961.1  0.91  1 712.0  0.79 
OK  359.5  0.35  444.3  0.41  417.0  0.36  471.1  0.37  238.0  0.18  93.8  0.07 
0  -9 214.4  -0.59  -10 544.8  -0.64  -11 227.9  -0.65  -12 090.9  -0.66  -11332.3  -0.62  -11  456.1  -0.62 
GR  3 609.4  4.69  4 118.4  5.20  3 945.5  4.71  3 548.2  4.02  3 992.2  4.11  4 314.5  4.07 
E  2 372.4  0.53  2 779.0  0.68  3 378.8  0.84  7 516.4  1.76  5 757.2  1.26  5 537.2  1.19 
F  -2 054.3  -0.20  -1134.7  -0.11  -1  798.0  -0.16  -1 444.3  -0.12  -1311.2  -0.11  -1 757.2  -0.14 
IRL  2192.1  6.08  2 518.6  6.90  1 947.6  4.90  2 072.3  4.85  2  404.3  5.05  2 800.8  5.07 
I  - 821.6  -0.09  -1  679.7  -0.20  -1 828.1  -0.22  - 317.6  -0.04  -2 091.3  -0.22  - 564.0  -0.06 
L  611.7  5.12  724.4  5.81  611.9  4.58  690.5  4.86  770.6  5.37  715.0  4.82 
NL  66.8  0.03  - 261.7  -0.10  - 468.2  -0.17  - 684.5  -0.23  -1428.1  -0.46  -1  224.0  -0.38 
A  - - - - - - 883.5  -0.50  - 351.6  -0.20  - 873.9  -0.48 
p  2 162.7  2.98  2 513.8  3.52  1 953.1  2.64  2 542.2  3.21  2 806.6  3.36  2 675.4  3.07 
FIN  - - - - - - - 116.0  -0.12  37.1  0.04  1.4  0.00 
s  - - - - - 754.1  -0.44  - 668.9  -0.35  -1195.0  -0.62 
UK  -1 024.7  -0.13  -1 405.8  -0.18  1144.4  0.13  -3 005.1  -0.36  - 783.5  -0.09  - 658.5  -0.06 
Total  0.0  -·  0.0  - 0.0  - 0.0  - 0.0  -·  0.0  -
1) Simplified calculation, see Annex 3, point 4.1. 
Table 7 
Size of the UK rebate 
Imbalance 
1  Correction  Imbalance less 
Other factors 
2  Budgeted 
correction  correction 
(1)  (2)  (3) =( 1)-(2)  (4)  (5) = (2)  +{4) 
Mecus  %GNP  Mecus  %GNP  Mecus  %GNP  Mecus  %GNP  Mecus  %GNP 
1985  2 847.0  0.50  1 879.0  0.33  968.0  0.17  -897.6  -0.16  981.4  0.16 
1986  2 748.0  0.46  1 813.7  0.30  934.3  0.16  57.4  0.01  1 871.1  0.33 
1987  3 310.1  0.50  2 194.7  0.33  1 115.4  0.17  -381.0  .{).06  1 813.7  0.30 
1988  3 943.0  0.57  2 150.6  0.31  1 792.4  0.26  44.0  0.01  2 194.6  0.32 
1989  4 272.3  0.57  2 516.6  0.34  1 755.7  0.24  -324.8  .{).04  2191.8  0.29 
1990  3 833.8  0.51  2 452.4  0.32  1 381.4  0.18  41.3  0.01  2 493.7  0.33 
1991  4 331.1  0.54  2 787.0  0.34  1 544.1  0.19  773.5  0.10  3 560.5  0.44 
1992  4 164.7  0.52  2 659.7  0.33  1 505.1  0.19  -86.4  .{).01  2 573.3  0.32 
1993  4 706.6  0.59  2 940.3  ·0.37  1 766.3  0.22  219.7  0.03  3 160.0  0.39 
1994  3 575.8  . 0.42  2 276.5  0.27  1 299.3  0.15  36.8  0.00  2 313.3  0.27 
1995  4 686.3  0.55  3 079.1  0.36  1 607.2  0.19  -1611.0  .{).19  1 468.1  0.17 
1996  4 570.6  0.50  2 856.5  0.31  1 714.1  0.19  88.8  0.01  2 945.3  0.32 
1997  3 442.7  0.30  1 977.5  0.17  1 465.2  0.13  481.3  0.04  2 458.8  0.22 
1998  6 945.0  0.56  3 931.2  0.32  3 013.8  0.24  -700.6  .{).06  3 230.6  0.26 
1)  The imbalance is calculated as in the "Mode de Cal cui", see Annex 4 
2)  Other factors  include the  adjustment for the definitive calculation  of the year "n-4" and  exchange rate effects(see 
Annex 4, page 3-4) 
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Table 8 
Gross national product at·current market prices per head of population 
(until1990: EUR-15 excluding East Germany= 100;  from1991: EUR-15 induding new Lander= 100; 1998-99: forecasts) 
ECU 
1980  1982  1984  1986  1988  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
B  121.3  103.8  101.0  104.0  102.9  104.0  106.0  108.5  115.3  117.9  121.5  117.4  112.8  111.4  110.8 
OK  126.1  124.6  131.1  139.7  134.9  127.8  124.3  125.7  132.8  134.7  140.2  138.8  137.4  137.6  138.8 
D  131.9  126.5  129.9  132.4  129.2  127.3  114.6  119.7  127.1  127;8  130.9  124.9  118.6  116.6  116.1 
GR  52.1  58.4  53.5  43.1  42.6  44.0  46.6  46.9  48.1  48.5  49.2  51.6  53.3  50.2  50.2 
E  55.8  55.5  52.3  53.7  58.3  66.7  71.4  71.6  65.9  62.2  63.4  64.5  62.6  63.0  63.9 
F  123.8  120.6  115.7  118.9  113.2  111.4  110.3  111.0  115.3  115.5  116.4  114.2  109.9  109.1  108.8 
IRL  57.7  . 64.2  61.9  61.4  58.0  61.3  62.4  63.8  64.4  66.9  69.1  73.1  79.9  79.4  82.7 
I  79.8  83.8  92.7  95.8  97.1  101.1  105.3  102.4  91.4  88.7  83.2  91.4  92.2  91.5  91.8 
L  157.8  163.1  171.4  179.4  173.3  184.0  192.3  191.6  197.6  199.5  201.8  192.1  186.4  186.1  186.2 
NL  120.9  115.8  112.0  111.1  102.9  100.7  101.2  102.1  109.4  110.7  113.7  111.7  108.1  108.0  108.4  . 
A  103.1  106.1  109.3  111.7  109.5  109.2  111.8  114.5  122.5  123.8  127.6  124.0  118.8  117.6  117.3 
p  28.5  29.9  26.2  29.6  31.5  35.8  41.5  46.4  45.7  45.3  46.8  47.0  46.7  46.8  47.6 
FIN  105.6  122.1  130.1  126.1  136.1  139.5  123.3  98:2  85.3  93.7  105.9  103.6  104.9  105.1  106.1 
s  149.9  142.1  144.5  140.9  139.8  137.8  142.4  134.3  110.4  110.9  111.7  118.4  114.2  114.3  115.0 
UK  95.2  102.9  98.6  89.5  96.2  89.1  91.2  87.4  86.9  88.5  83.8  85.8  101.8  106.7  106.2 
EUR-15  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
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Table 9 
Gross national product at curren~ market prices per head of population 
(until1990: EUR-15 exduding East Germany= 100;  from1991: EUR-15 including new Lander= 100; 1998-99: forecasts) 
PPS 
1980  1982  1984  1986  1988  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
B  108.5  107.9  106.8  104.1  104.7  105.3  109.2  111.8  116.7  116.6  115.7  115.2  115.3  115.3  115.2 
OK  102.9  103.7  106.7  109.6  104.6  100.6  102.4  100.5  107.0  108.5  110.8  111.6  112.5  112.7  112.9 
D  117.8  116.4  119.0  118.2  116.1  117.8  107.3  109.6  109.1  110.6  11Q.4  110.5  109.4  109.1  108.8 
GR  66.6  65.2  62.8  61.4  59.9  59.3  62.3  63.8  65.3  66.2  66.5  68.1  69.0  69.1  69.8 
E  70.0  69.7  69.0  69.5  72.1  74.2  79.4  n.4  78.3  75.7  76.8  77.3  77.7  78.8  79.8 
F  112.9  115.3  111.7  110.1  109.5  109.7  11M  110.8  108.5  106.8  1.06.7  104.6  104.3  104.4  104.3 
IRL  62.3  62.3  59.6  58.0  58.6  64.3  68.7  71.3  73.0  77.3  80.5  80.0  82.4  84.8  86.8 
I  102.1  101.9  101.9  102.4  102.9  101.9  105.5  104.8  102.4  103.1  103.7  103.2  102.6  102.5  102.7 
L  146.7  168.7  173.5  181.5  176.7  185.2  196.6  191.8  188.2  183.9  181.6  175.8  176.2  175.0  174.9 
NL  105.1  102.3  102.7  102.7  98.4  101.3  102.3  101.8  104.0  104.6  106.8  105.6  106.0  106.3  106.2 
A  104.9  106.5  106.1  105.2  103.5  105.8  108.8  109.0  112.3  112.0  111.1  113.1  112.6  112.5  112.4 
p  53.6  53.1  49.4  52.3  55.7  58.9  64.5  65.6  68.7  70.3  70.0  68.9  69.6  70.5  71.2 
FIN  94.9  98.3  99.1  99.1  101.3  99.9  91.1  84.0  87.5  87.8  93.6  93.2  96.4  98.4  99.4 
s  110.9  110.3  111.8  111.0  109.1  104.5  102.4  96.7  95.5  95.5  97.3  95.2  93.7  93.8  93.8 
UK  97.0  97.4  99.6  101.5  103.5  99.5  96.3  98.0  99.2  99.0  96.4  98.8  100.3  99.4  98.6 
EUR-15  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
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Table 10 
Gross National Product at current market prices 
(Ecu-Euro millions;  1998-1999: forecasts) 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
B  173 285  184 518  197 653  211  690  214466  217025  224 335  234 203 
OK  103 348  109 322  116 203  126 018  131 339  137 032  143 815  152 454 
D  .  1 533 230  1 636 447  1 725 209  1 837 598  1839972  1 837 908  1 892 649  1976634 
GR  76979  79 211  83 817  88 328  97098  105 948  104 786  110 127 
E  443957  408476  403 293  427168  455245  465 373  489 076  519 717 
F  1 012148  1 054 623  1108 652  1163 060  1198 541  1 217 015  1 268 038  1329741 
IRL  36070  36 518  39760  42752  47645  55273  57 871  63 702 
I  925 235  827 616  841  397  819 264  944 011  1 001  758  1 039694  1 094 776 
L  11954  12 478  13 350  14 210  14 356  14 825  15662  16 614 
NL  246 411  265427  282152  302185  311  923  318 548  334421  353054 
A  144 027  155 310  164 805  176 503  179687  181 492  188199  197137 
p  72485  71422  73 913  79 271  83476  87098  91326  97217 
FIN  78 691  68.572  79062  93 011  95509  101 827  106 880  113 306 
s  185 075  152 696  161 400  169937  189562  192 439  201 625  212725 
UK  806 011  802 726  856 957  844 401  907 294  1134 509  1246095  1 301 867 
EUR-15  5 848 906  5 865362  6147 623  6 395 397  6 710125  7 068 070  7 404472  7773274 
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Table 11 
Total population 
(1000) 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1.999 
B  10 045  10 085  10 116  10 137  10 157  10182  10 208  10 233 
DK  5 171  5189  5 205  5228  5262  5 278  5 298  5 316 
D  80 594  81179  81  422  81  661  81  895  82060  82250  82425 
GR  10 322  10 380  10 426  10 454  10 465  10 518  10 570  10 623 
E  39008  39 086  39150  39 210  39 270  39323  39 371  39 371 
F  57 374  57 654  57 900  58138  58375  58 607  58 877  59148 
IRL  3 555  3 574  3586  3 601  3 626  3 661  3696  3730 
I  56 859  57 049  57 204  57 301  57 403  57 506  57 609  57 714 
L  392  398  404  410  416  421  426  432 
NL  15182  15 290  15 381  15 460  15 523  15 603  15 692  15 761 
A  7 914  7 991  8 030  8047  8 059  8084  8108  8132 
p  9833  9840  9 840  9847  9 866  9 876  9886  9896 
FIN  5 042  5 067  5 088  5108  5125  5140  5155  5170 
s  8 668  8 718  8 782  8847  8 901  8 918  8 936  8954 
UK  58006  58 191  58 395  58606  58 782  58 977  59172  59367 
EUR-15  367 965  369 690  370 927  372 054  373124  374153  375 254  376 272 
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